vmalloc() is a bit slow, and pounding vmalloc()/vfree() will eventually
force a global TLB flush.

To reduce pressure on them, if CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y, cache two thread
stacks per CPU.  This will let us quickly allocate a hopefully
cache-hot, TLB-hot stack under heavy forking workloads (shell script style).

On my silly pthread_create() benchmark, it saves about 2 µs per
pthread_create()+join() with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/94811d8e3994b2e962f88866290017d498eb069c.1474003868.git.luto@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

We currently keep every task's stack around until the task_struct
itself is freed.  This means that we keep the stack allocation alive
for longer than necessary and that, under load, we free stacks in
big batches whenever RCU drops the last task reference.  Neither of
these is good for reuse of cache-hot memory, and freeing in batches
prevents us from usefully caching small numbers of vmalloced stacks.

On architectures that have thread_info on the stack, we can't easily
change this, but on architectures that set THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK, we
can free it as soon as the task is dead.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/08ca06cde00ebed0046c5d26cbbf3fbb7ef5b812.1474003868.git.luto@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This will avoid a potential read-after-free if collect_syscall()
(e.g. /proc/PID/syscall) is called on an exiting task.

Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0bfd8e6d4729c97745d3781a29610a33d0a8091d.1474003868.git.luto@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

This will prevent a crash if get_wchan() runs after the task stack
is freed.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/337aeca8614024aa4d8d9c81053bbf8fcffbe4ad.1474003868.git.luto@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Specifically, pin the stack in save_stack_trace_tsk() and
show_trace_log_lvl().

This will prevent a crash if the target task dies before or while
dumping its stack once we start freeing task stacks early.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cf0082cde65d1941a996d026f2b2cdbfaca17bfa.1474003868.git.luto@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

get_task_struct(tsk) no longer pins tsk->stack so all users of
to_live_kthread() should do try_get_task_stack/put_task_stack to protect
"struct kthread" which lives on kthread's stack.

TODO: Kill to_live_kthread(), perhaps we can even kill "struct kthread" too,
and rework kthread_stop(), it can use task_work_add() to sync with the exiting
kernel thread.

Message-Id: <20160629180357.GA7178@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/cb9b16bbc19d4aea4507ab0552e4644c1211d130.1474003868.git.luto@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

There are a few places in the kernel that access stack memory
belonging to a different task.  Before we can start freeing task
stacks before the task_struct is freed, we need a way for those code
paths to pin the stack.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/17a434f50ad3d77000104f21666575e10a9c1fbd.1474003868.git.luto@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

When I rebased my thread_info changes onto Brian's switch_to()
changes, I carefully checked that I fixed up all the code correctly,
but I missed a comment :(

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 15f4eae7 ("x86: Move thread_info into task_struct")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/089fe1e1cbe8b258b064fccbb1a5a5fd23861031.1474003868.git.luto@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The semaphore used by the AMD IOMMU to signal command
completion lived on the stack until now, which was safe as
the driver busy-waited on the semaphore with IRQs disabled,
so the stack can't go away under the driver.

But the recently introduced vmap-based stacks break this as
the physical address of the semaphore can't be determinded
easily anymore. The driver used the __pa() macro, but that
only works in the direct-mapping. The result were
Completion-Wait timeout errors seen by the IOMMU driver,
breaking system boot.

Since putting the semaphore on the stack is bad design
anyway, move the semaphore into 'struct amd_iommu'. It is
protected by the per-iommu lock and now in the direct
mapping again. This fixes the Completion-Wait timeout errors
and makes AMD IOMMU systems boot again with vmap-based
stacks enabled.

Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Now that most of the thread_info users have been cleaned up,
this is straightforward.

Most of this code was written by Linus.

