- Feb 01, 2024
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Bingbu Cao authored
[ Upstream commit 7b0454cf ] As the sensor device maybe accessible right after its async sub-device is registered, such as ipu-bridge will try to power up sensor by sensor's client device's runtime PM from the async notifier callback, if runtime PM is not enabled, it will fail. So runtime PM should be ready before its async sub-device is registered and accessible by others. Fixes: 7ee85054 ("media: Add sensor driver support for the ov13b10 camera.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bingbu Cao <bingbu.cao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Arec Kao authored
[ Upstream commit 1af2f618 ] Tell ACPI device PM code that the driver supports the device being in non-zero ACPI D state when the driver's probe function is entered. Also do identification on the first access of the device, whether in probe or when starting streaming. Signed-off-by: Arec Kao <arec.kao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: 7b0454cf ("media: ov13b10: Enable runtime PM before registering async sub-device") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Gao Xiang authored
[ Upstream commit 3c12466b ] Currently EROFS can map another compressed buffer for inplace decompression, that was used to handle the cases that some pages of compressed data are actually not in-place I/O. However, like most simple LZ77 algorithms, LZ4 expects the compressed data is arranged at the end of the decompressed buffer and it explicitly uses memmove() to handle overlapping: __________________________________________________________ |_ direction of decompression --> ____ |_ compressed data _| Although EROFS arranges compressed data like this, it typically maps two individual virtual buffers so the relative order is uncertain. Previously, it was hardly observed since LZ4 only uses memmove() for short overlapped literals and x86/arm64 memmove implementations seem to completely cover it up and they don't have this issue. Juhyung reported that EROFS data corruption can be found on a new Intel x86 processor. After some analysis, it seems that recent x86 processors with the new FSRM feature expose this issue with "rep movsb". Let's strictly use the decompressed buffer for lz4 inplace decompression for now. Later, as an useful improvement, we could try to tie up these two buffers together in the correct order. Reported-and-tested-by: Juhyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAD14+f2AVKf8Fa2OO1aAUdDNTDsVzzR6ctU_oJSmTyd6zSYR2Q@mail.gmail.com Fixes: 0ffd71bc ("staging: erofs: introduce LZ4 decompression inplace") Fixes: 598162d0 ("erofs: support decompress big pcluster for lz4 backend") Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+ Tested-by: Yifan Zhao <zhaoyifan@sjtu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206045534.3920847-1-hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Gao Xiang authored
[ Upstream commit 123ec246 ] It's unnecessary to use kmap_atomic() compared with kmap_local_page(). In addition, kmap_atomic() is deprecated now. Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Yue Hu <huyue2@coolpad.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230627161240.331-1-hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com> Stable-dep-of: 3c12466b ("erofs: fix lz4 inplace decompression") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Ma Jun authored
commit ca1ffb17 upstream. The power source flag should be updated when [1] System receives an interrupt indicating that the power source has changed. [2] System resumes from suspend or runtime suspend Signed-off-by: Ma Jun <Jun.Ma2@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Lijo Lazar <lijo.lazar@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Nicholas Kazlauskas authored
commit 4b56f7d4 upstream. [Why] We can experience DENTIST hangs during optimize_bandwidth or TDRs if FIFO is toggled and hangs. [How] Port the DCN35 fixes to DCN314. Cc: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Charlene Liu <charlene.liu@amd.com> Acked-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas <nicholas.kazlauskas@amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit 28d3d069 upstream. The i2c_master_send/recv() functions return negative error codes or they return "len" on success. So the error handling here can be written as just normal checks for "if (ret < 0) return ret;". No need to complicate things. Btw, in this code the "len" parameter can never be zero, but even if it were, then I feel like this would still be the best way to write it. Fixes: 91443799 ("drm/bridge: nxp-ptn3460: fix i2c_master_send() error checking") Suggested-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Robert Foss <rfoss@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Robert Foss <rfoss@kernel.org> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/04242630-42d8-4920-8c67-24ac9db6b3c9@moroto.mountain Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Nathan Chancellor authored
commit 416de024 upstream. When booting a kernel with CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, there is a CFI failure when accessing any of the values under /sys/devices/system/cpu/intel_uncore_frequency/package_00_die_00: $ cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/intel_uncore_frequency/package_00_die_00/max_freq_khz fish: Job 1, 'cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/int…' terminated by signal SIGSEGV (Address boundary error) $ sudo dmesg &| grep 'CFI failure' [ 170.953925] CFI failure at kobj_attr_show+0x19/0x30 (target: show_max_freq_khz+0x0/0xc0 [intel_uncore_frequency_common]; expected type: 0xd34078c5 The sysfs callback functions such as show_domain_id() are written as if they are going to be called by dev_attr_show() but as the above message shows, they are instead called by kobj_attr_show(). kCFI checks that the destination of an indirect jump has the exact same type as the prototype of the function pointer it is called