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Commit 931ab636 authored by Peter Zijlstra's avatar Peter Zijlstra
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x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT



Implement an alternative CFI scheme that merges both the fine-grained
nature of kCFI but also takes full advantage of the coarse grained
hardware CFI as provided by IBT.

To contrast:

  kCFI is a pure software CFI scheme and relies on being able to read
text -- specifically the instruction *before* the target symbol, and
does the hash validation *before* doing the call (otherwise control
flow is compromised already).

  FineIBT is a software and hardware hybrid scheme; by ensuring every
branch target starts with a hash validation it is possible to place
the hash validation after the branch. This has several advantages:

   o the (hash) load is avoided; no memop; no RX requirement.

   o IBT WAIT-FOR-ENDBR state is a speculation stop; by placing
     the hash validation in the immediate instruction after
     the branch target there is a minimal speculation window
     and the whole is a viable defence against SpectreBHB.

   o Kees feels obliged to mention it is slightly more vulnerable
     when the attacker can write code.

Obviously this patch relies on kCFI, but additionally it also relies
on the padding from the call-depth-tracking patches. It uses this
padding to place the hash-validation while the call-sites are
re-written to modify the indirect target to be 16 bytes in front of
the original target, thus hitting this new preamble.

Notably, there is no hardware that needs call-depth-tracking (Skylake)
and supports IBT (Tigerlake and onwards).

Suggested-by: default avatarJoao Moreira (Intel) <joao@overdrivepizza.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221027092842.634714496@infradead.org
parent 9a479f76
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