A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong
addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok
check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess
routines.

This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy
barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit.

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

In a similar manner to array_index_mask_nospec, this patch introduces an
assembly macro (mask_nospec64) which can be used to bound a value under
speculation. This macro is then used to ensure that the indirect branch
through the syscall table is bounded under speculation, with out-of-range
addresses speculating as calls to sys_io_setup (0).

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Similarly to x86, mitigate speculation past an access_ok() check by
masking the pointer against the address limit before use.

Even if we don't expect speculative writes per se, it is plausible that
a CPU may still speculate at least as far as fetching a cache line for
writing, hence we also harden put_user() and clear_user() for peace of
mind.

Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Currently, USER_DS represents an exclusive limit while KERNEL_DS is
inclusive. In order to do some clever trickery for speculation-safe
masking, we need them both to behave equivalently - there aren't enough
bits to make KERNEL_DS exclusive, so we have precisely one option. This
also happens to correct a longstanding false negative for a range
ending on the very top byte of kernel memory.

Mark Rutland points out that we've actually got the semantics of
addresses vs. segments muddled up in most of the places we need to
amend, so shuffle the {USER,KERNEL}_DS definitions around such that we
can correct those properly instead of just pasting "-1"s everywhere.

Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Provide an optimised, assembly implementation of array_index_mask_nospec()
for arm64 so that the compiler is not in a position to transform the code
in ways which affect its ability to inhibit speculation (e.g. by introducing
conditional branches).

This is similar to the sequence used by x86, modulo architectural differences
in the carry/borrow flags.

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

For CPUs capable of data value prediction, CSDB waits for any outstanding
predictions to architecturally resolve before allowing speculative execution
to continue. Provide macros to expose it to the arch code.

Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

The identity map is mapped as both writeable and executable by the
SWAPPER_MM_MMUFLAGS and this is relied upon by the kpti code to manage
a synchronisation flag. Update the .pushsection flags to reflect the
actual mapping attributes.

Reported-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

pte_to_phys lives in assembler.h and takes its destination register as
the first argument. Move phys_to_pte out of head.S to sit with its
counterpart and rejig it to follow the same calling convention.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

We don't fully understand the Cavium ThunderX erratum, but it appears
that mapping the kernel as nG can lead to horrible consequences such as
attempting to execute userspace from kernel context. Since kpti isn't
enabled for these CPUs anyway, simplify the comment justifying the lack
of post_ttbr_update_workaround in the exception trampoline.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Since AArch64 assembly instructions take the destination register as
their first operand, do the same thing for the phys_to_ttbr macro.

Acked-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Cavium ThunderX's erratum 27456 results in a corruption of icache
entries that are loaded from memory that is mapped as non-global
(i.e. ASID-tagged).

As KPTI is based on memory being mapped non-global, let's prevent
it from kicking in if this erratum is detected.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
[will: Update comment]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Defaulting to global mappings for kernel space is generally good for
performance and appears to be necessary for Cavium ThunderX. If we
subsequently decide that we need to enable kpti, then we need to rewrite
our existing page table entries to be non-global. This is fiddly, and
made worse by the possible use of contiguous mappings, which require
a strict break-before-make sequence.

Since the enable callback runs on each online CPU from stop_machine
context, we can have all CPUs enter the idmap, where secondaries can
wait for the primary CPU to rewrite swapper with its MMU off. It's all
fairly horrible, but at least it only runs once.

Tested-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Break-before-make is not needed when transitioning from Global to
Non-Global mappings, provided that the contiguous hint is not being used.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

To allow systems which do not require kpti to continue running with
global kernel mappings (which appears to be a requirement for Cavium
ThunderX due to a CPU erratum), make the use of nG in the kernel page
tables dependent on arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0(), which is resolved
at runtime.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

The ARM architecture defines the memory locations that are permitted
to be accessed as the result of a speculative instruction fetch from
an exception level for which all stages of translation are disabled.
Specifically, the core is permitted to speculatively fetch from the
4KB region containing the current program counter 4K and next 4K.

When translation is changed from enabled to disabled for the running
exception level (SCTLR_ELn[M] changed from a value of 1 to 0), the
Falkor core may errantly speculatively access memory locations outside
of the 4KB region permitted by the architecture. The errant memory
access may lead to one of the following unexpected behaviors.