through and fails when they do not. These callbacks are called through kobj_attr_show() because uncore_root_kobj was initialized with kobject_create_and_add(), which means uncore_root_kobj has a ->sysfs_ops of kobj_sysfs_ops from kobject_create(), which uses kobj_attr_show() as its ->show() value. The only reason there has not been a more noticeable problem until this point is that 'struct kobj_attribute' and 'struct device_attribute' have the same layout, so getting the callback from container_of() works the same with either value. Change all the callbacks and their uses to be compatible with kobj_attr_show() and kobj_attr_store(), which resolves the kCFI failure and allows the sysfs files to work properly. Closes: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1974 Fixes: ae7b2ce5 ("platform/x86/intel/uncore-freq: Use sysfs API to create attributes") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104-intel-uncore-freq-kcfi-fix-v1-1-bf1e8939af40@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> [nathan: Fix conflicts due to lack of 9b8dea80 in 6.1] Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Mario Limonciello authored
commit 571c2fa2 upstream. When screen brightness is rapidly changed and PSR-SU is enabled the display hangs on panels with this TCON even on the latest DCN 3.1.4 microcode (0x8002a81 at this time). This was disabled previously as commit 072030b1 ("drm/amd: Disable PSR-SU on Parade 0803 TCON") but reverted as commit 1e66a17c ("Revert "drm/amd: Disable PSR-SU on Parade 0803 TCON"") in favor of testing for a new enough microcode (commit cd2e31a9 ("drm/amd/display: Set minimum requirement for using PSR-SU on Phoenix")). As hangs are still happening specifically with this TCON, disable PSR-SU again for it until it can be root caused. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: aaron.ma@canonical.com Cc: binli@gnome.org Cc: Marc Rossi <Marc.Rossi@amd.com> Cc: Hamza Mahfooz <Hamza.Mahfooz@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/2046131 Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Tomi Valkeinen authored
commit 95d4b471 upstream. tidss_crtc_atomic_flush() checks if the crtc is enabled, and if not, returns immediately as there's no reason to do any register changes. However, the code checks for 'crtc->state->enable', which does not reflect the actual HW state. We should instead look at the 'crtc->state->active' flag. This causes the tidss_crtc_atomic_flush() to proceed with the flush even if the active state is false, which then causes us to hit the WARN_ON(!crtc->state->event) check. Fix this by checking the active flag, and while at it, fix the related debug print which had "active" and "needs modeset" wrong way. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 32a1795f ("drm/tidss: New driver for TI Keystone platform Display SubSystem") Reviewed-by: Aradhya Bhatia <a-bhatia1@ti.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231109-tidss-probe-v2-10-ac91b5ea35c0@ideasonboard.com Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit 91443799 upstream. The i2c_master_send/recv() functions return negative error codes or the number of bytes that were able to be sent/received. This code has two problems. 1) Instead of checking if all the bytes were sent or received, it checks that at least one byte was sent or received. 2) If there was a partial send/receive then we should return a negative error code but this code returns success. Fixes: a9fe713d ("drm/bridge: Add PTN3460 bridge driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Robert Foss <rfoss@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Robert Foss <rfoss@kernel.org> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/0cdc2dce-ca89-451a-9774-1482ab2f4762@moroto.mountain Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Ville Syrjälä authored
commit cb4daf27 upstream. If we get a deadlock after the fb lookup in drm_mode_page_flip_ioctl() we proceed to unref the fb and then retry the whole thing from the top. But we forget to reset the fb pointer back to NULL, and so if we then get another error during the retry, before the fb lookup, we proceed the unref the same fb again without having gotten another reference. The end result is that the fb will (eventually) end up being freed while it's still in use. Reset fb to NULL once we've unreffed it to avoid doing it again until we've done another fb lookup. This turned out to be pretty easy to hit on a DG2 when doing async flips (and CONFIG_DEBUG_WW_MUTEX_SLOWPATH=y). The first symptom I saw that drm_closefb() simply got stuck in a busy loop while walking the framebuffer list. Fortunately I was able to convince it to oops instead, and from there it was easier to track down the culprit. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231211081625.25704-1-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com Acked-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Rafael J. Wysocki authored
commit 192cdb1c upstream. On systems using HWP, if a given frequency is equal to the maximum turbo frequency or the maximum non-turbo frequency, the HWP performance level corresponding to it is already known and can be used directly without any computation. Accordingly, adjust the code to use the known HWP performance levels in the cases mentioned above. This also helps to avoid limiting CPU capacity artificially in some cases when the BIOS produces the HWP_CAP numbers using a different E-core-to-P-core performance scaling factor than expected by the kernel. Fixes: f5c8cf2a ("cpufreq: intel_pstate: hybrid: Use known scaling factor for P-cores") Cc: 6.1+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.1+ Tested-by: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Mario Limonciello authored
commit 805c74ea upstream. Spurious wakeups are reported on the GPD G1619-04 which can be absolved by programming the GPIO to ignore wakeups. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-and-tested-by: George Melikov <mail@gmelikov.ru> Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/3073 Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Dave Chinner authored
