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    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation · 801c6058
      Daniel Borkmann authored
      The current implemented mechanisms to mitigate data disclosure under
      speculation mainly address stack and map value oob access from the
      speculative domain. However, Piotr discovered that uninitialized BPF
      stack is not protected yet, and thus old data from the kernel stack,
      potentially including addresses of kernel structures, could still be
      extracted from that 512 bytes large window. The BPF stack is special
      compared to map values since it's not zero initialized for every
      program invocation, whereas map values /are/ zero initialized upon
      their initial allocation and thus cannot leak any prior data in either
      domain. In the non-speculative domain, the verifier ensures that every
      stack slot read must have a prior stack slot write by the BPF program
      to avoid such data leaking issue.
      
      However, this is not enough: for example, when the pointer arithmetic
      operation moves the stack pointer from the last valid stack offset to
      the first valid offset, the sanitation logic allows for any intermediate
      offsets during speculative execution, which could then be used to
      extract any restricted stack content via side-channel.
      
      Given for unprivileged stack pointer arithmetic the use of unknown
      but bounded scalars is generally forbidden, we can simply turn the
      register-based arithmetic operation into an immediate-based arithmetic
      operation without the need for masking. This also gives the benefit
      of reducing the needed instructions for the operation. Given after
      the work in 7fedb63a
      
       ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic
      mask"), the aux->alu_limit already holds the final immediate value for
      the offset register with the known scalar. Thus, a simple mov of the
      immediate to AX register with using AX as the source for the original
      instruction is sufficient and possible now in this case.
      
      Reported-by: default avatarPiotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
      Tested-by: default avatarPiotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarPiotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      801c6058