1) A System Error Interrupt (SEI) being raised by the Falkor core due
   to the errant memory access attempting to access a region of memory
   that is protected by a slave-side memory protection unit.
2) Unpredictable device behavior due to a speculative read from device
   memory. This behavior may only occur if the instruction cache is
   disabled prior to or coincident with translation being changed from
   enabled to disabled.

The conditions leading to this erratum will not occur when either of the
following occur:
 1) A higher exception level disables translation of a lower exception level
   (e.g. EL2 changing SCTLR_EL1[M] from a value of 1 to 0).
 2) An exception level disabling its stage-1 translation if its stage-2
    translation is enabled (e.g. EL1 changing SCTLR_EL1[M] from a value of 1
    to 0 when HCR_EL2[VM] has a value of 1).

To avoid the errant behavior, software must execute an ISB immediately
prior to executing the MSR that will change SCTLR_ELn[M] from 1 to 0.

Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

If the spinlock "next" ticket wraps around between the initial LDR
and the cmpxchg in the LSE version of spin_trylock, then we can erroneously
think that we have successfuly acquired the lock because we only check
whether the next ticket return by the cmpxchg is equal to the owner ticket
in our updated lock word.

This patch fixes the issue by performing a full 32-bit check of the lock
word when trying to determine whether or not the CASA instruction updated
memory.

Reported-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

In cpu_do_switch_mm(.) with ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN=y we apply phys_to_ttbr
to a value that already has an ASID inserted into the upper bits. For
52-bit PA configurations this then can give us TTBR0_EL1 registers that
cause translation table walks to attempt to access non-zero PA[51:48]
spuriously. Ultimately leading to a Synchronous External Abort on level
1 translation.

This patch re-arranges the logic in cpu_do_switch_mm(.) such that
phys_to_ttbr is called before the ASID is inserted into the TTBR0 value.

Fixes: 6b88a32c

 ("arm64: kpti: Fix the interaction between ASID switching and software PAN")
Acked-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Tested-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Whitelist Broadcom Vulcan/Cavium ThunderX2 processors in
unmap_kernel_at_el0(). These CPUs are not vulnerable to
CVE-2017-5754 and do not need KPTI when KASLR is off.

Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jayachandran C <jnair@caviumnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Use PSCI based mitigation for speculative execution attacks targeting
the branch predictor. We use the same mechanism as the one used for
Cortex-A CPUs, we expect the PSCI version call to have a side effect
of clearing the BTBs.

Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jayachandran C <jnair@caviumnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

When a CPU is brought up after we have finalised the system
wide capabilities (i.e, features and errata), we make sure the
new CPU doesn't need a new errata work around which has not been
detected already. However we don't run enable() method on the new
CPU for the errata work arounds already detected. This could
cause the new CPU running without potential work arounds.
It is upto the "enable()" method to decide if this CPU should
do something about the errata.

Fixes: commit 6a6efbb4

 ("arm64: Verify CPU errata work arounds on hotplugged CPU")
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

We call arm64_apply_bp_hardening() from post_ttbr_update_workaround,
which has the unexpected consequence of being triggered on every
exception return to userspace when ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN is selected,
even if no context switch actually occured.

This is a bit suboptimal, and it would be more logical to only
invalidate the branch predictor when we actually switch to
a different mm.

In order to solve this, move the call to arm64_apply_bp_hardening()
into check_and_switch_context(), where we're guaranteed to pick
a different mm context.

Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

When booting a kernel without 52-bit PA support (e.g. a kernel with 4k
pages) on a system with 52-bit memory, the kernel will currently try to
use the 52-bit memory and crash. Fix this by ignoring any memory higher
than what the kernel supports.

Fixes: f77d2817

 ("arm64: enable 52-bit physical address support")
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

With ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN enabled, the exception entry code checks the
active ASID to decide whether user access was enabled (non-zero ASID)
when the exception was taken. On return from exception, if user access
was previously disabled, it re-instates TTBR0_EL1 from the per-thread
saved value (updated in switch_mm() or efi_set_pgd()).

