- Aug 08, 2021
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Pravin B Shelar authored
[ Upstream commit a17ad096 ] In some cases skb head could be locked and entire header data is pulled from skb. When skb_zerocopy() called in such cases, following BUG is triggered. This patch fixes it by copying entire skb in such cases. This could be optimized incase this is performance bottleneck. ---8<--- kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2961! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Tainted: G OE 5.4.0-77-generic #86-Ubuntu Hardware name: OpenStack Foundation OpenStack Nova, BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:skb_zerocopy+0x37a/0x3a0 RSP: 0018:ffffbcc70013ca38 EFLAGS: 00010246 Call Trace: <IRQ> queue_userspace_packet+0x2af/0x5e0 [openvswitch] ovs_dp_upcall+0x3d/0x60 [openvswitch] ovs_dp_process_packet+0x125/0x150 [openvswitch] ovs_vport_receive+0x77/0xd0 [openvswitch] netdev_port_receive+0x87/0x130 [openvswitch] netdev_frame_hook+0x4b/0x60 [openvswitch] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x2b4/0xc90 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x3f/0xa0 __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60 process_backlog+0xa9/0x160 net_rx_action+0x142/0x390 __do_softirq+0xe1/0x2d6 irq_exit+0xae/0xb0 do_IRQ+0x5a/0xf0 common_interrupt+0xf/0xf Code that triggered BUG: int skb_zerocopy(struct sk_buff *to, struct sk_buff *from, int len, int hlen) { int i, j = 0; int plen = 0; /* length of skb->head fragment */ int ret; struct page *page; unsigned int offset; BUG_ON(!from->head_frag && !hlen); Signed-off-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@ovn.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Oder Chiou authored
[ Upstream commit 6a503e1c ] While using the DMIC recording, the garbled data will be captured by the DMIC. It is caused by the critical power of PLL closed in the jack detect function. Signed-off-by: Oder Chiou <oder_chiou@realtek.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210716085853.20170-1-oder_chiou@realtek.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Jia He authored
[ Upstream commit 6206b798 ] Liajian reported a bug_on hit on a ThunderX2 arm64 server with FastLinQ QL41000 ethernet controller: BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/0:4/531/0x00000200 [qed_probe:488()]hw prepare failed kernel BUG at mm/vmalloc.c:2355! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 531 Comm: kworker/0:4 Tainted: G W 5.4.0-77-generic #86-Ubuntu pstate: 00400009 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO) Call trace: vunmap+0x4c/0x50 iounmap+0x48/0x58 qed_free_pci+0x60/0x80 [qed] qed_probe+0x35c/0x688 [qed] __qede_probe+0x88/0x5c8 [qede] qede_probe+0x60/0xe0 [qede] local_pci_probe+0x48/0xa0 work_for_cpu_fn+0x24/0x38 process_one_work+0x1d0/0x468 worker_thread+0x238/0x4e0 kthread+0xf0/0x118 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 In this case, qed_hw_prepare() returns error due to hw/fw error, but in theory work queue should be in process context instead of interrupt. The root cause might be the unpaired spin_{un}lock_bh() in _qed_mcp_cmd_and_union(), which causes botton half is disabled incorrectly. Reported-by: Lijian Zhang <Lijian.Zhang@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jia He <justin.he@arm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Takashi Iwai authored
[ Upstream commit 9c23aa51 ] rtl8152_close() takes the refcount via usb_autopm_get_interface() but it doesn't release when RTL8152_UNPLUG test hits. This may lead to the imbalance of PM refcount. This patch addresses it. Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1186194 Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Kyle Russell authored
[ Upstream commit 9cf76a72 ] These are backwards from Table 7-71 of the TLV320AIC3100 spec [1]. This was broken in 12eb4d66 when BCLK_MASTER and WCLK_MASTER were converted from 0x08 and 0x04 to BIT(2) and BIT(3), respectively. -#define AIC31XX_BCLK_MASTER 0x08 -#define AIC31XX_WCLK_MASTER 0x04 +#define AIC31XX_BCLK_MASTER BIT(2) +#define AIC31XX_WCLK_MASTER BIT(3) Probably just a typo since the defines were not listed in bit order. [1] https://www.ti.com/lit/gpn/tlv320aic3100 Signed-off-by: Kyle Russell <bkylerussell@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210622010941.241386-1-bkylerussell@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Alain Volmat authored
[ Upstream commit e4a5c198 ] In case of Full-Duplex mode, DXP flag is set when RXP and TXP flags are set. But to avoid 2 different handlings, just add TXP and RXP flag in the mask instead of DXP, and then keep the initial handling of TXP and RXP events. Also rephrase comment about EOTIE which is one of the interrupt enable bits. It is not triggered by any event. Signed-off-by: Amelie Delaunay <amelie.delaunay@foss.st.com> Signed-off-by: Alain Volmat <alain.volmat@foss.st.com> Reviewed-by: Amelie Delaunay <amelie.delaunay@foss.st.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1625042723-661-3-git-send-email-alain.volmat@foss.st.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Axel Lin authored
[ Upstream commit 6549c46a ] For linear regulators, the n_voltages should be (max - min) / step + 1. Buck voltage from 1v to 3V, per step 100mV, and vout mask is 0x1f. If value is from 20 to 31, the voltage will all be fixed to 3V. And LDO also, just vout range is different from 1.2v to 3v, step is the same. If value is from 18 to 31, the voltage will also be fixed to 3v. Signed-off-by: Axel Lin <axel.lin@ingics.com> Reviewed-by: ChiYuan Huang <cy_huang@richtek.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210627080418.1718127-1-axel.lin@ingics.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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ChiYuan Huang authored
[ Upstream commit 2b6a761b ] Fix wrong mask for strobe-polarity-high. Signed-off-by: ChiYuan Huang <cy_huang@richtek.com> In-reply-to: <CAFRkauB=0KwrJW19nJTTagdHhBR=V2R8YFWG3R3oVXt=rBRsqw@mail.gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Axel Lin <axel.lin@ingics.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1624723112-26653-1-git-send-email-u0084500@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Filipe Manana authored
