- Feb 28, 2019
-
-
Lan Tianyu authored
The max flush rep count of HvFlushGuestPhysicalAddressList hypercall is equal with how many entries of union hv_gpa_page_range can be populated into the input parameter page. The code lacks parenthesis around PAGE_SIZE - 2 * sizeof(u64) which results in bogus computations. Add them. Fixes: cc4edae4 ("x86/hyper-v: Add HvFlushGuestAddressList hypercall support") Signed-off-by:
Lan Tianyu <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: kys@microsoft.com Cc: haiyangz@microsoft.com Cc: sthemmin@microsoft.com Cc: sashal@kernel.org Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190225143114.5149-1-Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com
-
- Feb 26, 2019
-
-
Andy Lutomirski authored
When calling __put_user(foo(), ptr), the __put_user() macro would call foo() in between __uaccess_begin() and __uaccess_end(). If that code were buggy, then those bugs would be run without SMAP protection. Fortunately, there seem to be few instances of the problem in the kernel. Nevertheless, __put_user() should be fixed to avoid doing this. Therefore, evaluate __put_user()'s argument before setting AC. This issue was noticed when an objtool hack by Peter Zijlstra complained about genregs_get() and I compared the assembly output to the C source. [ bp: Massage commit message and fixed up whitespace. ] Fixes: 11f1a4b9 ("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses") Signed-off-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190225125231.845656645@infradead.org
-
- Feb 15, 2019
-
-
Hedi Berriche authored
Calls into UV firmware must be protected against concurrency, expose the efi_runtime_lock to the UV platform, and use it to serialise UV BIOS calls. Signed-off-by:
Hedi Berriche <hedi.berriche@hpe.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reviewed-by:
Russ Anderson <rja@hpe.com> Reviewed-by:
Dimitri Sivanich <sivanich@hpe.com> Reviewed-by:
Mike Travis <mike.travis@hpe.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org> Cc: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org> Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+ Cc: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190213193413.25560-5-hedi.berriche@hpe.com
-
- Feb 14, 2019
-
-
Rajneesh Bhardwaj authored
Add the CPUID model number of Icelake (ICL) mobile processors to the Intel family list. Icelake U/Y series uses model number 0x7E. Signed-off-by:
Rajneesh Bhardwaj <rajneesh.bhardwaj@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "David E. Box" <david.e.box@intel.com> Cc: dvhart@infradead.org Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190214115712.19642-2-rajneesh.bhardwaj@linux.intel.com
-
- Feb 13, 2019
-
-
Borislav Petkov authored
dump_thread32() in aout_core_dump() does not clear the user32 structure allocated on the stack as the first thing on function entry. As a result, the dump.u_comm, dump.u_ar0 and dump.signal which get assigned before the clearing, get overwritten. Rename that function to fill_dump() to make it clear what it does and call it first thing. This was caught while staring at a patch by Derek Robson <robsonde@gmail.com>. Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Derek Robson <robsonde@gmail.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael Matz <matz@suse.de> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190202005512.3144-1-robsonde@gmail.com
-
- Feb 10, 2019
-
-
Juergen Gross authored
set_pmd_at() calls native_set_pmd() unconditionally on x86. This was fine as long as only huge page entries were written via set_pmd_at(), as Xen pv guests don't support those. Commit 2c91bd4a ("mm: speed up mremap by 20x on large regions") introduced a usage of set_pmd_at() possible on pv guests, leading to failures like: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff888023e26778 #PF error: [PROT] [WRITE] RIP: e030:move_page_tables+0x7c1/0xae0 move_vma.isra.3+0xd1/0x2d0 __se_sys_mremap+0x3c6/0x5b0 do_syscall_64+0x49/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Make set_pmd_at() paravirt aware by just letting it use set_pmd(). Fixes: 2c91bd4a ("mm: speed up mremap by 20x on large regions") Reported-by:
Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it> Signed-off-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: sstabellini@kernel.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190210074056.11842-1-jgross@suse.com
-
- Feb 08, 2019
-
-
Peter Zijlstra authored
The recent commit fe0937b2 ("x86/mm/cpa: Fold cpa_flush_range() and cpa_flush_array() into a single cpa_flush() function") accidentally made the call to make_addr_canonical_again() go away, which breaks set_mce_nospec(). Re-instate the call to convert the address back into canonical form right before invoking either CLFLUSH or INVLPG. Rename the function while at it to be shorter (and less MAGA). Fixes: fe0937b2 ("x86/mm/cpa: Fold cpa_flush_range() and cpa_flush_array() into a single cpa_flush() function") Reported-by:
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by:
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190208120859.GH32511@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
-
- Feb 07, 2019
-
-
Kirill A. Shutemov authored
RDMSR in the trampoline code overwrites EDX but that register is used to indicate whether 5-level paging has to be enabled and if clobbered, leads to failure to boot on a 5-level paging machine. Preserve EDX on the stack while we are dealing with EFER. Fixes: b677dfae ("x86/boot/compressed/64: Set EFER.LME=1 in 32-bit trampoline before returning to long mode") Reported-by:
Kyle D Pelton <kyle.d.pelton@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190206115253.1907-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
-
- Feb 03, 2019
-
-
Tony Luck authored
Internal injection testing crashed with a console log that said: mce: [Hardware Error]: CPU 7: Machine Check Exception: f Bank 0: bd80000000100134 This caused a lot of head scratching because the MCACOD (bits 15:0) of that status is a signature from an L1 data cache error. But Linux says that it found it in "Bank 0", which on this model CPU only reports L1 instruction cache errors. The answer was that Linux doesn't initialize "m->bank" in the case that it finds a fatal error in the mce_no_way_out() pre-scan of banks. If this was a local machine check, then this partially initialized struct mce is being passed to mce_panic(). Fix is simple: just initialize m->bank in the case of a fatal error. Fixes: 40c36e27 ("x86/mce: Fix incorrect "Machine check from unknown source" message") Signed-off-by:
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.18 Note pre-v5.0 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c was called arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190201003341.10638-1-tony.luck@intel.com
-
- Feb 02, 2019
-
-
Johannes Weiner authored
"Resource Control" is a very broad term for this CPU feature, and a term that is also associated with containers, cgroups etc. This can easily cause confusion. Make the user prompt more specific. Match the config symbol name. [ bp: In the future, the corresponding ARM arch-specific code will be under ARM_CPU_RESCTRL and the arch-agnostic bits will be carved out under the CPU_RESCTRL umbrella symbol. ] Signed-off-by:
Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Babu Moger <Babu.Moger@amd.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn> Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190130195621.GA30653@cmpxchg.org
-
Kairui Song authored
Kexec-ing a kernel with "efi=noruntime" on the first kernel's command line causes the following null pointer dereference: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 #PF error: [normal kernel read fault] Call Trace: efi_runtime_map_copy+0x28/0x30 bzImage64_load+0x688/0x872 arch_kexec_kernel_image_load+0x6d/0x70 kimage_file_alloc_init+0x13e/0x220 __x64_sys_kexec_file_load+0x144/0x290 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Just skip the EFI info setup if EFI runtime services are not enabled. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Suggested-by:
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by:
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: bhe@redhat.com Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: erik.schmauss@intel.com Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: lenb@kernel.org Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Cc: robert.moore@intel.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190118111310.29589-2-kasong@redhat.com
-
- Jan 31, 2019
-
-
Thomas Lendacky authored
The load_microcode_amd() function searches for microcode patches and attempts to apply a microcode patch if it is of different level than the currently installed level. While the processor won't actually load a level that is less than what is already installed, the logic wrongly returns UCODE_NEW thus signaling to its caller reload_store() that a late loading should be attempted. If the file-system contains an older microcode revision than what is currently running, such a late microcode reload can result in these misleading messages: x86/CPU: CPU features have changed after loading microcode, but might not take effect. x86/CPU: Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update. These messages were issued on a system where SME/SEV are not enabled by the BIOS (MSR C001_0010[23] = 0b) because during boot, early_detect_mem_encrypt() is called and cleared the SME and SEV features in this case. However, after the wrong late load attempt, get_cpu_cap() is called and reloads the SME and SEV feature bits, resulting in the messages. Update the microcode level check to not attempt microcode loading if the current level is greater than(!) and not only equal to the current patch level. [ bp: massage commit message. ] Fixes: 2613f36e ("x86/microcode: Attempt late loading only when new microcode is present") Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/154894518427.9406.8246222496874202773.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
