configfs: fix kernel infoleak through user-controlled format string

Some modules call config_item_init_type_name() and config_group_init_type_name()
with parameter "name" directly controlled by userspace.  These two
functions call config_item_set_name() with this name used as a format
string, which can be used to leak information such as content of the
stack to userspace.

For example, make_netconsole_target() in netconsole module calls
config_item_init_type_name() with the name of a newly-created directory.
This means that the following commands give some unexpected output, with
configfs mounted in /sys/kernel/config/ and on a system with a
configured eth0 ethernet interface:

    # modprobe netconsole
    # mkdir /sys/kernel/config/netconsole/target_%lx
    # echo eth0 > /sys/kernel/config/netconsole/target_%lx/dev_name
    # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/netconsole/target_%lx/enabled
    # echo eth0 > /sys/kernel/config/netconsole/target_%lx/dev_name
    # dmesg |tail -n1
    [  142.697668] netconsole: target (target_ffffffffc0ae8080) is
    enabled, disable to update parameters

The directory name is correct but %lx has been interpreted in the
internal item name, displayed here in the error message used by
store_dev_name() in drivers/net/netconsole.c.

To fix this, update every caller of config_item_set_name to use "%s"
when operating on untrusted input.

This issue was found using -Wformat-security gcc flag, once a __printf
attribute has been added to config_item_set_name().

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>