commit d8d222e0 upstream. Recently xfs/513 started failing on my test machines testing "-o ro,norecovery" mount options. This was being emitted in dmesg: [ 9906.932724] XFS (pmem0): no-recovery mounts must be read-only. Turns out, readonly mounts with the fsopen()/fsconfig() mount API have been busted since day zero. It's only taken 5 years for debian unstable to start using this "new" mount API, and shortly after this I noticed xfs/513 had started to fail as per above. The syscall trace is: fsopen("xfs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC) = 3 mount_setattr(-1, NULL, 0, NULL, 0) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument) ..... fsconfig(3, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "source", "/dev/pmem0", 0) = 0 fsconfig(3, FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG, "ro", NULL, 0) = 0 fsconfig(3, FSCONFIG_SET_FLAG, "norecovery", NULL, 0) = 0 fsconfig(3, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 0) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument) close(3) = 0 Showing that the actual mount instantiation (FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE) is what threw out the error. During mount instantiation, we call xfs_fs_validate_params() which does: /* No recovery flag requires a read-only mount */ if (xfs_has_norecovery(mp) && !xfs_is_readonly(mp)) { xfs_warn(mp, "no-recovery mounts must be read-only."); return -EINVAL; } and xfs_is_readonly() checks internal mount flags for read only state. This state is set in xfs_init_fs_context() from the context superblock flag state: /* * Copy binary VFS mount flags we are interested in. */ if (fc->sb_flags & SB_RDONLY) set_bit(XFS_OPSTATE_READONLY, &mp->m_opstate); With the old mount API, all of the VFS specific superblock flags had already been parsed and set before xfs_init_fs_context() is called, so this all works fine. However, in the brave new fsopen/fsconfig world, xfs_init_fs_context() is called from fsopen() context, before any VFS superblock have been set or parsed. Hence if we use fsopen(), the internal XFS readonly state is *never set*. Hence anything that depends on xfs_is_readonly() actually returning true for read only mounts is broken if fsopen() has been used to mount the filesystem. Fix this by moving this internal state initialisation to xfs_fs_fill_super() before we attempt to validate the parameters that have been set prior to the FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE call being made. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Fixes: 73e5fff9 ("xfs: switch to use the new mount-api") cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Cristian Marussi authored
commit 437a310b upstream. On reception of a completion interrupt the shared memory area is accessed to retrieve the message header at first and then, if the message sequence number identifies a transaction which is still pending, the related payload is fetched too. When an SCMI command times out the channel ownership remains with the platform until eventually a late reply is received and, as a consequence, any further transmission attempt remains pending, waiting for the channel to be relinquished by the platform. Once that late reply is received the channel ownership is given back to the agent and any pending request is then allowed to proceed and overwrite the SMT area of the just delivered late reply; then the wait for the reply to the new request starts. It has been observed that the spurious IRQ related to the late reply can be wrongly associated with the freshly enqueued request: when that happens the SCMI stack in-flight lookup procedure is fooled by the fact that the message header now present in the SMT area is related to the new pending transaction, even though the real reply has still to arrive. This race-condition on the A2P channel can be detected by looking at the channel status bits: a genuine reply from the platform will have set the channel free bit before triggering the completion IRQ. Add a consistency check to validate such condition in the A2P ISR. Reported-by: Xinglong Yang <xinglong.yang@cixtech.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/PUZPR06MB54981E6FA00D82BFDBB864FBF08DA@PUZPR06MB5498.apcprd06.prod.outlook.com/ Fixes: 5c8a47a5 ("firmware: arm_scmi: Make scmi core independent of the transport type") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+ Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com> Tested-by: Xinglong Yang <xinglong.yang@cixtech.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231220172112.763539-1-cristian.marussi@arm.com Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Lin Ma authored
commit ebeae8ad upstream. Similar to a reported issue (check the commit b33fb5b8 ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix global oob in rmnet_policy"), my local fuzzer finds another global out-of-bounds read for policy ksmbd_nl_policy. See bug trace below: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:386 [inline] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x24af/0x2750 lib/nlattr.c:600 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff8f24b100 by task syz-executor.1/62810 CPU: 0 PID: 62810 Comm: syz-executor.1 Tainted: G N 6.1.0 #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x8b/0xb3 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x172/0x475 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0xbb/0x1c0 mm/kasan/report.c:495 validate_nla lib/nlattr.c:386 [inline] __nla_validate_parse+0x24af/0x2750 lib/nlattr.c:600 __nla_parse+0x3e/0x50 lib/nlattr.c:697 __nlmsg_parse include/net/netlink.h:748 [inline] genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x1b0/0x290 net/netlink/genetlink.c:565 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xda/0x330 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:833 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x441/0x780 