Commit 7655abb9 ("arm64: mm: Move ASID from TTBR0 to TTBR1") makes a
TTBR0_EL1 + ASID switching non-atomic. Subsequently, commit 27a921e7
("arm64: mm: Fix and re-enable ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN") changes the
__uaccess_ttbr0_disable() function and asm macro to first write the
reserved TTBR0_EL1 followed by the ASID=0 update in TTBR1_EL1. If an
exception occurs between these two, the exception return code will
re-instate a valid TTBR0_EL1. Similar scenario can happen in
cpu_switch_mm() between setting the reserved TTBR0_EL1 and the ASID
update in cpu_do_switch_mm().

This patch reverts the entry.S check for ASID == 0 to TTBR0_EL1 and
disables the interrupts around the TTBR0_EL1 and ASID switching code in
__uaccess_ttbr0_disable(). It also ensures that, when returning from the
EFI runtime services, efi_set_pgd() doesn't leave a non-zero ASID in
TTBR1_EL1 by using uaccess_ttbr0_{enable,disable}.

The accesses to current_thread_info()->ttbr0 are updated to use
READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE.

As a safety measure, __uaccess_ttbr0_enable() always masks out any
existing non-zero ASID TTBR1_EL1 before writing in the new ASID.

Fixes: 27a921e7

 ("arm64: mm: Fix and re-enable ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN")
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Tested-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

ARMv8.2 adds a new bit HCR_EL2.TEA which routes synchronous external
aborts to EL2, and adds a trap control bit HCR_EL2.TERR which traps
all Non-secure EL1&0 error record accesses to EL2.

This patch enables the two bits for the guest OS, guaranteeing that
KVM takes external aborts and traps attempts to access the physical
error registers.

ERRIDR_EL1 advertises the number of error records, we return
zero meaning we can treat all the other registers as RAZ/WI too.

Signed-off-by: Dongjiu Geng <gengdongjiu@huawei.com>
[removed specific emulation, use trap_raz_wi() directly for everything,
 rephrased parts of the commit message]
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

We expect to have firmware-first handling of RAS SErrors, with errors
notified via an APEI method. For systems without firmware-first, add
some minimal handling to KVM.

There are two ways KVM can take an SError due to a guest, either may be a
RAS error: we exit the guest due to an SError routed to EL2 by HCR_EL2.AMO,
or we take an SError from EL2 when we unmask PSTATE.A from __guest_exit.

The current SError from EL2 code unmasks SError and tries to fence any
pending SError into a single instruction window. It then leaves SError
unmasked.

With the v8.2 RAS Extensions we may take an SError for a 'corrected'
error, but KVM is only able to handle SError from EL2 if they occur
during this single instruction window...

The RAS Extensions give us a new instruction to synchronise and
consume SErrors. The RAS Extensions document (ARM DDI0587),
'2.4.1 ESB and Unrecoverable errors' describes ESB as synchronising
SError interrupts generated by 'instructions, translation table walks,
hardware updates to the translation tables, and instruction fetches on
the same PE'. This makes ESB equivalent to KVMs existing
'dsb, mrs-daifclr, isb' sequence.

Use the alternatives to synchronise and consume any SError using ESB
instead of unmasking and taking the SError. Set ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT
in the exit_code so that we can restart the vcpu if it turns out this
SError has no impact on the vcpu.

Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

We expect to have firmware-first handling of RAS SErrors, with errors
notified via an APEI method. For systems without firmware-first, add
some minimal handling to KVM.

There are two ways KVM can take an SError due to a guest, either may be a
RAS error: we exit the guest due to an SError routed to EL2 by HCR_EL2.AMO,
or we take an SError from EL2 when we unmask PSTATE.A from __guest_exit.

For SError that interrupt a guest and are routed to EL2 the existing
behaviour is to inject an impdef SError into the guest.

Add code to handle RAS SError based on the ESR. For uncontained and
uncategorized errors arm64_is_fatal_ras_serror() will panic(), these
errors compromise the host too. All other error types are contained:
For the fatal errors the vCPU can't make progress, so we inject a virtual
SError. We ignore contained errors where we can make progress as if
we're lucky, we may not hit them again.