-
- Jan 30, 2019
-
-
Borislav Petkov authored
... so that they can get CCed on platform patches. Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190128113619.19025-1-bp@alien8.de
-
Colin Ian King authored
show_ldttss() shifts desc.base2 by 24 bit, but base2 is 8 bits of a bitfield in a u16. Due to the really great idea of integer promotion in C99 base2 is promoted to an int, because that's the standard defined behaviour when all values which can be represented by base2 fit into an int. Now if bit 7 is set in desc.base2 the result of the shift left by 24 makes the resulting integer negative and the following conversion to unsigned long legitmately sign extends first causing the upper bits 32 bits to be set in the result. Fix this by casting desc.base2 to unsigned long before the shift. Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1475635 ("Unintended sign extension") [ tglx: Reworded the changelog a bit as I actually had to lookup the standard (again) to decode the original one. ] Fixes: a1a371c4 ("x86/fault: Decode page fault OOPSes better") Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181222191116.21831-1-colin.king@canonical.com
-
Wei Huang authored
In some old AMD KVM implementation, guest's EFER.LME bit is cleared by KVM when the hypervsior detects that the guest sets CR0.PG to 0. This causes the guest OS to reboot when it tries to return from 32-bit trampoline code because the CPU is in incorrect state: CR4.PAE=1, CR0.PG=1, CS.L=1, but EFER.LME=0. As a precaution, set EFER.LME=1 as part of long mode activation procedure. This extra step won't cause any harm when Linux is booted on a bare-metal machine. Signed-off-by:
Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by:
Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190104054411.12489-1-wei@redhat.com
-
- Jan 29, 2019
-
-
Kan Liang authored
Add the Atom Tremont model number to the Intel family list. [ Tony: Also update comment at head of file to say "_X" suffix is also used for microserver parts. ] Signed-off-by:
Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> Cc: Megha Dey <megha.dey@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com> Cc: Rajneesh Bhardwaj <rajneesh.bhardwaj@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190125195902.17109-4-tony.luck@intel.com
-
- Jan 23, 2019
-
-
Sinan Kaya authored
After commit 5d32a665 ("PCI/ACPI: Allow ACPI to be built without CONFIG_PCI set") dependencies on CONFIG_PCI that previously were satisfied implicitly through dependencies on CONFIG_ACPI have to be specified directly. PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG depends on PCI but this dependency has not been mentioned in the Kconfig so add an explicit dependency here and fix WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG Depends on [n]: PCI [=n] Selected by [y]: - X86 [=y] Fixes: 5d32a665 ("PCI/ACPI: Allow ACPI to be built without CONFIG_PCI set") Signed-off-by:
Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190121231958.28255-2-okaya@kernel.org
-
- Jan 18, 2019
-
-
Jan Beulich authored
While in the native case entry into the kernel happens on the trampoline stack, PV Xen kernels get entered with the current thread stack right away. Hence source and destination stacks are identical in that case, and special care is needed. Other than in sync_regs() the copying done on the INT80 path isn't NMI / #MC safe, as either of these events occurring in the middle of the stack copying would clobber data on the (source) stack. There is similar code in interrupt_entry() and nmi(), but there is no fixup required because those code paths are unreachable in XEN PV guests. [ tglx: Sanitized subject, changelog, Fixes tag and stable mail address. Sigh ] Fixes: 7f2590a1 ("x86/entry/64: Use a per-CPU trampoline stack for IDT entries") Signed-off-by:
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Acked-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5C3E1128020000780020DFAD@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com
-
- Jan 15, 2019
-
-
Dave Young authored
Commit b6664ba4 ("s390, kexec_file: drop arch_kexec_mem_walk()") changed the behavior of kexec_locate_mem_hole(): it will try to allocate free memory only when kbuf.mem is initialized to zero. However, x86's kexec_file_load() implementation reuses a struct kexec_buf allocated on the stack and its kbuf.mem member gets set by each kexec_add_buffer() invocation. The second kexec_add_buffer() will reuse the same kbuf but not reinitialize kbuf.mem. Therefore, explictily reset kbuf.mem each time in order for kexec_locate_mem_hole() to locate a free memory region each time. [ bp: massage commit message. ] Fixes: b6664ba4 ("s390, kexec_file: drop arch_kexec_mem_walk()") Signed-off-by:
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by:
Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me> Cc: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181228011247.GA9999@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com
-
Peng Hao authored
Using sizeof(pointer) for determining the size of a memset() only works when the size of the pointer and the size of type to which it points are the same. For pte_t this is only true for 64bit and 32bit-NONPAE. On 32bit PAE systems this is wrong as the pointer size is 4 byte but the PTE entry is 8 bytes. It's actually not a real world issue as this code depends on 64bit, but it's wrong nevertheless. Use sizeof(*p) for correctness sake. Fixes: aad98391 ("x86/mm/encrypt: Simplify sme_populate_pgd() and sme_populate_pgd_large()") Signed-off-by:
Peng Hao <peng.hao2@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: luto@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1546065252-97996-1-git-send-email-peng.hao2@zte.com.cn
-
Dave Hansen authored
There was a bug where the per-mm pkey state was not being preserved across fork() in the child. fork() is performed in the pkey selftests, but all of the pkey activity is performed in the parent. The child does not perform any actions sensitive to pkey state. To make the test more sensitive to these kinds of bugs, add a fork() where the parent exits, and execution continues in the child. To achieve this let the key exhaustion test not terminate at the first allocation failure and fork after 2*NR_PKEYS loops and continue in the child. Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: jroedel@suse.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190102215657.585704B7@viggo.jf.intel.com
-
Dave Hansen authored
Memory protection key behavior should be the same in a child as it was in the parent before a fork. But, there is a bug that resets the state in the child at fork instead of preserving it. The creation of new mm's is a bit convoluted. At fork(), the code does: 1. memcpy() the parent mm to initialize child 2. mm_init() to initalize some select stuff stuff 3. dup_mmap() to create true copies that memcpy() did not do right For pkeys two bits of state need to be preserved across a fork: 'execute_only_pkey' and 'pkey_allocation_map'. Those are preserved by the memcpy(), but mm_init() invokes init_new_context() which overwrites 'execute_only_pkey' and 'pkey_allocation_map' with "new" values. The author of the code erroneously believed that init_new_context is *only* called at execve()-time. But, alas, init_new_context() is used at execve() and fork(). The result is that, after a fork(), the child's pkey state ends up looking like it does after an execve(), which is totally wrong. pkeys that are already allocated can be allocated again, for instance. To fix this, add code called by dup_mmap() to copy the pkey state from parent to child explicitly. Also add a comment above init_new_context() to make it more clear to the next poor sod what this code is used for. Fixes: e8c24d3a ("x86/pkeys: Allocation/free syscalls") Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Cc: luto@kernel.org Cc: jroedel@suse.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190102215655.7A69518C@viggo.jf.intel.com
-
- Jan 12, 2019
-
-
Daniel Drake authored
The outb() function takes parameters value and port, in that order. Fix the parameters used in the kalsr i8254 fallback code. Fixes: 5bfce5ef ("x86, kaslr: Provide randomness functions") Signed-off-by:
Daniel Drake <drake@endlessm.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: linux@endlessm.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190107034024.15005-1-drake@endlessm.com
-
Sinan Kaya authored
After commit 5d32a665 ("PCI/ACPI: Allow ACPI to be built without CONFIG_PCI set") dependencies on CONFIG_PCI that previously were satisfied implicitly through dependencies on CONFIG_ACPI have to be specified directly. LPSS code relies on PCI infrastructure but this dependency has not been explicitly called out so do that. Fixes: 5d32a665 ("PCI/ACPI: Allow ACPI to be built without CONFIG_PCI set") Signed-off-by:
Sinan Kaya <okaya@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190102181038.4418-11-okaya@kernel.org
-
- Jan 09, 2019
-
-
WANG Chao authored
Commit 4cd24de3 ("x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support") replaced the RETPOLINE define with CONFIG_RETPOLINE checks. Remove the remaining pieces. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: 4cd24de3 ("x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support") Signed-off-by:
WANG Chao <chao.wang@ucloud.cn> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by:
Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com> Cc: Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net> Cc: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org Cc: srinivas.eeda@oracle.com Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181210163725.95977-1-chao.wang@ucloud.cn
-
Borislav Petkov authored
CONFIG_RESCTRL is too generic. The final goal is to have a generic option called like this which is selected by the arch-specific ones CONFIG_X86_RESCTRL and CONFIG_ARM64_RESCTRL. The generic one will cover the resctrl filesystem and other generic and shared bits of functionality. Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Suggested-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Requested-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Cc: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190108171401.GC12235@zn.tnic
-
- Jan 08, 2019
-
-
Tycho Andersen authored
Both the .o and the actual executable need to be built with -m32 in order to link correctly. Reported-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Reviewed-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Fixes: fec7b669 ("samples: add an example of seccomp user trap") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190107231631.1849-1-tycho@tycho.ws Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
-
- Jan 07, 2019
-
-
Masahiro Yamada authored
For some reasons, I accidentally got rid of "generic-y += shmparam.h" from some architectures. Restore them to fix building c6x, h8300, hexagon, m68k, microblaze, openrisc, and unicore32. Fixes: d6e4b3e3 ("arch: remove redundant UAPI generic-y defines") Signed-off-by:
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
Linus Torvalds authored
-
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuildLinus Torvalds authored
Pull more Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada: - improve boolinit.cocci and use_after_iter.cocci semantic patches - fix alignment for kallsyms - move 'asm goto' compiler test to Kconfig and clean up jump_label CONFIG option - generate asm-generic wrappers automatically if arch does not implement mandatory UAPI headers - remove redundant generic-y defines - misc cleanups * tag 'kbuild-v4.21-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: kconfig: rename generated .*conf-cfg to *conf-cfg kbuild: remove unnecessary stubs for archheader and archscripts kbuild: use assignment instead of define ... endef for filechk_* rules arch: remove redundant UAPI generic-y defines kbuild: generate asm-generic wrappers if mandatory headers are missing arch: remove stale comments "UAPI Header export list" riscv: remove redundant kernel-space generic-y kbuild: change filechk to surround the given command with { } kbuild: remove redundant target cleaning on failure kbuild: clean up rule_dtc_dt_yaml kbuild: remove UIMAGE_IN and UIMAGE_OUT jump_label: move 'asm goto' support test to Kconfig kallsyms: lower alignment on ARM scripts: coccinelle: boolinit: drop warnings on named constants scripts: coccinelle: check for redeclaration kconfig: remove unused "file" field of yylval union nds32: remove redundant kernel-space generic-y nios2: remove unneeded HAS_DMA define
-
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull perf tooling updates form Ingo Molnar: "A final batch of perf tooling changes: mostly fixes and small improvements" * 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (29 commits) perf session: Add comment for perf_session__register_idle_thread() perf thread-stack: Fix thread stack processing for the idle task perf thread-stack: Allocate an array of thread stacks perf thread-stack: Factor out thread_stack__init() perf thread-stack: Allow for a thread stack array perf thread-stack: Avoid direct reference to the thread's stack perf thread-stack: Tidy thread_stack__bottom() usage perf thread-stack: Simplify some code in thread_stack__process() tools gpio: Allow overriding CFLAGS tools power turbostat: Override CFLAGS assignments and add LDFLAGS to build command tools thermal tmon: Allow overriding CFLAGS assignments tools power x86_energy_perf_policy: Override CFLAGS assignments and add LDFLAGS to build command perf c2c: Increase the HITM ratio limit for displayed cachelines perf c2c: Change the default coalesce setup perf trace beauty ioctl: Beautify USBDEVFS_ commands perf trace beauty: Export function to get the files for a thread perf trace: Wire up ioctl's USBDEBFS_ cmd table generator perf beauty ioctl: Add generator for USBDEVFS_ ioctl commands tools headers uapi: Grab a copy of usbdevice_fs.h perf trace: Store the major number for a file when storing its pathname ...