net/netlink/genetlink.c:850 netlink_rcv_skb+0x14f/0x410 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2540 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:861 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x54e/0x800 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 netlink_sendmsg+0x930/0xe50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0x154/0x190 net/socket.c:734 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6df/0x840 net/socket.c:2482 ___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2536 __sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2565 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7fdd66a8f359 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fdd65e00168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fdd66bbcf80 RCX: 00007fdd66a8f359 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000500 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fdd66ada493 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffc84b81aff R14: 00007fdd65e00300 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the variable: ksmbd_nl_policy+0x100/0xa80 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:0000000034f47940 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1ccc4b flags: 0x200000000001000(reserved|node=0|zone=2) raw: 0200000000001000 ffffea00073312c8 ffffea00073312c8 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffffffff8f24b000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffffffff8f24b080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffffffff8f24b100: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 07 f9 ^ ffffffff8f24b180: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 05 ffffffff8f24b200: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 04 f9 ================================================================== To fix it, add a placeholder named __KSMBD_EVENT_MAX and let KSMBD_EVENT_MAX to be its original value - 1 according to what other netlink families do. Also change two sites that refer the KSMBD_EVENT_MAX to correct value. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0626e664 ("cifsd: add server handler for central processing and tranport layers") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Shin'ichiro Kawasaki authored
commit 5913320e upstream. p2sb_bar() unhides P2SB device to get resources from the device. It guards the operation by locking pci_rescan_remove_lock so that parallel rescans do not find the P2SB device. However, this lock causes deadlock when PCI bus rescan is triggered by /sys/bus/pci/rescan. The rescan locks pci_rescan_remove_lock and probes PCI devices. When PCI devices call p2sb_bar() during probe, it locks pci_rescan_remove_lock again. Hence the deadlock. To avoid the deadlock, do not lock pci_rescan_remove_lock in p2sb_bar(). Instead, do the lock at fs_initcall. Introduce p2sb_cache_resources() for fs_initcall which gets and caches the P2SB resources. At p2sb_bar(), refer the cache and return to the caller. Before operating the device at P2SB DEVFN for resource cache, check that its device class is PCI_CLASS_MEMORY_OTHER 0x0580 that PCH specifications define. This avoids unexpected operation to other devices at the same DEVFN. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/6xb24fjmptxxn5js2fjrrddjae6twex5bjaftwqsuawuqqqydx@7cl3uik5ef6j/ Fixes: 9745fb07 ("platform/x86/intel: Add Primary to Sideband (P2SB) bridge support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240108062059.3583028-2-shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Florian Westphal authored
commit f342de4e upstream. This reverts commit e0abdadc. core.c:nf_hook_slow assumes that the upper 16 bits of NF_DROP verdicts contain a valid errno, i.e. -EPERM, -EHOSTUNREACH or similar, or 0. Due to the reverted commit, its possible to provide a positive value, e.g. NF_ACCEPT (1), which results in use-after-free. Its not clear to me why this commit was made. NF_QUEUE is not used by nftables; "queue" rules in nftables will result in use of "nft_queue" expression. If we later need to allow specifiying errno values from userspace (do not know why), this has to call NF_DROP_GETERR and check that "err <= 0" holds true. Fixes: e0abdadc ("netfilter: nf_tables: accept QUEUE/DROP verdict parameters") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Notselwyn <notselwyn@pwning.tech> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Pablo Neira Ayuso authored
commit 01acb2e8 upstream. Remove netdevice from inet/ingress basechain in case NETDEV_UNREGISTER event is reported, otherwise a stale reference to netdevice remains in the hook list. Fixes: 60a3815d ("netfilter: add inet ingress support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Michael Kelley authored
commit 6941f67a upstream. Current code in netvsc_drv_init() incorrectly assumes that PAGE_SIZE is 4 Kbytes, which is wrong on ARM64 with 16K or 64K page size. As a result, the default VMBus ring buffer size on ARM64 with 64K page size is 8 Mbytes instead of the expected 512 Kbytes. While this doesn't break anything, a typical VM with 8 vCPUs and 8 netvsc channels wastes 120 Mbytes (8 channels * 2 ring buffers/channel * 7.5 Mbytes/ring buffer). Unfortunately, the module parameter specifying the ring buffer size is in units of 4 Kbyte pages. Ideally, it should be in units that are independent of PAGE_SIZE, but backwards compatibility prevents changing that now. Fix this by having netvsc_drv_init() hardcode 4096 instead of using PAGE_SIZE when calculating the ring buffer size in bytes. Also use the VMBUS_RING_SIZE macro to ensure proper alignment when running with page size larger than 4K. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.15.x Fixes: 7aff79e2 ("Drivers: hv: Enable Hyper-V code to be built on ARM64") Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240122162028.348885-1-mhklinux@outlook.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Emmanuel Grumbach authored