[ Upstream commit ecc64fab ] When checking if we need to log the new name of a renamed inode, we are checking if the inode and its parent inode have been logged before, and if not we don't log the new name. The check however is buggy, as it directly compares the logged_trans field of the inodes versus the ID of the current transaction. The problem is that logged_trans is a transient field, only stored in memory and never persisted in the inode item, so if an inode was logged before, evicted and reloaded, its logged_trans field is set to a value of 0, meaning the check will return false and the new name of the renamed inode is not logged. If the old parent directory was previously fsynced and we deleted the logged directory entries corresponding to the old name, we end up with a log that when replayed will delete the renamed inode. The following example triggers the problem: $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc $ mount /dev/sdc /mnt $ mkdir /mnt/A $ mkdir /mnt/B $ echo -n "hello world" > /mnt/A/foo $ sync # Add some new file to A and fsync directory A. $ touch /mnt/A/bar $ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/A # Now trigger inode eviction. We are only interested in triggering # eviction for the inode of directory A. $ echo 2 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches # Move foo from directory A to directory B. # This deletes the directory entries for foo in A from the log, and # does not add the new name for foo in directory B to the log, because # logged_trans of A is 0, which is less than the current transaction ID. $ mv /mnt/A/foo /mnt/B/foo # Now make an fsync to anything except A, B or any file inside them, # like for example create a file at the root directory and fsync this # new file. This syncs the log that contains all the changes done by # previous rename operation. $ touch /mnt/baz $ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/baz <power fail> # Mount the filesystem and replay the log. $ mount /dev/sdc /mnt # Check the filesystem content. $ ls -1R /mnt /mnt/: A B baz /mnt/A: bar /mnt/B: $ # File foo is gone, it's neither in A/ nor in B/. Fix this by using the inode_logged() helper at btrfs_log_new_name(), which safely checks if an inode was logged before in the current transaction. A test case for fstests will follow soon. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Filipe Manana authored
[ Upstream commit de53d892 ] When we are doing a rename or a link operation for an inode that was logged in the previous transaction and that transaction is still committing, we have a time window where we incorrectly consider that the inode was logged previously in the current transaction and therefore decide to log it to update it in the log. The following steps give an example on how this happens during a link operation: 1) Inode X is logged in transaction 1000, so its logged_trans field is set to 1000; 2) Task A starts to commit transaction 1000; 3) The state of transaction 1000 is changed to TRANS_STATE_UNBLOCKED; 4) Task B starts a link operation for inode X, and as a consequence it starts transaction 1001; 5) Task A is still committing transaction 1000, therefore the value stored at fs_info->last_trans_committed is still 999; 6) Task B calls btrfs_log_new_name(), it reads a value of 999 from fs_info->last_trans_committed and because the logged_trans field of inode X has a value of 1000, the function does not return immediately, instead it proceeds to logging the inode, which should not happen because the inode was logged in the previous transaction (1000) and not in the current one (1001). This is not a functional problem, just wasted time and space logging an inode that does not need to be logged, contributing to higher latency for link and rename operations. So fix this by comparing the inodes' logged_trans field with the generation of the current transaction instead of comparing with the value stored in fs_info->last_trans_committed. This case is often hit when running dbench for a long enough duration, as it does lots of rename operations. This patch belongs to a patch set that is comprised of the following patches: btrfs: fix race causing unnecessary inode logging during link and rename btrfs: fix race that results in logging old extents during a fast fsync btrfs: fix race that causes unnecessary logging of ancestor inodes btrfs: fix race that makes inode logging fallback to transaction commit btrfs: fix race leading to unnecessary transaction commit when logging inode btrfs: do not block inode logging for so long during transaction commit Performance results are mentioned in the change log of the last patch. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Faith Ekstrand authored
commit 3761baae upstream. This reverts commit 9e31c1fe . Ever since that commit, we've been having issues where a hang in one client can propagate to another. In particular, a hang in an app can propagate to the X server which causes the whole desktop to lock up. Error propagation along fences sound like a good idea, but as your bug shows, surprising consequences, since propagating errors across security boundaries is not a good thing. What we do have is track the hangs on the ctx, and report information to userspace using RESET_STATS. That's how arb_robustness works. Also, if my understanding is still correct, the EIO from execbuf is when your context is banned (because not recoverable or too many hangs). And in all these cases it's up to userspace to figure out what is all impacted and should be reported to the application, that's not on the kernel to guess and automatically propagate. What's more, we're also building more features on top of ctx error reporting with RESET_STATS ioctl: Encrypted buffers use the same, and the userspace fence wait also relies on that mechanism. So it is the path going forward for reporting gpu hangs and resets to userspace. So all together that's why I think we should just bury this idea again as not quite the direction we want to go to, hence why I think the revert is the