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Commit 53936b5b authored by Thomas Huth's avatar Thomas Huth Committed by Christian Borntraeger
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KVM: s390: Do not leak kernel stack data in the KVM_S390_INTERRUPT ioctl



When the userspace program runs the KVM_S390_INTERRUPT ioctl to inject
an interrupt, we convert them from the legacy struct kvm_s390_interrupt
to the new struct kvm_s390_irq via the s390int_to_s390irq() function.
However, this function does not take care of all types of interrupts
that we can inject into the guest later (see do_inject_vcpu()). Since we
do not clear out the s390irq values before calling s390int_to_s390irq(),
there is a chance that we copy random data from the kernel stack which
could be leaked to the userspace later.

Specifically, the problem exists with the KVM_S390_INT_PFAULT_INIT
interrupt: s390int_to_s390irq() does not handle it, and the function
__inject_pfault_init() later copies irq->u.ext which contains the
random kernel stack data. This data can then be leaked either to
the guest memory in __deliver_pfault_init(), or the userspace might
retrieve it directly with the KVM_S390_GET_IRQ_STATE ioctl.

Fix it by handling that interrupt type in s390int_to_s390irq(), too,
and by making sure that the s390irq struct is properly pre-initialized.
And while we're at it, make sure that s390int_to_s390irq() now
directly returns -EINVAL for unknown interrupt types, so that we
immediately get a proper error code in case we add more interrupt
types to do_inject_vcpu() without updating s390int_to_s390irq()
sometime in the future.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: default avatarDavid Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJanosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20190912115438.25761-1-thuth@redhat.com


Signed-off-by: default avatarChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
parent 13a17cc0
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