commit cf4a0d84 upstream. iwl_fw_ini_trigger_tlv::data is a pointer to a __le32, which means that if we copy to iwl_fw_ini_trigger_tlv::data + offset while offset is in bytes, we'll write past the buffer. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218233 Fixes: cf29c5b6 ("iwlwifi: dbg_ini: implement time point handling") Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://msgid.link/20240111150610.2d2b8b870194.I14ed76505a5cf87304e0c9cc05cc0ae85ed3bf91@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Bernd Edlinger authored
commit 84c39ec5 upstream. If get_unused_fd_flags() fails, the error handling is incomplete because bprm->cred is already set to NULL, and therefore free_bprm will not unlock the cred_guard_mutex. Note there are two error conditions which end up here, one before and one after bprm->cred is cleared. Fixes: b8a61c9e ("exec: Generic execfd support") Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/AS8P193MB128517ADB5EFF29E04389EDAE4752@AS8P193MB1285.EURP193.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Ilya Dryomov authored
commit ded080c8 upstream. The running list is supposed to contain requests that are pinning the exclusive lock, i.e. those that must be flushed before exclusive lock is released. When wake_lock_waiters() is called to handle an error, requests on the acquiring list are failed with that error and no flushing takes place. Briefly moving them to the running list is not only pointless but also harmful: if exclusive lock gets acquired before all of their state machines are scheduled and go through rbd_lock_del_request(), we trigger rbd_assert(list_empty(&rbd_dev->running_list)); in rbd_try_acquire_lock(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 637cd060 ("rbd: new exclusive lock wait/wake code") Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Dongsheng Yang <dongsheng.yang@easystack.cn> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Omar Sandoval authored
commit 7081929a upstream. If the source file descriptor to the snapshot ioctl refers to a deleted subvolume, we get the following abort: BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -2) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 833 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1875 create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs] Modules linked in: pata_acpi btrfs ata_piix libata scsi_mod virtio_net blake2b_generic xor net_failover virtio_rng failover scsi_common rng_core raid6_pq libcrc32c CPU: 0 PID: 833 Comm: t_snapshot_dele Not tainted 6.7.0-rc6 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs] RSP: 0018:ffffa09c01337af8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9982053e7c78 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: ffff99827dc20848 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff99827dc20840 RBP: ffffa09c01337c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa09c01337998 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffffb96da248 R12: fffffffffffffffe R13: ffff99820535bb28 R14: ffff99820b7bd000 R15: ffff99820381ea80 FS: 00007fe20aadabc0(0000) GS:ffff99827dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000559a120b502f CR3: 00000000055b6000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs] ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs] ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x3a/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs] ? create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs] create_pending_snapshots+0x92/0xc0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x66b/0xf40 [btrfs] btrfs_mksubvol+0x301/0x4d0 [btrfs] btrfs_mksnapshot+0x80/0xb0 [btrfs] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x1c2/0x1d0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0xc4/0x150 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x8a6/0x2650 [btrfs] ? kmem_cache_free+0x22/0x340 ? do_sys_openat2+0x97/0xe0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 RIP: 0033:0x7fe20abe83af RSP: 002b:00007ffe6eff1360 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007fe20abe83af RDX: 00007ffe6eff23c0 RSI: 0000000050009417 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fe20ad16cd0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffe6eff13c0 R14: 00007fe20ad45000 R15: 0000559a120b6d58 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- BTRFS: error (device vdc: state A) in create_pending_snapshot:1875: errno=-2 No such entry BTRFS info (device vdc: state EA): forced readonly BTRFS warning (device vdc: state EA): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. BTRFS: error (device vdc: state EA) in cleanup_transaction:2055: errno=-2 No such entry This happens because create_pending_snapshot() initializes the new root item as a copy of the source root item. This includes the refs field, which is 0 for a deleted subvolume. The call to btrfs_insert_root() therefore inserts a root with refs == 0. btrfs_get_new_fs_root() then finds the root and returns -ENOENT if refs == 0, which causes create_pending_snapshot() to abort. Fix it by checking the source root's refs before attempting the snapshot, but after locking subvol_sem to avoid racing with deletion. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me> Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Qu Wenruo authored
commit 173431b2 upstream. Add extra sanity check for btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args::flags. This is not really to enhance fuzzing tests, but as a preparation for future expansion on btrfs_ioctl_defrag_range_args. In the future we're going to add new members, allowing more fine tuning for btrfs defrag. Without the -ENONOTSUPP error, there would be no way to detect if the kernel supports those new defrag features. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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David Sterba authored
