bluetooth: Perform careful capability checks in hci_sock_ioctl()

mainline inclusion
from mainline-v6.4-rc1
commit 25c150ac
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6WHKQ
CVE: CVE-2023-2002

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit?id=25c150ac103a4ebeed0319994c742a90634ddf18



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Previously, capability was checked using capable(), which verified that the
caller of the ioctl system call had the required capability. In addition,
the result of the check would be stored in the HCI_SOCK_TRUSTED flag,
making it persistent for the socket.

However, malicious programs can abuse this approach by deliberately sharing
an HCI socket with a privileged task. The HCI socket will be marked as
trusted when the privileged task occasionally makes an ioctl call.

This problem can be solved by using sk_capable() to check capability, which
ensures that not only the current task but also the socket opener has the
specified capability, thus reducing the risk of privilege escalation
through the previously identified vulnerability.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f81f5b2d ("Bluetooth: Send control open and close messages for HCI raw sockets")
Signed-off-by: Ruihan Li <lrh2000@pku.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Jian <liujian56@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang <wangweiyang2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>