Originally-from: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a50eab40abeaec9cb9a9e3cbdeafd32190206654.1473801993.git.luto@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

If an arch opts in by setting CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT,
then thread_info is defined as a single 'u32 flags' and is the first
entry of task_struct.  thread_info::task is removed (it serves no
purpose if thread_info is embedded in task_struct), and
thread_info::cpu gets its own slot in task_struct.

This is heavily based on a patch written by Linus.

Originally-from: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a0898196f0476195ca02713691a5037a14f2aac5.1473801993.git.luto@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@ke...>

thread_info may move in the future, so use the accessors.

[ Andy Lutomirski wrote this changelog message and changed
  "task_thread_info(child)->cpu" to "task_cpu(child)". ]

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3439705d9838940cc82733a7335fa8c654c37db8.1473801993.git.luto@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

It was a nice optimization while it lasted, but thread_info is moving
and this optimization will no longer work.

Quoting Linus:

    Oh Gods, Andy. That pt_regs_to_thread_info() thing made me want
    to do unspeakable acts on a poor innocent wax figure that looked
    _exactly_ like you.

[ Changelog written by Andy. ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/6376aa81c68798cc81631673f52bd91a3e078944.1473801993.git.luto@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Because sched.h and thread_info.h are a tangled mess, I turned
in_compat_syscall() into a macro.  If we had current_thread_struct()
or similar and we could use it from thread_info.h, then this would
be a bit cleaner.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ccc8a1b2f41f9c264a41f771bb4a6539a642ad72.1473801993.git.luto@kernel.org


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

in_exception_stack() has some recursion checking which makes sure the
stack trace code never traverses a given exception stack more than once.
This prevents an infinite loop if corruption somehow causes a stack's
"next stack" pointer to point to itself (directly or indirectly).

The recursion checking can be useful for other stacks in addition to the
exception stack, so extend it to work for all stacks.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/95de5db4cfe111754845a5cef04e20630d01423f.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

When an interrupt happens in entry code while running on a software IRQ
stack, and the IRQ stack was empty, regs->sp will contain the stack end
address (e.g., irq_stack_ptr).  If the regs are passed to dump_trace(),
get_stack_info() will report STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN, causing dump_trace() to
return prematurely without trying to go to the next stack.

Update the bounds checking for software interrupt stacks so that the
ending address is now considered part of the stack.

This means that it's now possible for the 'walk_stack' callbacks --
print_context_stack() and print_context_stack_bp() -- to be called with
an empty stack.  But that's fine; they're already prepared to deal with
that due to their on_stack() checks.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5a5e5de92dcf11e8dc6b6e8e50ad7639d067830b.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

valid_stack_ptr() is buggy: it assumes that all stacks are of size
THREAD_SIZE, which is not true for exception stacks.  So the
walk_stack() callbacks will need to know the location of the beginning
of the stack as well as the end.

Another issue is that in general the various features of a stack (type,
size, next stack pointer, description string) are scattered around in
various places throughout the stack dump code.

Encapsulate all that information in a single place with a new stack_info
struct and a get_stack_info() interface.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8164dd0db96b7e6a279fa17ae5e6dc375eecb4a9.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

in_exception_stack() does some bad, bad things just so the unwinder can
print different values for different areas of the debug exception stack.

There's no need to clarify where exactly on the stack it is.  Just print
"#DB" and be done with it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e91cb410169dd576678dd427c35efb716fd0cee1.1473905218.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Pull PCI fixes from Bjorn Helgaas:
 "Here are two changes for v4.8.  The first fixes a "[Firmware Bug]: reg
  0x10: invalid BAR (can't size)" warning on Haswell, and the second
  fixes a problem in some new runtime suspend functionality we merged
  for v4.8.  Summary:

  Enumeration:
    Mark Haswell Power Control Unit as having non-compliant BARs (Bjorn Helgaas)

  Power management:
    Fix bridge_d3 update on device removal (Lukas Wunner)"

* tag 'pci-v4.8-fixes-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/helgaas/pci:
  PCI: Fix bridge_d3 update on device removal
  PCI: Mark Haswell Power Control Unit as having non-compliant BARs