commit a208b3f1 upstream. There's a warning in btrfs_issue_discard() when the range is not aligned to 512 bytes, originally added in 4d89d377 ("btrfs: btrfs_issue_discard ensure offset/length are aligned to sector boundaries"). We can't do sub-sector writes anyway so the adjustment is the only thing that we can do and the warning is unnecessary. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reported-by: <syzbot+4a4f1eba14eb5c3417d1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Chung-Chiang Cheng authored
commit f398e70d upstream. The error message should accurately reflect the size rather than the type. Fixes: f82d1c7c ("btrfs: tree-checker: Add EXTENT_ITEM and METADATA_ITEM check") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Chung-Chiang Cheng <cccheng@synology.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Fedor Pchelkin authored
commit f03e274a upstream. As clearing REF_VERIFY mount option indicates there were some errors in a ref-verify process, a ref cache is not relevant anymore and should be freed. btrfs_free_ref_cache() requires REF_VERIFY option being set so call it just before clearing the mount option. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Reported-by: <syzbot+be14ed7728594dc8bd42@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Fixes: fd708b81 ("Btrfs: add a extent ref verify tool") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000e5a65c05ee832054@google.com/ Reported-by: <syzbot+c563a3c79927971f950f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0000000000007fe09705fdc6086c@google.com/ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Omar Sandoval authored
commit 3324d054 upstream. Sweet Tea spotted a race between subvolume deletion and snapshotting that can result in the root item for the snapshot having the BTRFS_ROOT_SUBVOL_DEAD flag set. The race is: Thread 1 | Thread 2 ----------------------------------------------|---------- btrfs_delete_subvolume | btrfs_set_root_flags(BTRFS_ROOT_SUBVOL_DEAD)| |btrfs_mksubvol | down_read(subvol_sem) | create_snapshot | ... | create_pending_snapshot | copy root item from source down_write(subvol_sem) | This flag is only checked in send and swap activate, which this would cause to fail mysteriously. create_snapshot() now checks the root refs to reject a deleted subvolume, so we can fix this by locking subvol_sem earlier so that the BTRFS_ROOT_SUBVOL_DEAD flag and the root refs are updated atomically. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reported-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me> Reviewed-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me> Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 78fbb92a upstream. syzbot complains that msg->msg_get_inq value can be uninitialized [1] struct msghdr got many new fields recently, we should always make sure their values is zero by default. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tcp_recvmsg+0x686/0xac0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2571 tcp_recvmsg+0x686/0xac0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2571 inet_recvmsg+0x131/0x580 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:879 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x12b/0x1e0 net/socket.c:1066 __sock_xmit+0x236/0x5c0 drivers/block/nbd.c:538 nbd_read_reply drivers/block/nbd.c:732 [inline] recv_work+0x262/0x3100 drivers/block/nbd.c:863 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2627 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0x104e/0x1e70 kernel/workqueue.c:2700 worker_thread+0xf45/0x1490 kernel/workqueue.c:2781 kthread+0x3ed/0x540 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242 Local variable msg created at: __sock_xmit+0x4c/0x5c0 drivers/block/nbd.c:513 nbd_read_reply drivers/block/nbd.c:732 [inline] recv_work+0x262/0x3100 drivers/block/nbd.c:863 CPU: 1 PID: 7465 Comm: kworker/u5:1 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc7-syzkaller-00041-gf016f7547aee #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023 Workqueue: nbd5-recv recv_work Fixes: f94fd25c ("tcp: pass back data left in socket after receive") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org Cc: nbd@other.debian.org Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240112132657.647112-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Shenwei Wang authored
[ Upstream commit 5e344807 ] When repeatedly changing the interface link speed using the command below: ethtool -s eth0 speed 100 duplex full ethtool -s eth0 speed 1000 duplex full The following errors may sometimes be reported by the ARM SMMU driver: [ 5395.035364] fec 5b040000.ethernet eth0: Link is Down [ 5395.039255] arm-smmu 51400000.iommu: Unhandled context fault: fsr=0x402, iova=0x00000000, fsynr=0x100001, cbfrsynra=0x852, cb=2 [ 5398.108460] fec 5b040000.ethernet eth0: Link is Up - 100Mbps/Full - flow control off It is identified that the FEC driver does not properly stop the TX queue during the link speed transitions, and this results in the invalid virtual I/O address translations from the SMMU and causes the context faults. Fixes: dbc64a8e ("net: fec: move calls to quiesce/resume packet processing out of fec_restart()") Signed-off-by: Shenwei Wang <shenwei.wang@nxp.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123165141.2008104-1-shenwei.wang@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Zhipeng Lu authored
[ Upstream commit f6cc4b6a ] In fjes_hw_setup, it allocates several memory and delay the deallocation to the fjes_hw_exit in fjes_probe through the following call chain: fjes_probe |-> fjes_hw_init |-> fjes_hw_setup |-> fjes_hw_exit However, when fjes_hw_setup fails, fjes_hw_exit won't be called and thus all the resources allocated in fjes_hw_setup will be leaked. In this patch, we free those resources in fjes_hw_setup and prevents such leaks. Fixes: 2fcbca68 ("fjes: platform_driver's .probe and .remove routine") Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Lu <alexious@zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240122172445.3841883-1-alexious@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Jakub Kicinski authored