right option here. For backporters: Please note that you _must_ have a backport of https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/20210602164149.391653-2-jason@jlekstrand.net/ for otherwise backporting just this patch opens up a security bug. v2: Augment commit message. Also restore Jason's sob that I accidentally lost. v3: Add a note for backporters Signed-off-by: Jason Ekstrand <jason@jlekstrand.net> Reported-by: Marcin Slusarz <marcin.slusarz@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+ Cc: Jason Ekstrand <jason.ekstrand@intel.com> Cc: Marcin Slusarz <marcin.slusarz@intel.com> Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/3080 Fixes: 9e31c1fe ("drm/i915: Propagate errors on awaiting already signaled fences") Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Reviewed-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210714193419.1459723-3-jason@jlekstrand.net (cherry picked from commit 93a2711c ) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Faith Ekstrand authored
commit c9d9fdbc upstream. This reverts 686c7c35 ("drm/i915/gem: Asynchronous cmdparser"). The justification for this commit in the git history was a vague comment about getting it out from under the struct_mutex. While this may improve perf for some workloads on Gen7 platforms where we rely on the command parser for features such as indirect rendering, no numbers were provided to prove such an improvement. It claims to closed two gitlab/bugzilla issues but with no explanation whatsoever as to why or what bug it's fixing. Meanwhile, by moving command parsing off to an async callback, it leaves us with a problem of what to do on error. When things were synchronous, EXECBUFFER2 would fail with an error code if parsing failed. When moving it to async, we needed another way to handle that error and the solution employed was to set an error on the dma_fence and then trust that said error gets propagated to the client eventually. Moving back to synchronous will help us untangle the fence error propagation mess. This also reverts most of 0edbb9ba ("drm/i915: Move cmd parser pinning to execbuffer") which is a refactor of some of our allocation paths for asynchronous parsing. Now that everything is synchronous, we don't need it. v2 (Daniel Vetter): - Add stabel Cc and Fixes tag Signed-off-by: Jason Ekstrand <jason@jlekstrand.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+ Fixes: 9e31c1fe ("drm/i915: Propagate errors on awaiting already signaled fences") Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jon Bloomfield <jon.bloomfield@intel.com> Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210714193419.1459723-2-jason@jlekstrand.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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- Aug 04, 2021
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210802134339.023067817@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Fox Chen <foxhlchen@gmail.com> Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@denx.de> Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk> Tested-by: Rudi Heitbaum <rudi@heitbaum.com> Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Tested-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot@huawei.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Oleksij Rempel authored
commit 0c71437d upstream. The j1939_session_deactivate() is decrementing the session ref-count and potentially can free() the session. This would cause use-after-free situation. However, the code calling j1939_session_deactivate() does always hold another reference to the session, so that it would not be free()ed in this code path. This patch adds a comment to make this clear and a WARN_ON, to ensure that future changes will not violate this requirement. Further this patch avoids dereferencing the session pointer as a precaution to avoid use-after-free if the session is actually free()ed. Fixes: 9d71dd0c ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210714111602.24021-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Reported-by: Xiaochen Zou <xzou017@ucr.edu> Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Lukasz Cieplicki authored
commit dc614c46 upstream. In case of PHY type error occurs, the message was too generic. Add additional info to PHY type error indicating that it can be wrong cable connected. Fixes: 124ed15b ("i40e: Add dual speed module support") Signed-off-by: Lukasz Cieplicki <lukaszx.cieplicki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Maloszewski <michal.maloszewski@intel.com> Tested-by: Tony Brelinski <tonyx.brelinski@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo authored
commit 9bac1bd6 upstream. This makes 'perf top' abort in some cases, and the right fix will involve surgery that is too much to do at this stage, so revert for now and fix it in the next merge window. This reverts commit 2d6b74ba . Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Srikar Dronamraju authored
commit 333cf507 upstream. With commit c9f34013 ("powerpc: Always enable queued spinlocks for 64s, disable for others") CONFIG_PPC_QUEUED_SPINLOCKS is always enabled on ppc64le, external modules that use spinlock APIs are failing. ERROR: modpost: GPL-incompatible module XXX.ko uses GPL-only symbol 'shared_processor' Before the above commit, modules were able to build without any issues. Also this problem is not seen on other architectures. This problem can be workaround if CONFIG_UNINLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK is enabled in the config. However CONFIG_UNINLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK is not enabled by default and only enabled in certain conditions like CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCKS is set in the kernel config. #include <linux/module.h> spinlock_t spLock; static int __init spinlock_test_init(void) { spin_lock_init(&spLock); spin_lock(&spLock); spin_unlock(&spLock); return 0; } static void __exit spinlock_test_exit(void) { printk("spinlock_test unloaded\n"); } module_init(spinlock_test_init); module_exit(spinlock_test_exit); MODULE_DESCRIPTION ("spinlock_test"); MODULE_LICENSE ("non-GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR ("Srikar Dronamraju"); Given that spin locks are one of the basic facilities for module code, this effectively makes it impossible to build/load almost any non GPL modules on ppc64le. This was first reported at https://github.com/openzfs/zfs/issues/11172 Currently shared_processor is exported as GPL only symbol. Fix this for parity with other architectures by exposing shared_processor to non-GPL modules too. Fixes: 14c73bd3 ("powerpc/vcpu: Assume dedicated processors as non-preempt") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+ Reported-by: <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210729060449.292780-1-srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Steve French authored
