Commit b4bfec7f authored by Seth Forshee's avatar Seth Forshee Committed by Mimi Zohar
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security/integrity: Harden against malformed xattrs



In general the handling of IMA/EVM xattrs is good, but I found
a few locations where either the xattr size or the value of the
type field in the xattr are not checked. Add a few simple checks
to these locations to prevent malformed or malicious xattrs from
causing problems.

Signed-off-by: default avatarSeth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
parent 5465d02a
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+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static bool init_keyring __initdata;
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
			    const char *digest, int digestlen)
{
	if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX)
	if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX || siglen < 2)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (!keyring[id]) {
+4 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
	/* check value type */
	switch (xattr_data->type) {
	case EVM_XATTR_HMAC:
		if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) {
			evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
			goto out;
		}
		rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
				   xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
		if (rc)
+4 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
				 int xattr_len)
{
	struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
	enum hash_algo ret;

	if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2)
		/* return default hash algo */
@@ -143,7 +144,9 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
		return sig->hash_algo;
		break;
	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
		return xattr_value->digest[0];
		ret = xattr_value->digest[0];
		if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST)
			return ret;
		break;
	case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
		/* this is for backward compatibility */