[ Upstream commit 0879020a ] This test is missing a whole bunch of checks for interface renaming and one ifup. Presumably it was only used on a system with renaming disabled and NetworkManager running. Fixes: 91f430b2 ("selftests: net: add a test for UDP tunnel info infra") Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123060529.1033912-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Jenishkumar Maheshbhai Patel authored
[ Upstream commit 9f538b41 ] Register value persist after booting the kernel using kexec which results in kernel panic. Thus clear the BM pool registers before initialisation to fix the issue. Fixes: 3f518509 ("ethernet: Add new driver for Marvell Armada 375 network unit") Signed-off-by: Jenishkumar Maheshbhai Patel <jpatel2@marvell.com> Reviewed-by: Maxime Chevallier <maxime.chevallier@bootlin.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119035914.2595665-1-jpatel2@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Bernd Edlinger authored
[ Upstream commit a5f5eee2 ] otherwise the synopsys_id value may be read out wrong, because the GMAC_VERSION register might still be in reset state, for at least 1 us after the reset is de-asserted. Add a wait for 10 us before continuing to be on the safe side. > From what have you got that delay value? Just try and error, with very old linux versions and old gcc versions the synopsys_id was read out correctly most of the time (but not always), with recent linux versions and recnet gcc versions it was read out wrongly most of the time, but again not always. I don't have access to the VHDL code in question, so I cannot tell why it takes so long to get the correct values, I also do not have more than a few hardware samples, so I cannot tell how long this timeout must be in worst case. Experimentally I can tell that the register is read several times as zero immediately after the reset is de-asserted, also adding several no-ops is not enough, adding a printk is enough, also udelay(1) seems to be enough but I tried that not very often, and I have not access to many hardware samples to be 100% sure about the necessary delay. And since the udelay here is only executed once per device instance, it seems acceptable to delay the boot for 10 us. BTW: my hardware's synopsys id is 0x37. Fixes: c5e4ddbd ("net: stmmac: Add support for optional reset control") Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/AS8P193MB1285A810BD78C111E7F6AA34E4752@AS8P193MB1285.EURP193.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Pablo Neira Ayuso authored
[ Upstream commit d0009eff ] Several expressions explicitly refer to NF_INET_* hook definitions from expr->ops->validate, however, family is not validated. Bail out with EOPNOTSUPP in case they are used from unsupported families. Fixes: 0ca743a5 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add compatibility layer for x_tables") Fixes: a3c90f7a ("netfilter: nf_tables: flow offload expression") Fixes: 2fa84193 ("netfilter: nf_tables: introduce routing expression") Fixes: 554ced0a ("netfilter: nf_tables: add support for native socket matching") Fixes: ad49d86e ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add synproxy support") Fixes: 4ed8eb65 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add native tproxy support") Fixes: 6c472602 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add xfrm expression") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit b462579b ] nftables has two types of sets/maps, one where userspace defines the name, and anonymous sets/maps, where userspace defines a template name. For the latter, kernel requires presence of exactly one "%d". nftables uses "__set%d" and "__map%d" for this. The kernel will expand the format specifier and replaces it with the smallest unused number. As-is, userspace could define a template name that allows to move the set name past the 256 bytes upperlimit (post-expansion). I don't see how this could be a problem, but I would prefer if userspace cannot do this, so add a limit of 16 bytes for the '%d' template name. 16 bytes is the old total upper limit for set names that existed when nf_tables was merged initially. Fixes: 38745490 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Allow set names of up to 255 chars") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 8e7f82de upstream. When opening a directory (opendir(3)) or rewinding it (rewinddir(3)), we are not holding the directory's inode locked, and this can result in later attempting to add two entries to the directory with the same index number, resulting in a transaction abort, with -EEXIST (-17), when inserting the second delayed dir index. This results in a trace like the following: Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: BTRFS error (device dm-3): err add delayed dir index item(name: cockroach-stderr.log) into the insertion tree of the delayed node(root id: 5, inode id: 4539217, errno: -17) Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ------------[ cut here ]------------ Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1504! Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 7159 Comm: cockroach Not tainted 6.4.15-200.fc38.x86_64 #1 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: Hardware name: ASUS ESC500 G3/P9D WS, BIOS 2402 06/27/2018 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RIP: 0010:btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: Code: eb dd 48 (...) Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RSP: 0000:ffffa9980e0fbb28 EFLAGS: 00010282 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8b10b8f4a3c0 RCX: 0000000000000000 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8b177ec21540 RDI: ffff8b177ec21540 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: RBP: ffff8b110cf80888 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa9980e0fb938 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffff86146508 R12: 0000000000000014 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: R13: ffff8b1131ae5b40 R14: ffff8b10b8f4a418 R15: 00000000ffffffef Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: FS: 00007fb14a7fe6c0(0000) GS:ffff8b177ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: CR2: 000000c00143d000 CR3: 00000001b3b4e002 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: Call Trace: Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: <TASK> Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? die+0x36/0x90 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? do_trap+0xda/0x100 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? do_error_trap+0x6a/0x90 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index+0x1da/0x260 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: btrfs_insert_dir_item+0x200/0x280 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: btrfs_add_link+0xab/0x4f0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? ktime_get_real_ts64+0x47/0xe0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: btrfs_create_new_inode+0x7cd/0xa80 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: btrfs_symlink+0x190/0x4d0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? schedule+0x5e/0xd0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? __d_lookup+0x7e/0xc0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: vfs_symlink+0x148/0x1e0 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: do_symlinkat+0x130/0x140 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: __x64_sys_symlinkat+0x3d/0x50 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2b/0x40 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90 Sep 11 22:34:59 myhostname kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc The race leading to the problem happens like this: 1) Directory inode X is loaded into memory, its ->index_cnt field is initialized to (u64)-1 (at btrfs_alloc_inode()); 2) Task A is adding a new file to directory X, holding its vfs inode lock, and calls btrfs_set_inode_index() to get an index number for the entry. Because the inode's index_cnt field is set to (u64)-1 it calls btrfs_inode_delayed_dir_index_count() which fails because no dir index entries were added yet to the delayed inode and then it calls btrfs_set_inode_index_count(). This functions finds the last dir index key and then sets index_cnt to that index value + 1. It found that the last index key has an offset of 100. However before it assigns a value of 101 to index_cnt... 3) Task B calls opendir(3), ending up at btrfs_opendir(), where the VFS lock for inode X is not taken, so it calls btrfs_get_dir_last_index() and sees index_cnt still with a value of (u64)-1. Because of that it calls btrfs_inode_delayed_dir_index_count() which fails since no dir index entries were added to the delayed inode yet, and then it also calls btrfs_set_inode_index_count(). This also finds that the last index key has an offset of 100, and before it assigns the value 101 to the index_cnt field of inode X... 4) Task A assigns a value of 101 to index_cnt. And then the code flow goes to btrfs_set_inode_index() where it increments index_cnt from 101 to 102. Task A then creates a delayed dir index entry with a sequence number of 101 and adds it to the delayed inode; 5) Task B assigns 101 to the index_cnt field of inode X; 6) At some later point when someone tries to add a new entry to the directory, btrfs_set_inode_index() will return 101 again and shortly after an attempt to add another delayed dir index key with index number 101 will fail with -EEXIST resulting in a transaction abort. Fix this by locking the inode at btrfs_get_dir_last_index(), which is only only used when opening a directory or attempting to lseek on it. Reported-by: ken <ken@bllue.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAE6xmH+Lp=Q=E61bU+v9eWX8gYfLvu6jLYxjxjFpo3zHVPR0EQ@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: <syzbot+d13490c82ad5353c779d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000036e1290603e097e0@google.com/ Fixes: 9b378f6a ("btrfs: fix infinite directory reads") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.5+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Filipe Manana authored
commit e60aa5da upstream. When opening a directory we find what's the index of its last entry and then store it in the directory's file handle private data (struct btrfs_file_private::last_index), so that in the case new directory entries are added to a directory after an opendir(3) call we don't end up in an infinite loop (see commit 9b378f6a ("btrfs: fix infinite directory reads")) when calling readdir(3). However once rewinddir(3) is called, POSIX states [1] that any new directory entries added after the previous opendir(3) call, must be returned by subsequent calls to readdir(3): "The rewinddir() function shall reset the position of the directory stream to which dirp refers to the beginning of the directory. It shall also cause the directory stream to refer to the current state of the corresponding directory, as a call to opendir() would have done." We currently don't refresh the last_index field of the struct btrfs_file_private associated to the directory, so after a rewinddir(3) we are not returning any new entries added after the opendir(3) call. Fix this by finding the current last index of the directory when llseek is called against the directory. This can be reproduced by the following C program provided by Ian Johnson: #include <dirent.h> #include <stdio.h> int main(void) { DIR *dir = opendir("test"); FILE *file; file = fopen("test/1", "w"); fwrite("1", 1, 1, file); fclose(file); file = fopen("test/2", "w"); fwrite("2", 1, 1, file); fclose(file); rewinddir(dir); struct dirent *entry; while ((entry = readdir(dir))) { printf("%s\n", entry->d_name); } closedir(dir); return 0; } Reported-by: Ian Johnson <ian@ianjohnson.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/YR1P0S.NGASEG570GJ8@ianjohnson.dev/ Fixes: 9b378f6a ("btrfs: fix infinite directory reads") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.5+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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