commit f2a26a3c upstream. readpage was calculating the offset of the page incorrectly for the case of large swapcaches. loff_t offset = (loff_t)page->index << PAGE_SHIFT; As pointed out by Matthew Wilcox, this needs to use page_file_offset() to calculate the offset instead. Pages coming from the swap cache have page->index set to their index within the swapcache, not within the backing file. For a sufficiently large swapcache, we could have overlapping values of page->index within the same backing file. Suggested by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.7+ Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Daniel Borkmann authored
commit e042aa53 upstream. In 7fedb63a ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask") we narrowed the offset mask for unprivileged pointer arithmetic in order to mitigate a corner case where in the speculative domain it is possible to advance, for example, the map value pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of- bounds in order to leak kernel memory via side-channel to user space. The verifier's state pruning for scalars leaves one corner case open where in the first verification path R_x holds an unknown scalar with an aux->alu_limit of e.g. 7, and in a second verification path that same register R_x, here denoted as R_x', holds an unknown scalar which has tighter bounds and would thus satisfy range_within(R_x, R_x') as well as tnum_in(R_x, R_x') for state pruning, yielding an aux->alu_limit of 3: Given the second path fits the register constraints for pruning, the final generated mask from aux->alu_limit will remain at 7. While technically not wrong for the non-speculative domain, it would however be possible to craft similar cases where the mask would be too wide as in 7fedb63a . One way to fix it is to detect the presence of unknown scalar map pointer arithmetic and force a deeper search on unknown scalars to ensure that we do not run into a masking mismatch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Lorenz Bauer authored
commit c9e73e3d upstream. func_states_equal makes a very short lived allocation for idmap, probably because it's too large to fit on the stack. However the function is called quite often, leading to a lot of alloc / free churn. Replace the temporary allocation with dedicated scratch space in struct bpf_verifier_env. Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210429134656.122225-4-lmb@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Daniel Borkmann authored
commit 59089a18 upstream. Follow-up to fe9a5ca7 ("bpf: Do not mark insn as seen under speculative path verification"). The sanitize_insn_aux_data() helper does not serve a particular purpose in today's code. The original intention for the helper was that if function-by-function verification fails, a given program would be cleared from temporary insn_aux_data[], and then its verification would be re-attempted in the context of the main program a second time. However, a failure in do_check_subprogs() will skip do_check_main() and propagate the error to the user instead, thus such situation can never occur. Given its interaction is not compatible to the Spectre v1 mitigation (due to comparing aux->seen with env->pass_cnt), just remove sanitize_insn_aux_data() to avoid future bugs in this area. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 2039f26f ] Spectre v4 gadgets make use of memory disambiguation, which is a set of techniques that execute memory access instructions, that is, loads and stores, out of program order; Intel's optimization manual, section 2.4.4.5: A load instruction micro-op may depend on a preceding store. Many microarchitectures block loads until all preceding store addresses are known. The memory disambiguator predicts which loads will not depend on any previous stores. When the disambiguator predicts that a load does not have such a dependency, the load takes its data from the L1 data cache. Eventually, the prediction is verified. If an actual conflict is detected, the load and all succeeding instructions are re-executed. af86ca4e ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") tried to mitigate this attack by sanitizing the memory locations through preemptive "fast" (low latency) stores of zero prior to the actual "slow" (high latency) store of a pointer value such that upon dependency misprediction the CPU then speculatively executes the load of the pointer value and retrieves the zero value instead of the attacker controlled scalar value previously stored at that location, meaning, subsequent access in the speculative domain is then redirected to the "zero page". The sanitized preemptive store of zero prior to the actual "slow" store is done through a simple ST instruction based on r10 (frame pointer) with relative offset to the stack location that the verifier has been tracking on the original used register for STX, which does not have to be r10. Thus, there are no memory dependencies for this store, since it's only using r10 and immediate constant of zero; hence af86ca4e /assumed/ a low latency operation. However, a recent attack demonstrated that this mitigation is not sufficient since the preemptive store of zero could also be turned into a "slow" store and is thus bypassed as well: [...] // r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar) // r7 = pointer to map value 31: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2 // r9 will remain "fast" register, r10 will become "slow" register below 32: (bf) r9 = r10 // JIT maps BPF reg to x86 reg: // r9 -> r15 (callee saved) // r10 -> rbp // train store forward prediction to break dependency link between both r9 // and r10 by evicting them from the predictor's LRU table. 