xprtrdma: Invalidate in the RPC reply handler
There is a window between the time the RPC reply handler wakes the waiting RPC task and when xprt_release() invokes ops->buf_free. During this time, memory regions containing the data payload may still be accessed by a broken or malicious server, but the RPC application has already been allowed access to the memory containing the RPC request's data payloads. The server should be fenced from client memory containing RPC data payloads _before_ the RPC application is allowed to continue. This change also more strongly enforces send queue accounting. There is a maximum number of RPC calls allowed to be outstanding. When an RPC/RDMA transport is set up, just enough send queue resources are allocated to handle registration, Send, and invalidation WRs for each those RPCs at the same time. Before, additional RPC calls could be dispatched while invalidation WRs were still consuming send WQEs. When invalidation WRs backed up, dispatching additional RPCs resulted in a send queue overrun. Now, the reply handler prevents RPC dispatch until invalidation is complete. This prevents RPC call dispatch until there are enough send queue resources to proceed. Still to do: If an RPC exits early (say, ^C), the reply handler has no opportunity to perform invalidation. Currently, xprt_rdma_free() still frees remaining RDMA resources, which could deadlock. Additional changes are needed to handle invalidation properly in this case. Reported-by:Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> Signed-off-by:
Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Tested-by:
Devesh Sharma <devesh.sharma@avagotech.com> Signed-off-by:
Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
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