- Jul 18, 2017
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Tom Lendacky authored
The SMP MP-table is built by UEFI and placed in memory in a decrypted state. These tables are accessed using a mix of early_memremap(), early_memunmap(), phys_to_virt() and virt_to_phys(). Change all accesses to use early_memremap()/early_memunmap(). This allows for proper setting of the encryption mask so that the data can be successfully accessed when SME is active. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d9464b0d7c861021ed8f494e4a40d6cd10f1eddd.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Boot data (such as EFI related data) is not encrypted when the system is booted because UEFI/BIOS does not run with SME active. In order to access this data properly it needs to be mapped decrypted. Update early_memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to modify the pagetable protection attributes before they are applied to the new mapping. This is used to remove the encryption mask for boot related data. Update memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to determine if RAM remapping is allowed. RAM remapping will cause an encrypted mapping to be generated. By preventing RAM remapping, ioremap_cache() will be used instead, which will provide a decrypted mapping of the boot related data. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/81fb6b4117a5df6b9f2eda342f81bbef4b23d2e5.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
When SME is active, pagetable entries created for EFI need to have the encryption mask set as necessary. When the new pagetable pages are allocated they are mapped encrypted. So, update the efi_pgt value that will be used in CR3 to include the encryption mask so that the PGD table can be read successfully. The pagetable mapping as well as the kernel are also added to the pagetable mapping as encrypted. All other EFI mappings are mapped decrypted (tables, etc.). Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9a8f4c502db4a84b09e2f0a1555bb75aa8b69785.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
The efi_mem_type() function currently returns a 0, which maps to EFI_RESERVED_TYPE, if the function is unable to find a memmap entry for the supplied physical address. Returning EFI_RESERVED_TYPE implies that a memmap entry exists, when it doesn't. Instead of returning 0, change the function to return a negative error value when no memmap entry is found. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7fbf40a9dc414d5da849e1ddcd7f7c1285e4e181.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Add a function that will determine if a supplied physical address matches the address of an EFI table. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e1e06441d80f44776df391e0e4cb485b345b7518.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Add a function that will return the E820 type associated with an address range. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b797aaa588803bf33263d5dd8c32377668fa931a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted state and are copied early in the boot process. The early page fault support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied. For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of the initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed properly. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bb0d430b41efefd45ee515aaf0979dcfda8b6a44.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Add support to be able to either encrypt or decrypt data in place during the early stages of booting the kernel. This does not change the memory encryption attribute - it is used for ensuring that data present in either an encrypted or decrypted memory area is in the proper state (for example the initrd will have been loaded by the boot loader and will not be encrypted, but the memory that it resides in is marked as encrypted). Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f9968e9432cd6c4b57ef245729be04ff18852225.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Add early_memremap() support to be able to specify encrypted and decrypted mappings with and without write-protection. The use of write-protection is necessary when encrypting data "in place". The write-protect attribute is considered cacheable for loads, but not stores. This implies that the hardware will never give the core a dirty line with this memtype. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/479b5832c30fae3efa7932e48f81794e86397229.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
The CR3 register entry can contain the SME encryption mask that indicates the PGD is encrypted. The encryption mask should not be used when creating a virtual address from the CR3 register, so remove the SME encryption mask in the read_cr3_pa() function. During early boot SME will need to use a native version of read_cr3_pa(), so create native_read_cr3_pa(). Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/767b085c384a46f67f451f8589903a462c7ff68a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these macros. Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization without the encryption mask before SME becomes active. Two new pgprot() macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask. The FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE define is introduced for use with MMIO. SME does not support encryption for MMIO areas so this define removes the encryption mask from the page attribute. Two new macros are introduced (__sme_pa() / __sme_pa_nodebug()) to allow creating a physical address with the encryption mask. These are used when working with the cr3 register so that the PGD can be encrypted. The current __va() macro is updated so that the virtual address is generated based off of the physical address without the encryption mask thus allowing the same virtual address to be generated regardless of whether encryption is enabled for that physical location or not. Also, an early initialization function is added for SME. If SME is active, this function: - Updates the early_pmd_flags so that early page faults create mappings with the encryption mask. - Updates the __supported_pte_mask to include the encryption mask. - Updates the protection_map entries to include the encryption mask so that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask applied. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b36e952c4c39767ae7f0a41cf5345adf27438480.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Create a pgd_pfn() macro similar to the p[4um]d_pfn() macros and then use the p[g4um]d_pfn() macros in the p[g4um]d_page() macros instead of duplicating the code. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e61eb533a6d0aac941db2723d8aa63ef6b882dee.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME). Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption. The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e52ad781f085224bf835b3caff9aa3aee6febccb.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Currently there is a check if the address being mapped is in the ISA range (is_ISA_range()), and if it is, then phys_to_virt() is used to perform the mapping. When SME is active, the default is to add pagetable mappings with the encryption bit set unless specifically overridden. The resulting pagetable mapping from phys_to_virt() will result in a mapping that has the encryption bit set. With SME, the use of ioremap() is intended to generate pagetable mappings that do not have the encryption bit set through the use of the PAGE_KERNEL_IO protection value. Rather than special case the SME scenario, remove the ISA range check and usage of phys_to_virt() and have ISA range mappings continue through the remaining ioremap() path. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/88ada7b09c6568c61cd696351eb59fb15a82ce1a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent patches to mark pages as encrypted. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a6c34d16caaed3bc3e2d6f0987554275bd291554.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
When System Memory Encryption (SME) is enabled, the physical address space is reduced. Adjust the x86_phys_bits value to reflect this reduction. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/593c037a3cad85ba92f3d061ffa7462e9ce3531d.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature. SME is identified by CPUID 0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of MSR_K8_SYSCFG). Only show the SME feature as available if reported by CPUID, enabled by BIOS and not configured as CONFIG_X86_32=y. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/85c17ff450721abccddc95e611ae8df3f4d9718b.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
The ioremap() function is intended for mapping MMIO. For RAM, the memremap() function should be used. Convert calls from ioremap() to memremap() when re-mapping RAM. This will be used later by SME to control how the encryption mask is applied to memory mappings, with certain memory locations being mapped decrypted vs encrypted. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b13fccb9abbd547a7eef7b1fdfc223431b211c88.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
For processors that support PAT, set the write-protect cache mode (_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP) entry to the actual write-protect value (x05). Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ade53b63d4dbffbfc3cb08fb62024647059c8688.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Tom Lendacky authored
Create a Documentation entry to describe the AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature and add documentation for the mem_encrypt= kernel parameter. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ca0a0c13b055fd804cfc92cbaca8acd68057eed0.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Ingo Molnar authored
The SME patches we are about to apply add some E820 logic, so merge in pending E820 code changes first, to have a single code base. Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Baoquan He authored
Now process_e820_entry() is not limited to e820 entry processing, rename it to process_mem_region(). And adjust the code comment accordingly. Signed-off-by:
Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: thgarnie@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1499603862-11516-4-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Baoquan He authored
This makes process_e820_entry() be able to process any kind of memory region. Signed-off-by:
Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: thgarnie@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1499603862-11516-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Baoquan He authored
The original function process_e820_entry() only takes care of each e820 entry passed. And move the E820_TYPE_RAM checking logic into process_e820_entries(). And remove the redundent local variable 'addr' definition in find_random_phys_addr(). Signed-off-by:
Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: thgarnie@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1499603862-11516-2-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/sparcLinus Torvalds authored
Pull sparc fixes from David Miller: - Fix DMA regression in 4.13 merge window, only certain chips can do 64-bit DMA. From Dave Dushar. - Correct cpu cross-call algorithm to correctly detect stalled or stuck remote cpus, from Jane Chu. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/sparc: sparc64: Measure receiver forward progress to avoid send mondo timeout SPARC64: Fix sun4v DMA panic
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull irq fix from Thomas Gleixner: "Fix the fallout from reworking the locking and resource management in request/free_irq()" * 'irq-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: genirq: Keep chip buslock across irq_request/release_resources()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull SMP fix from Thomas Gleixner: "Replace the bogus BUG_ON in the cpu hotplug code" * 'smp-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: smp/hotplug: Replace BUG_ON and react useful
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Linus Torvalds authored
Merge tag 'regmap-fix-w1-merge-window' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/regmap Pull regmap fix from Mark Brown: "Fix build due to w1 header refactoring The regmap support for w1 was added shortly before a reorganization of the w1 headers. While this was noticed before the merge window and efforts made to get it resolved in what was sent that managed to fall through the cracks, this cleans up and updates things so we look for the header in the new location. It didn't cause build failures as the driver that's going to be the first user got held up with other review issues" * tag 'regmap-fix-w1-merge-window' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/regmap: regmap: regmap-w1: Fix build troubles
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsiLinus Torvalds authored
Pull SCSI fixes from James Bottomley: "This is actually just a small set of mainly bug fixes for the original merge window code plus a few trivial updates and qedi boot from SAN support feature patch" * tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi: scsi: libfc: pass an error pointer to fc_disc_error() scsi: hisi_sas: make several const arrays static scsi: qla2xxx: Off by one in qlt_ctio_to_cmd() scsi: sg: fix SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV transfers scsi: virtio_scsi: always read VPD pages for multiqueue too scsi: qedf: fix spelling mistake: "offlading" -> "offloading" scsi: qedi: fix another spelling mistake: "alloction" -> "allocation" scsi: isci: fix typo in function names scsi: cxlflash: return -EFAULT if copy_from_user() fails scsi: qedi: Add support for Boot from SAN over iSCSI offload
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Geert Uytterhoeven authored
Several variables had their types changed from unsigned long to u32, but the printk()-style format to print them wasn't updated, leading to: arch/blackfin/kernel/flat.c: In function 'bfin_get_addr_from_rp': arch/blackfin/kernel/flat.c:35:3: warning: format '%lx' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 2 has type 'u32' [-Wformat] arch/blackfin/kernel/flat.c: In function 'bfin_put_addr_at_rp': arch/blackfin/kernel/flat.c:80:3: warning: format '%lx' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 2 has type 'u32' [-Wformat] Fixes: 468138d7 ("binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail") Signed-off-by:
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- Jul 17, 2017
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minimumlaw@rambler.ru authored
Fixes: cc5d0db3 ("regmap: Add 1-Wire bus support") Commit de0d6dbd ("w1: Add subsystem kernel public interface") Fix place off w1.h header file Cosmetic: Fix company name (local to international) Signed-off-by:
Alex A. Mihaylov <minimumlaw@rambler.ru> Signed-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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Geert Uytterhoeven authored
In file included from include/linux/flat.h:13:0, from fs/binfmt_flat.c:36: arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h: In function 'flat_get_addr_from_rp': arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h:28:3: error: expected ')' before 'val' val &= 0x00ffffff; ^ arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h:31:1: error: expected expression before '}' token } ^ In file included from include/linux/flat.h:13:0, from fs/binfmt_flat.c:36: arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h:26:6: warning: unused variable 'val' [-Wunused-variable] u32 val = get_unaligned((__force u32 *)rp); ^ In file included from include/linux/flat.h:13:0, from fs/binfmt_flat.c:36: arch/h8300/include/asm/flat.h:31:1: warning: no return statement in function returning non-void [-Wreturn-type] } ^ Reported-by:
kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Fixes: 468138d7 ("binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail") Signed-off-by:
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Geert Uytterhoeven authored
Several variables had their types changed from unsigned long to u32, but the arch-specific implementations of flat_set_persistent() weren't updated, leading to compiler warnings on blackfin and m68k: fs/binfmt_flat.c: In function ‘load_flat_file’: fs/binfmt_flat.c:799: warning: passing argument 2 of ‘flat_set_persistent’ from incompatible pointer type Fixes: 468138d7 ("binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail") Signed-off-by:
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Geert Uytterhoeven authored
Several variables had their types changed from unsigned long to u32, but the printk()-style format to print them wasn't updated, leading to: fs/binfmt_flat.c: In function ‘load_flat_file’: fs/binfmt_flat.c:577: warning: format ‘%ld’ expects type ‘long int’, but argument 3 has type ‘u32’ Fixes: 468138d7 ("binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail") Signed-off-by:
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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- Jul 16, 2017
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Linus Torvalds authored
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git://git.lwn.net/linuxLinus Torvalds authored
Pull documentation format standardization from Jonathan Corbet: "This series converts a number of top-level documents to the RST format without incorporating them into the Sphinx tree. The hope is to bring some uniformity to kernel documentation and, perhaps more importantly, have our existing docs serve as an example of the desired formatting for those that will be added later. Mauro has gone through and fixed up a lot of top-level documentation files to make them conform to the RST format, but without moving or renaming them in any way. This will help when we incorporate the ones we want to keep into the Sphinx doctree, but the real purpose is to bring a bit of uniformity to our documentation and let the top-level docs serve as examples for those writing new ones" * tag 'standardize-docs' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (84 commits) docs: kprobes.txt: Fix whitespacing tee.txt: standardize document format cgroup-v2.txt: standardize document format dell_rbu.txt: standardize document format zorro.txt: standardize document format xz.txt: standardize document format xillybus.txt: standardize document format vfio.txt: standardize document format vfio-mediated-device.txt: standardize document format unaligned-memory-access.txt: standardize document format this_cpu_ops.txt: standardize document format svga.txt: standardize document format static-keys.txt: standardize document format smsc_ece1099.txt: standardize document format SM501.txt: standardize document format siphash.txt: standardize document format sgi-ioc4.txt: standardize document format SAK.txt: standardize document format rpmsg.txt: standardize document format robust-futexes.txt: standardize document format ...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/randomLinus Torvalds authored
Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o: "Add wait_for_random_bytes() and get_random_*_wait() functions so that callers can more safely get random bytes if they can block until the CRNG is initialized. Also print a warning if get_random_*() is called before the CRNG is initialized. By default, only one single-line warning will be printed per boot. If CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is defined, then a warning will be printed for each function which tries to get random bytes before the CRNG is initialized. This can get spammy for certain architecture types, so it is not enabled by default" * tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random: random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness net/route: use get_random_int for random counter net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfsLinus Torvalds authored
Pull ->s_options removal from Al Viro: "Preparations for fsmount/fsopen stuff (coming next cycle). Everything gets moved to explicit ->show_options(), killing ->s_options off + some cosmetic bits around fs/namespace.c and friends. Basically, the stuff needed to work with fsmount series with minimum of conflicts with other work. It's not strictly required for this merge window, but it would reduce the PITA during the coming cycle, so it would be nice to have those bits and pieces out of the way" * 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: isofs: Fix isofs_show_options() VFS: Kill off s_options and helpers orangefs: Implement show_options 9p: Implement show_options isofs: Implement show_options afs: Implement show_options affs: Implement show_options befs: Implement show_options spufs: Implement show_options bpf: Implement show_options ramfs: Implement show_options pstore: Implement show_options omfs: Implement show_options hugetlbfs: Implement show_options VFS: Don't use save/replace_mount_options if not using generic_show_options VFS: Provide empty name qstr VFS: Make get_filesystem() return the affected filesystem VFS: Clean up whitespace in fs/namespace.c and fs/super.c Provide a function to create a NUL-terminated string from unterminated data
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfsLinus Torvalds authored
Pull more __copy_.._user elimination from Al Viro. * 'work.__copy_to_user' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: drm_dp_aux_dev: switch to read_iter/write_iter
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfsLinus Torvalds authored
Pull uacess-unaligned removal from Al Viro: "That stuff had just one user, and an exotic one, at that - binfmt_flat on arm and m68k" * 'work.uaccess-unaligned' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: kill {__,}{get,put}_user_unaligned() binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail
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