33: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24576) 34: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0 35: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24580) 36: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0 37: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24584) 38: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0 39: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24588) 40: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0 [...] 543: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596) 544: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0 // prepare call to bpf_ringbuf_output() helper. the latter will cause rbp // to spill to stack memory while r13/r14/r15 (all callee saved regs) remain // in hardware registers. rbp becomes slow due to push/pop latency. below is // disasm of bpf_ringbuf_output() helper for better visual context: // // ffffffff8117ee20: 41 54 push r12 // ffffffff8117ee22: 55 push rbp // ffffffff8117ee23: 53 push rbx // ffffffff8117ee24: 48 f7 c1 fc ff ff ff test rcx,0xfffffffffffffffc // ffffffff8117ee2b: 0f 85 af 00 00 00 jne ffffffff8117eee0 <-- jump taken // [...] // ffffffff8117eee0: 49 c7 c4 ea ff ff ff mov r12,0xffffffffffffffea // ffffffff8117eee7: 5b pop rbx // ffffffff8117eee8: 5d pop rbp // ffffffff8117eee9: 4c 89 e0 mov rax,r12 // ffffffff8117eeec: 41 5c pop r12 // ffffffff8117eeee: c3 ret 545: (18) r1 = map[id:4] 547: (bf) r2 = r7 548: (b7) r3 = 0 549: (b7) r4 = 4 550: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_output#194288 // instruction 551 inserted by verifier \ 551: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here // storing map value pointer r7 at fp-16 | since value of r10 is "slow". 552: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 / // following "fast" read to the same memory location, but due to dependency // misprediction it will speculatively execute before insn 551/552 completes. 553: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r9 -16) // in speculative domain contains attacker controlled r2. in non-speculative // domain this contains r7, and thus accesses r7 +0 below. 554: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) // leak r3 As can be seen, the current speculative store bypass mitigation which the verifier inserts at line 551 is insufficient since /both/, the write of the zero sanitation as well as the map value pointer are a high latency instruction due to prior memory access via push/pop of r10 (rbp) in contrast to the low latency read in line 553 as r9 (r15) which stays in hardware registers. Thus, architecturally, fp-16 is r7, however, microarchitecturally, fp-16 can still be r2. Initial thoughts to address this issue was to track spilled pointer loads from stack and enforce their load via LDX through r10 as well so that /both/ the preemptive store of zero /as well as/ the load use the /same/ register such that a dependency is created between the store and load. However, this option is not sufficient either since it can be bypassed as well under speculation. An updated attack with pointer spill/fills now _all_ based on r10 would look as follows: [...] // r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar) // r7 = pointer to map value [...] // longer store forward prediction training sequence than before. 2062: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25588) 2063: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30708) = r0 2064: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25592) 2065: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30712) = r0 2066: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596) 2067: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0 // store the speculative load address (scalar) this time after the store // forward prediction training. 2068: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2 // preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores. 2069: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0 2070: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0 2071: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0 2072: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0 2073: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29712) = r0 2074: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29716) = r0 2075: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29720) = r0 2076: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29724) = r0 2077: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29728) = r0 2078: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29732) = r0 2079: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29736) = r0 2080: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29740) = r0 2081: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29744) = r0 2082: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29748) = r0 2083: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29752) = r0 2084: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29756) = r0 2085: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29760) = r0 2086: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29764) = r0 2087: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29768) = r0 2088: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29772) = r0 2089: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29776) = r0 2090: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29780) = r0 2091: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29784) = r0 2092: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29788) = r0 2093: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29792) = r0 2094: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0 2095: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0 2096: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0 2097: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0 2098: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0 // overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; same as before, also including the // sanitation store with 0 from the current mitigation by the verifier. 