Commit f9fab3d9 authored by Maurizio Lombardi's avatar Maurizio Lombardi Committed by Martin K. Petersen
Browse files

scsi: target: iscsi: rename some variables to avoid confusion. 

This patch renames some variables in chap_server_compute_hash() to make it
harder to confuse the initiator's challenge with the target's challenge
when the mutual chap authentication is used.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191017131037.9903-4-mlombard@redhat.com


Signed-off-by: default avatarMaurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMartin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
parent 19f5f88e

drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c

+20 −20
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -215,8 +215,8 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( 
	unsigned long id;

	unsigned char id_as_uchar;

	unsigned char type;

	unsigned char identifier[10], *challenge = NULL;

	unsigned char *challenge_binhex = NULL;

	unsigned char identifier[10], *initiatorchg = NULL;

	unsigned char *initiatorchg_binhex = NULL;

	unsigned char *digest = NULL;

	unsigned char *response = NULL;

	unsigned char *client_digest = NULL;
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( 
	struct iscsi_chap *chap = conn->auth_protocol;

	struct crypto_shash *tfm = NULL;

	struct shash_desc *desc = NULL;

	int auth_ret = -1, ret, challenge_len;

	int auth_ret = -1, ret, initiatorchg_len;



	digest = kzalloc(chap->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);

	if (!digest) {
@@ -256,15 +256,15 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( 
	memset(chap_n, 0, MAX_CHAP_N_SIZE);

	memset(chap_r, 0, MAX_RESPONSE_LENGTH);



	challenge = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);

	if (!challenge) {

	initiatorchg = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);

	if (!initiatorchg) {

		pr_err("Unable to allocate challenge buffer\n");

		goto out;

	}



	challenge_binhex = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);

	if (!challenge_binhex) {

		pr_err("Unable to allocate challenge_binhex buffer\n");

	initiatorchg_binhex = kzalloc(CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);

	if (!initiatorchg_binhex) {

		pr_err("Unable to allocate initiatorchg_binhex buffer\n");

		goto out;

	}

	/*
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( 
	 * Get CHAP_C.

	 */

	if (extract_param(nr_in_ptr, "CHAP_C", CHAP_CHALLENGE_STR_LEN,

			challenge, &type) < 0) {

			initiatorchg, &type) < 0) {

		pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n");

		goto out;

	}
@@ -408,28 +408,28 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( 
		pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n");

		goto out;

	}

	challenge_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(strlen(challenge), 2);

	if (!challenge_len) {

	initiatorchg_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(strlen(initiatorchg), 2);

	if (!initiatorchg_len) {

		pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n");

		goto out;

	}

	if (challenge_len > 1024) {

	if (initiatorchg_len > 1024) {

		pr_err("CHAP_C exceeds maximum binary size of 1024 bytes\n");

		goto out;

	}

	if (hex2bin(challenge_binhex, challenge, challenge_len) < 0) {

	if (hex2bin(initiatorchg_binhex, initiatorchg, initiatorchg_len) < 0) {

		pr_err("Malformed CHAP_C\n");

		goto out;

	}

	pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", challenge);

	pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", initiatorchg);

	/*

	 * During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the

	 * initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by

	 * the target.

	 */

	if (challenge_len == chap->challenge_len &&

				!memcmp(challenge_binhex, chap->challenge,

				challenge_len)) {

	if (initiatorchg_len == chap->challenge_len &&

				!memcmp(initiatorchg_binhex, chap->challenge,

				initiatorchg_len)) {

		pr_err("initiator CHAP_C matches target CHAP_C, failing"

		       " login attempt\n");

		goto out;
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( 
	/*

	 * Convert received challenge to binary hex.

	 */

	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, challenge_binhex, challenge_len,

	ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, initiatorchg_binhex, initiatorchg_len,

				 digest);

	if (ret < 0) {

		pr_err("crypto_shash_finup() failed for ma challenge\n");
@@ -487,8 +487,8 @@ static int chap_server_compute_hash( 
	kzfree(desc);

	if (tfm)

		crypto_free_shash(tfm);

	kfree(challenge);

	kfree(challenge_binhex);

	kfree(initiatorchg);

	kfree(initiatorchg_binhex);

	kfree(digest);

	kfree(response);

	kfree(server_digest);