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Commit 3a847af8 authored by Mark Brown's avatar Mark Brown Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
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arm64: Always force a branch protection mode when the compiler has one

commit b8fdef31 upstream.

Compilers with branch protection support can be configured to enable it by
default, it is likely that distributions will do this as part of deploying
branch protection system wide. As well as the slight overhead from having
some extra NOPs for unused branch protection features this can cause more
serious problems when the kernel is providing pointer authentication to
userspace but not built for pointer authentication itself. In that case our
switching of keys for userspace can affect the kernel unexpectedly, causing
pointer authentication instructions in the kernel to corrupt addresses.

To ensure that we get consistent and reliable behaviour always explicitly
initialise the branch protection mode, ensuring that the kernel is built
the same way regardless of the compiler defaults.

[This is a reworked version of b8fdef31 ("arm64: Always
force a branch protection mode when the compiler has one") for backport.
Kernels prior to 74afda40 ("arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth
return address signing") don't have any Makefile machinery for forcing
on pointer auth but still have issues if the compiler defaults it on so
need this reworked version. -- broonie]

Fixes: 75031975

 (arm64: add basic pointer authentication support)
Reported-by: default avatarSzabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: remove Kconfig option in favour of Makefile check]
Signed-off-by: default avatarCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent a39f676c
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