2099: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here 2100: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 | since store unit is still busy. // load from stack intended to bypass stores. 2101: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 2102: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) // leak r3 [...] Looking at the CPU microarchitecture, the scheduler might issue loads (such as seen in line 2101) before stores (line 2099,2100) because the load execution units become available while the store execution unit is still busy with the sequence of dummy stores (line 2069-2098). And so the load may use the prior stored scalar from r2 at address r10 -16 for speculation. The updated attack may work less reliable on CPU microarchitectures where loads and stores share execution resources. This concludes that the sanitizing with zero stores from af86ca4e ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") is insufficient. Moreover, the detection of stack reuse from af86ca4e where previously data (STACK_MISC) has been written to a given stack slot where a pointer value is now to be stored does not have sufficient coverage as precondition for the mitigation either; for several reasons outlined as follows: 1) Stack content from prior program runs could still be preserved and is therefore not "random", best example is to split a speculative store bypass attack between tail calls, program A would prepare and store the oob address at a given stack slot and then tail call into program B which does the "slow" store of a pointer to the stack with subsequent "fast" read. From program B PoV such stack slot type is STACK_INVALID, and therefore also must be subject to mitigation. 2) The STACK_SPILL must not be coupled to register_is_const(&stack->spilled_ptr) condition, for example, the previous content of that memory location could also be a pointer to map or map value. Without the fix, a speculative store bypass is not mitigated in such precondition and can then lead to a type confusion in the speculative domain leaking kernel memory near these pointer types. While brainstorming on various alternative mitigation possibilities, we also stumbled upon a retrospective from Chrome developers [0]: [...] For variant 4, we implemented a mitigation to zero the unused memory of the heap prior to allocation, which cost about 1% when done concurrently and 4% for scavenging. Variant 4 defeats everything we could think of. We explored more mitigations for variant 4 but the threat proved to be more pervasive and dangerous than we anticipated. For example, stack slots used by the register allocator in the optimizing compiler could be subject to type confusion, leading to pointer crafting. Mitigating type confusion for stack slots alone would have required a complete redesign of the backend of the optimizing compiler, perhaps man years of work, without a guarantee of completeness. [...] From BPF side, the problem space is reduced, however, options are rather limited. One idea that has been explored was to xor-obfuscate pointer spills to the BPF stack: [...] // preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores. [...] 2106: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0 2107: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0 2108: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0 2109: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0 2110: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0 // overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; xored with random 'secret' value // of 943576462 before store ... 2111: (b4) w11 = 943576462 2112: (af) r11 ^= r7 2113: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r11 2114: (79) r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 2115: (b4) w2 = 943576462 2116: (af) r2 ^= r11 // ... and restored with the same 'secret' value with the help of AX reg. 2117: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) [...] While the above would not prevent speculation, it would make data leakage infeasible by directing it to random locations. In order to be effective and prevent type confusion under speculation, such random secret would have to be regenerated for each store. The additional complexity involved for a tracking mechanism that prevents jumps such that restoring spilled pointers would not get corrupted is not worth the gain for unprivileged. Hence, the fix in here eventually opted for emitting a non-public BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC instruction which the x86 JIT translates into a lfence opcode. Inserting the latter in between the store and load instruction is one of the mitigations options [1]. The x86 instruction manual notes: [...] An LFENCE that follows an instruction that stores to memory might complete before the data being stored have become globally visible. [...] The latter meaning that the preceding store instruction finished execution and the store is at minimum guaranteed to be in the CPU's store queue, but it's not guaranteed to be in that CPU's L1 cache at that point (globally visible). The latter would only be guaranteed via sfence. So the load which is guaranteed to execute after the lfence for that local CPU would have to rely on store-to-load forwarding. [2], in section 2.3 on store buffers says: [...] For every store operation that is added to the ROB, an entry is allocated in the store buffer. This entry requires both the virtual and physical address of the target. Only if there is no free entry in the store buffer, the frontend stalls until there is an empty slot available in the store buffer again. Otherwise, the CPU can immediately continue adding subsequent instructions to the ROB and execute them out of order. On Intel CPUs, the store buffer has up to 56 entries. [...] One small upside on the fix is that it lifts constraints from af86ca4e where the sanitize_stack_off