firmware: google: check if size is valid when decoding VPD data
The VPD implementation from Chromium Vital Product Data project used to parse data from untrusted input without checking if the meta data is invalid or corrupted. For example, the size from decoded content may be negative value, or larger than whole input buffer. Such invalid data may cause buffer overflow. To fix that, the size parameters passed to vpd_decode functions should be changed to unsigned integer (u32) type, and the parsing of entry header should be refactored so every size field is correctly verified before starting to decode. Fixes: ad2ac9d5 ("firmware: Google VPD: import lib_vpd source files") Signed-off-by:Hung-Te Lin <hungte@chromium.org> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Reviewed-by:
Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830022402.214442-1-hungte@chromium.org Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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