-
Linus Torvalds authored
The semantics of what "in core" means for the mincore() system call are somewhat unclear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page cache" rather than "page is mapped in the mapping". The problem with that traditional semantic is that it exposes a lot of system cache state that it really probably shouldn't, and that users shouldn't really even care about. So let's try to avoid that information leak by simply changing the semantics to be that mincore() counts actual mapped pages, not pages that might be cheaply mapped if they were faulted (note the "might be" part of the old semantics: being in the cache doesn't actually guarantee that you can access them without IO anyway, since things like network filesystems may have to revalidate the cache before use). In many ways the old semantics were somewhat insane even aside from the information leak issue. From the very beginning (and that beginning is a long time ago: 2.3.52 was released in March 2000, I think), the code had a comment saying Later we can get more picky about what "in core" means precisely. and this is that "later". Admittedly it is much later than is really comfortable. NOTE! This is a real semantic change, and it is for example known to change the output of "fincore", since that program literally does a mmmap without populating it, and then doing "mincore()" on that mapping that doesn't actually have any pages in it. I'm hoping that nobody actually has any workflow that cares, and the info leak is real. We may have to do something different if it turns out that people have valid reasons to want the old semantics, and if we can limit the information leak sanely. Cc: Kevin Easton <kevin@guarana.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Masatake YAMATO <yamato@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
Linus Torvalds authored
Commit 594cc251 ("make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'") broke both alpha and SH booting in qemu, as noticed by Guenter Roeck. It turns out that the bug wasn't actually in that commit itself (which would have been surprising: it was mostly a no-op), but in how the addition of access_ok() to the strncpy_from_user() and strnlen_user() functions now triggered the case where those functions would test the access of the very last byte of the user address space. The string functions actually did that user range test before too, but they did it manually by just comparing against user_addr_max(). But with user_access_begin() doing the check (using "access_ok()"), it now exposed problems in the architecture implementations of that function. For example, on alpha, the access_ok() helper macro looked like this: #define __access_ok(addr, size) \ ((get_fs().seg & (addr | size | (addr+size))) == 0) and what it basically tests is of any of the high bits get set (the USER_DS masking value is 0xfffffc0000000000). And that's completely wrong for the "addr+size" check. Because it's off-by-one for the case where we check to the very end of the user address space, which is exactly what the strn*_user() functions do. Why? Because "addr+size" will be exactly the size of the address space, so trying to access the last byte of the user address space will fail the __access_ok() check, even though it shouldn't. As a result, the user string accessor functions failed consistently - because they literally don't know how long the string is going to be, and the max access is going to be that last byte of the user address space. Side note: that alpha macro is buggy for another reason too - it re-uses the arguments twice. And SH has another version of almost the exact same bug: #define __addr_ok(addr) \ ((unsigned long __force)(addr) < current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg) so far so good: yes, a user address must be below the limit. But then: #define __access_ok(addr, size) \ (__addr_ok((addr) + (size))) is wrong with the exact same off-by-one case: the case when "addr+size" is exactly _equal_ to the limit is actually perfectly fine (think "one byte access at the last address of the user address space") The SH version is actually seriously buggy in another way: it doesn't actually check for overflow, even though it did copy the _comment_ that talks about overflow. So it turns out that both SH and alpha actually have completely buggy implementations of access_ok(), but they happened to work in practice (although the SH overflow one is a serious serious security bug, not that anybody likely cares about SH security). This fixes the problems by using a similar macro on both alpha and SH. It isn't trying to be clever, the end address is based on this logic: unsigned long __ao_end = __ao_a + __ao_b - !!