relative to r10 must be the same when coming from different paths. The BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC gets emitted after a BPF_STX or BPF_ST instruction. This happens either when we store a pointer or data value to the BPF stack for the first time, or upon later pointer spills. The former needs to be enforced since otherwise stale stack data could be leaked under speculation as outlined earlier. For non-x86 JITs the BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC mapping is currently optimized away, but others could emit a speculation barrier as well if necessary. For real-world unprivileged programs e.g. generated by LLVM, pointer spill/fill is only generated upon register pressure and LLVM only tries to do that for pointers which are not used often. The program main impact will be the initial BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC sanitation for the STACK_INVALID case when the first write to a stack slot occurs e.g. upon map lookup. In future we might refine ways to mitigate the latter cost. [0] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.05178.pdf [1] https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2018/05/21/analysis-and-mitigation-of-speculative-store-bypass-cve-2018-3639/ [2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.05725.pdf Fixes: af86ca4e ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") Fixes: f7cf25b2 ("bpf: track spill/fill of constants") Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit f5e81d11 ] In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF nospec instruction /either/ to a machine instruction which emits a speculation barrier /or/ to /no/ machine instruction in case the underlying architecture is not affected by Speculative Store Bypass or has different mitigations in place already. This covers both x86 and (implicitly) arm64: In case of x86, we use 'lfence' instruction for mitigation. In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any additional instructions here (hence only comment in arm64 JIT). Other archs can follow as needed. The BPF nospec instruction is specifically targeting Spectre v4 since i) we don't use a serialization barrier for the Spectre v1 case, and ii) mitigation instructions for v1 and v4 might be different on some archs. The BPF nospec is required for a future commit, where the BPF verifier does annotate intermediate BPF programs with speculation barriers. Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Dan Carpenter authored
[ Upstream commit f6b3c784 ] The hi3110_cmd() is supposed to return zero on success and negative error codes on failure, but it was accidentally declared as a u8 when it needs to be an int type. Fixes: 57e83fb9 ("can: hi311x: Add Holt HI-311x CAN driver") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210729141246.GA1267@kili Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Wang Hai authored
[ Upstream commit 89fb62fd ] Replace pci_enable_device() with pcim_enable_device(), pci_disable_device() and pci_release_regions() will be called in release automatically. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Wang Hai authored
[ Upstream commit 76a16be0 ] Replace pci_enable_device() with pcim_enable_device(), pci_disable_device() and pci_release_regions() will be called in release automatically. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Marcelo Ricardo Leitner authored
[ Upstream commit 557fb586 ] As Ben Hutchings noticed, this check should have been inverted: the call returns true in case of success. Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Fixes: 0c5dc070 ("sctp: validate from_addr_param return") Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Dima Chumak authored
[ Upstream commit b1c2f631 ] The result of __dev_get_by_index() is not checked for NULL and then gets dereferenced immediately. Also, __dev_get_by_index() must be called while holding either RTNL lock or @dev_base_lock, which isn't satisfied by mlx5e_hairpin_get_mdev() or its callers. This makes the underlying hlist_for_each_entry() loop not safe, and can have adverse effects in itself. Fix by using dev_get_by_index() and handling nullptr return value when ifindex device is not found. Update mlx5e_hairpin_get_mdev() callers to check for possible PTR_ERR() result. Fixes: 77ab67b7 ("net/mlx5e: Basic setup of hairpin object") Addresses-Coverity: ("Dereference null return value") Signed-off-by: Dima Chumak <dchumak@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Maor Gottlieb authored
[ Upstream commit 8b54874e ] Fix a bug when flow table is created in priority that already has other flow tables as shown in the below diagram. If the new flow table (FT-B) has the lowest level in the priority, we need to connect the flow tables from the previous priority (p0) to this new table. In addition when this flow table is destroyed (FT-B), we need to connect the flow tables from the previous priority (p0) to the next level flow table (FT-C) in the same priority of the destroyed table (if exists). --------- |root_ns| --------- | -------------------------------- | | | ---------- ---------- --------- |p(prio)-x| | p-y | | p-n | ---------- ---------- --------- | | ---------------- ------------------ |ns(e.g bypass)| |ns(e.g. kernel) | ---------------- ------------------ | | | ------- ------ ---- | p0 | | p1 | |p2| ------- ------ ---- | | \ -------- ------- ------ | FT-A | |FT-B | |FT-C| -------- ------- ------ Fixes: f90edfd2 ("net/mlx5_core: Connect flow tables") Signed-off-by: Maor Gottlieb <maorg@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Cong Wang authored
[ Upstream commit 8063e184 ] sk_psock_destroy() is a RCU callback, I can't see any reason why it could be used outside. Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Cc: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210127221501.46866-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Bjorn Andersson authored