Pull uaccess fixes from Al Viro:
 "Fixes for broken uaccess primitives - mostly lack of proper zeroing
  in copy_from_user()/get_user()/__get_user(), but for several
  architectures there's more (broken clear_user() on frv and
  strncpy_from_user() on hexagon)"

* 'uaccess-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (28 commits)
  avr32: fix copy_from_user()
  microblaze: fix __get_user()
  microblaze: fix copy_from_user()
  m32r: fix __get_user()
  blackfin: fix copy_from_user()
  sparc32: fix copy_from_user()
  sh: fix copy_from_user()
  sh64: failing __get_user() should zero
  score: fix copy_from_user() and friends
  score: fix __get_user/get_user
  s390: get_user() should zero on failure
  ppc32: fix copy_from_user()
  parisc: fix copy_from_user()
  openrisc: fix copy_from_user()
  nios2: fix __get_user()
  nios2: copy_from_user() should zero the tail of destination
  mn10300: copy_from_user() should zero on access_ok() failure...
  mn10300: failing __get_user() and get_user() should zero
  mips: copy_from_user() must zero the destination on access_ok() failure
  ARC: uaccess: get_user to zero out dest in cause of fault
  ...

Pull xen regression fix from David Vrabel:
 "Fix SMP boot in arm guests"

* tag 'for-linus-4.8b-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
  arm/xen: fix SMP guests boot

show_stack_log_lvl() and dump_trace() are already preemption safe:

- If they're running in irq or exception context, preemption is already
  disabled and the percpu stack pointers can be trusted.

- If they're running with preemption enabled, they must be running on
  the task stack anyway, so it doesn't matter if they're comparing the
  stack pointer against a percpu stack pointer from this CPU or another
  one: either way it won't match.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Byungchul Park <byungchul.park@lge.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a0ca0b1044eca97d4f0ec7c1619cf80b3b65560d.1473371307.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Commit 88e957d6

 ("xen: introduce xen_vcpu_id mapping") broke SMP
ARM guests on Xen. When FIFO-based event channels are in use (this is
the default), evtchn_fifo_alloc_control_block() is called on
CPU_UP_PREPARE event and this happens before we set up xen_vcpu_id
mapping in xen_starting_cpu. Temporary fix the issue by setting direct
Linux CPU id <-> Xen vCPU id mapping for all possible CPUs at boot. We
don't currently support kexec/kdump on Xen/ARM so these ids always
match.

In future, we have several ways to solve the issue, e.g.:

- Eliminate all hypercalls from CPU_UP_PREPARE, do them from the
  starting CPU. This can probably be done for both x86 and ARM and, if
  done, will allow us to get Xen's idea of vCPU id from CPUID/MPIDR on
  the starting CPU directly, no messing with ACPI/device tree
  required.

- Save vCPU id information from ACPI/device tree on ARM and use it to
  initialize xen_vcpu_id mapping. This is the same trick we currently
  do on x86.

Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Tested-by: Wei Chen <Wei.Chen@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>

really ugly, but apparently avr32 compilers turns access_ok() into
something so bad that they want it in assembler.  Left that way,
zeroing added in inline wrapper.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

It could be done in exception-handling bits in __get_user_b() et.al.,
but the surgery involved would take more knowledge of sh64 details
than I have or _want_ to have.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

* should zero on any failure
* __get_user() should use __copy_from_user(), not copy_from_user()

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

should clear on access_ok() failures.  Also remove the useless
range truncation logics.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

... that should zero on faults.  Also remove the <censored> helpful
logics wrt range truncation copied from ppc32.  Where it had ever
been needed only in case of copy_from_user() *and* had not been merged
into the mainline until a month after the need had disappeared.
A decade before openrisc went into mainline, I might add...

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

a) should not leave crap on fault
b) should _not_ require access_ok() in any cases.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>