If only some of the CPUs support RAS the guest will see the cpufeature
sanitised version of the id registers, but we may still take RAS SError
on this CPU. Move the SError handling out of handle_exit() into a new
handler that runs before we can be preempted. This allows us to use
this_cpu_has_cap(), via arm64_is_ras_serror().

Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

When we exit a guest due to an SError the vcpu fault info isn't updated
with the ESR. Today this is only done for traps.

The v8.2 RAS Extensions define ISS values for SError. Update the vcpu's
fault_info with the ESR on SError so that handle_exit() can determine
if this was a RAS SError and decode its severity.

Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

If we deliver a virtual SError to the guest, the guest may defer it
with an ESB instruction. The guest reads the deferred value via DISR_EL1,
but the guests view of DISR_EL1 is re-mapped to VDISR_EL2 when HCR_EL2.AMO
is set.

Add the KVM code to save/restore VDISR_EL2, and make it accessible to
userspace as DISR_EL1.

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Prior to v8.2's RAS Extensions, the HCR_EL2.VSE 'virtual SError' feature
generated an SError with an implementation defined ESR_EL1.ISS, because we
had no mechanism to specify the ESR value.

On Juno this generates an all-zero ESR, the most significant bit 'ISV'
is clear indicating the remainder of the ISS field is invalid.

With the RAS Extensions we have a mechanism to specify this value, and the
most significant bit has a new meaning: 'IDS - Implementation Defined
Syndrome'. An all-zero SError ESR now means: 'RAS error: Uncategorized'
instead of 'no valid ISS'.

Add KVM support for the VSESR_EL2 register to specify an ESR value when
HCR_EL2.VSE generates a virtual SError. Change kvm_inject_vabt() to
specify an implementation-defined value.

We only need to restore the VSESR_EL2 value when HCR_EL2.VSE is set, KVM
save/restores this bit during __{,de}activate_traps() and hardware clears the
bit once the guest has consumed the virtual-SError.

Future patches may add an API (or KVM CAP) to pend a virtual SError with
a specified ESR.

Cc: Dongjiu Geng <gengdongjiu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Non-VHE systems take an exception to EL2 in order to world-switch into the
guest. When returning from the guest KVM implicitly restores the DAIF
flags when it returns to the kernel at EL1.

With VHE none of this exception-level jumping happens, so KVMs
world-switch code is exposed to the host kernel's DAIF values, and KVM
spills the guest-exit DAIF values back into the host kernel.
On entry to a guest we have Debug and SError exceptions unmasked, KVM
has switched VBAR but isn't prepared to handle these. On guest exit
Debug exceptions are left disabled once we return to the host and will
stay this way until we enter user space.

Add a helper to mask/unmask DAIF around VHE guests. The unmask can only
happen after the hosts VBAR value has been synchronised by the isb in
__vhe_hyp_call (via kvm_call_hyp()). Masking could be as late as
setting KVMs VBAR value, but is kept here for symmetry.

Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

KVM would like to consume any pending SError (or RAS error) after guest
exit. Today it has to unmask SError and use dsb+isb to synchronise the
CPU. With the RAS extensions we can use ESB to synchronise any pending
SError.

Add the necessary macros to allow DISR to be read and converted to an
ESR.

We clear the DISR register when we enable the RAS cpufeature, and the
kernel has not executed any ESB instructions. Any value we find in DISR
must have belonged to firmware. Executing an ESB instruction is the
only way to update DISR, so we can expect firmware to have handled
any deferred SError. By the same logic we clear DISR in the idle path.

Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

ARM v8.2 has a feature to add implicit error synchronization barriers
whenever the CPU enters or returns from an exception level. Add this to the
features we always enable. CPUs that don't support this feature will treat
the bit as RES0.

This feature causes RAS errors that are not yet visible to software to
become pending SErrors. We expect to have firmware-first RAS support
so synchronised RAS errors will be take immediately to EL3.
Any system without firmware-first handling of errors will take the SError
either immediatly after exception return, or when we unmask SError after
entry.S's work.

Adding IESB to the ELx flags causes it to be enabled by KVM and kexec
too.

Platform level RAS support may require additional firmware support.

Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm-arm/msg28192.html


Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Prior to v8.2, SError is an uncontainable fatal exception. The v8.2 RAS
extensions use SError to notify software about RAS errors, these can be
contained by the Error Syncronization Barrier.