[ Upstream commit f9a39932 ] Some bootloaders set the widebus enable bit in the INTF_CONFIG register, but configuration of widebus isn't yet supported ensure that the register has a known value, with widebus disabled. Fixes: c943b494 ("drm/msm/dp: add displayPort driver support") Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722024434.3313167-1-bjorn.andersson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Robert Foss authored
[ Upstream commit b910a020 ] The downstream dts lists this value as 0x494, and not 0x45c. Fixes: af776a3e ("drm/msm/dpu: add SM8250 to hw catalog") Signed-off-by: Robert Foss <robert.foss@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@somainline.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210628085033.9905-1-robert.foss@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Pavel Skripkin authored
[ Upstream commit c7c9d210 ] Syzbot reported skb_over_panic() in llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). The problem was in wrong LCC header manipulations. Syzbot's reproducer tries to send XID packet. llc_ui_sendmsg() is doing following steps: 1. skb allocation with size = len + header size len is passed from userpace and header size is 3 since addr->sllc_xid is set. 2. skb_reserve() for header_len = 3 3. filling all other space with memcpy_from_msg() Ok, at this moment we have fully loaded skb, only headers needs to be filled. Then code comes to llc_sap_action_send_xid_c(). This function pushes 3 bytes for LLC PDU header and initializes it. Then comes llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). It initalizes next 3 bytes *AFTER* LLC PDU header and call skb_push(skb, 3). This looks wrong for 2 reasons: 1. Bytes rigth after LLC header are user data, so this function was overwriting payload. 2. skb_push(skb, 3) call can cause skb_over_panic() since all free space was filled in llc_ui_sendmsg(). (This can happen is user passed 686 len: 686 + 14 (eth header) + 3 (LLC header) = 703. SKB_DATA_ALIGN(703) = 704) So, in this patch I added 2 new private constansts: LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID and LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID. LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID is used to correctly reserve header size to handle LLC + XID case. LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID is used by llc_pdu_header_init() function to push 6 bytes instead of 3. And finally I removed skb_push() call from llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). This changes should not affect other parts of LLC, since after all steps we just transmit buffer. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-and-tested-by: <syzbot+5e5a981ad7cc54c4b2b4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
[ Upstream commit 0a31df68 ] MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK MSR is part of interrupt based asynchronous page fault interface and not the original (deprecated) KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF. This is stated in Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst. Fixes: 66570e96 ("kvm: x86: only provide PV features if enabled in guest's CPUID") Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Message-Id: <20210722123018.260035-1-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Jiapeng Chong authored
[ Upstream commit 7e4960b3 ] The error code is missing in this code scenario, add the error code '-EINVAL' to the return value 'err'. Eliminate the follow smatch warning: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/main.c:3538 mlx4_load_one() warn: missing error code 'err'. Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Fixes: 7ae0e400 ("net/mlx4_core: Flexible (asymmetric) allocation of EQs and MSI-X vectors for PF/VFs") Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Geetha sowjanya authored
[ Upstream commit 69f0aeb1 ] In the existing code while changing the number of TX/RX queues using ethtool the PF/VF interface resources are freed and reallocated (otx2_stop and otx2_open is called) if the device is in running state. If any resource allocation fails in otx2_open, driver free already allocated resources and return. But again, when the number of queues changes as the device state still running oxt2_stop is called. In which we try to free already freed resources leading to driver crash. This patch fixes the issue by setting the INTF_DOWN flag on error and free the resources in otx2_stop only if the flag is not set. Fixes: 50fe6c02 ("octeontx2-pf: Register and handle link notifications") Signed-off-by: Geetha sowjanya <gakula@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: Sunil Kovvuri Goutham <Sunil.Goutham@cavium.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Xin Long authored
[ Upstream commit 3cf4375a ] One skb's skb_shinfo frags are not writable, and they can be shared with other skbs' like by pskb_copy(). To write the frags may cause other skb's data crash. So before doing en/decryption, skb_cow_data() should always be called for a cloned or nonlinear skb if req dst is using the same sg as req src. While at it, the likely branch can be removed, as it will be covered by skb_cow_data(). Note that esp_input() has the same issue, and I will fix it in another patch. tipc_aead_encrypt() doesn't have this issue, as it only processes linear data in the unlikely branch. Fixes: fc1b6d6d ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication") Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Shannon Nelson authored
[ Upstream commit f07f9815 ] Be sure to count the csum_none cases when csum offload is enabled. Fixes: 0f3154e6 ("ionic: Add Tx and Rx handling") Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Shannon Nelson authored
[ Upstream commit 76ed8a4a ] We need to count the correct Tx and/or Rx packets for dynamic interrupt moderation, depending on which we're processing on the queue interrupt. Fixes: 04a83459 ("ionic: dynamic interrupt moderation") Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Shannon Nelson authored
[ Upstream commit a6ff85e0 ] Move the interrupt coalesce value update out of the napi thread and into the dim_work thread and set it only when it has actually changed. Fixes: 04a83459 ("ionic: dynamic interrupt moderation") Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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