__ao_b; which basically says "add start and length, and then subtract one unless the length was zero". We can't subtract one for a zero length, or we'd just hit an underflow instead. For a lot of access_ok() users the length is a constant, so this isn't actually as expensive as it initially looks. Reported-and-tested-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscryptLinus Torvalds authored
Pull fscrypt updates from Ted Ts'o: "Add Adiantum support for fscrypt" * tag 'fscrypt_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt: fscrypt: add Adiantum support
-
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4Linus Torvalds authored
Pull ext4 bug fixes from Ted Ts'o: "Fix a number of ext4 bugs" * tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4: ext4: fix special inode number checks in __ext4_iget() ext4: track writeback errors using the generic tracking infrastructure ext4: use ext4_write_inode() when fsyncing w/o a journal ext4: avoid kernel warning when writing the superblock to a dead device ext4: fix a potential fiemap/page fault deadlock w/ inline_data ext4: make sure enough credits are reserved for dioread_nolock writes
-
git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mappingLinus Torvalds authored
Pull dma-mapping fixes from Christoph Hellwig: "Fix various regressions introduced in this cycles: - fix dma-debug tracking for the map_page / map_single consolidatation - properly stub out DMA mapping symbols for !HAS_DMA builds to avoid link failures - fix AMD Gart direct mappings - setup the dma address for no kernel mappings using the remap allocator" * tag 'dma-mapping-4.21-1' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping: dma-direct: fix DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING for remapped allocations x86/amd_gart: fix unmapping of non-GART mappings dma-mapping: remove a few unused exports dma-mapping: properly stub out the DMA API for !CONFIG_HAS_DMA dma-mapping: remove dmam_{declare,release}_coherent_memory dma-mapping: implement dmam_alloc_coherent using dmam_alloc_attrs dma-mapping: implement dma_map_single_attrs using dma_map_page_attrs
-
Linus Torvalds authored
Merge tag 'tag-chrome-platform-for-v4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bleung/chrome-platform Pull chrome platform updates from Benson Leung: - Changes for EC_MKBP_EVENT_SENSOR_FIFO handling. - Also, maintainership changes. Olofj out, Enric balletbo in. * tag 'tag-chrome-platform-for-v4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bleung/chrome-platform: MAINTAINERS: add maintainers for ChromeOS EC sub-drivers MAINTAINERS: platform/chrome: Add Enric as a maintainer MAINTAINERS: platform/chrome: remove myself as maintainer platform/chrome: don't report EC_MKBP_EVENT_SENSOR_FIFO as wakeup platform/chrome: straighten out cros_ec_get_{next,host}_event() error codes
-
git://github.com/andersson/remoteprocLinus Torvalds authored
Pull hwspinlock updates from Bjorn Andersson: "This adds support for the hardware semaphores found in STM32MP1" * tag 'hwlock-v4.21' of git://github.com/andersson/remoteproc: hwspinlock: fix return value check in stm32_hwspinlock_probe() hwspinlock: add STM32 hwspinlock device dt-bindings: hwlock: Document STM32 hwspinlock bindings
-
- Jan 06, 2019
-
-
Eric Biggers authored
Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
-
git://git.lwn.net/linuxLinus Torvalds authored
Pull documentation fixes from Jonathan Corbet: "A handful of late-arriving documentation fixes" * tag 'docs-5.0-fixes' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: doc: filesystems: fix bad references to nonexistent ext4.rst file Documentation/admin-guide: update URL of LKML information link Docs/kernel-api.rst: Remove blk-tag.c reference
-