An ACPI system with firmware-first may use SError as its 'SEI'
notification. Future patches may add code to 'claim' this SError as a
notification.

Other systems can distinguish these RAS errors from the SError ESR and
use the AET bits and additional data from RAS-Error registers to handle
the error. Future patches may add this kernel-first handling.

Without support for either of these we will panic(), even if we received
a corrected error. Add code to decode the severity of RAS errors. We can
safely ignore contained errors where the CPU can continue to make
progress. For all other errors we continue to panic().

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

ARM's v8.2 Extentions add support for Reliability, Availability and
Serviceability (RAS). On CPUs with these extensions system software
can use additional barriers to isolate errors and determine if faults
are pending. Add cpufeature detection.

Platform level RAS support may require additional firmware support.

Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
[Rebased added config option, reworded commit message]
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

__cpu_setup() configures SCTLR_EL1 using some hard coded hex masks,
and el2_setup() duplicates some this when setting RES1 bits.

Lets make this the same as KVM's hyp_init, which uses named bits.

First, we add definitions for all the SCTLR_EL{1,2} bits, the RES{1,0}
bits, and those we want to set or clear.

Add a build_bug checks to ensures all bits are either set or clear.
This means we don't need to preserve endian-ness configuration
generated elsewhere.

Finally, move the head.S and proc.S users of these hard-coded masks
over to the macro versions.

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

this_cpu_has_cap() tests caps->desc not caps->matches, so it stops
walking the list when it finds a 'silent' feature, instead of
walking to the end of the list.

Prior to v4.6's 644c2ae1 ("arm64: cpufeature: Test 'matches' pointer
to find the end of the list") we always tested desc to find the end of
a capability list. This was changed for dubious things like PAN_NOT_UAO.
v4.7's e3661b12

 ("arm64: Allow a capability to be checked on
single CPU") added this_cpu_has_cap() using the old desc style test.

CC: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

When refactoring the sigreturn code to handle SVE, I changed the
sigreturn implementation to store the new FPSIMD state from the
user sigframe into task_struct before reloading the state into the
CPU regs.  This makes it easier to convert the data for SVE when
needed.

However, it turns out that the fpsimd_state structure passed into
fpsimd_update_current_state is not fully initialised, so assigning
the structure as a whole corrupts current->thread.fpsimd_state.cpu
with uninitialised data.

This means that if the garbage data written to .cpu happens to be a
valid cpu number, and the task is subsequently migrated to the cpu
identified by the that number, and then tries to enter userspace,
the CPU FPSIMD regs will be assumed to be correct for the task and
not reloaded as they should be.  This can result in returning to
userspace with the FPSIMD registers containing data that is stale or
that belongs to another task or to the kernel.

Knowingly handing around a kernel structure that is incompletely
initialised with user data is a potential source of mistakes,
especially across source file boundaries.  To help avoid a repeat
of this issue, this patch adapts the relevant internal API to hand
around the user-accessible subset only: struct user_fpsimd_state.

To avoid future surprises, this patch also converts all uses of
struct fpsimd_state that really only access the user subset, to use
struct user_fpsimd_state.  A few missing consts are added to
function prototypes for good measure.

Thanks to Will for spotting the cause of the bug here.

Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

The PUD macros (PUD_TABLE_BIT, PUD_TYPE_MASK, PUD_TYPE_SECT) use the
pgdval_t even when pudval_t is available. Even though the underlying
type for both (u64) is the same it is confusing and may lead to issues
in the future.

Fix this by using pudval_t to define the PUD_* macros.

Fixes: 084bd298 ("ARM64: mm: HugeTLB support.")
Fixes: 206a2a73

 ("arm64: mm: Create gigabyte kernel logical mappings where possible")
Signed-off-by: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

It isn't entirely obvious if we're using software PAN because we
don't say anything about it in the boot log. But if we're using
hardware PAN we'll print a nice CPU feature message indicating
it. Add a print for software PAN too so we know if it's being
used or not.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

The 'pos' argument is used to select where in TCR to write the value:
the IPS or PS bitfield.

Fixes: 787fd1d0

 ("arm64: limit PA size to supported range")
Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>