!1931 Backport 5.10.173 LTS patches from upstream.

KernelVersion:	4.0

Description:	Default output terminal descriptors

		All attributes read only:

		All attributes read only except bSourceID:

		==============	=============================================

		iTerminal	index of string descriptor

 memory.swappiness		     set/show swappiness parameter of vmscan

				     (See sysctl's vm.swappiness)

 memory.move_charge_at_immigrate     set/show controls of moving charges

                                     This knob is deprecated and shouldn't be

                                     used.

 memory.oom_control		     set/show oom controls.

 memory.numa_stat		     show the number of memory usage per numa

				     node

       It is recommended to set the soft limit always below the hard limit,

       otherwise the hard limit will take precedence.

8. Move charges at task migration

=================================

8. Move charges at task migration (DEPRECATED!)

===============================================

THIS IS DEPRECATED!

It's expensive and unreliable! It's better practice to launch workload

tasks directly from inside their target cgroup. Use dedicated workload

cgroups to allow fine-grained policy adjustments without having to

move physical pages between control domains.

Users can move charges associated with a task along with task migration, that

is, uncharge task's pages from the old cgroup and charge them to the new cgroup.

   On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,

   cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.

   On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. Enhanced

   IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.

   On CPUs with hardware mitigation for Spectre variant 2 (e.g. IBRS

   or enhanced IBRS on x86), retpoline is automatically disabled at run time.

   Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at

   boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against

   Spectre v2 variant attacks, including cross-thread branch target injections

   on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, eIBRS enables STIBP too.

   Legacy IBRS systems clear the IBRS bit on exit to userspace and

   therefore explicitly enable STIBP for that

   The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable

   CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator

   For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, individual user programs

   can be compiled with return trampolines for indirect branches.

   This protects them from consuming poisoned entries in the branch

   target buffer left by malicious software.  Alternatively, the

   programs can disable their indirect branch speculation via prctl()

   (See :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).

   target buffer left by malicious software.

   On legacy IBRS systems, at return to userspace, implicit STIBP is disabled

   because the kernel clears the IBRS bit. In this case, the userspace programs

   can disable indirect branch speculation via prctl() (See

   :ref:`Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst <set_spec_ctrl>`).

   On x86, this will turn on STIBP to guard against attacks from the

   sibling thread when the user program is running, and use IBPB to

   flush the branch target buffer when switching to/from the program.

			set var $prev_flags = $info->flags

		end

		set var $id = ($id + 1) & $id_mask

		if ($id == $end_id)

			loop_break

		end

		set var $id = ($id + 1) & $id_mask

	end

end

document dmesg

  this mode. In this case, you should build the kernel with

  CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE disabled if the architecture supports KASLR.

- Build the gdb scripts (required on kernels v5.1 and above)::

    make scripts_gdb

- Enable the gdb stub of QEMU/KVM, either

    - at VM startup time by appending "-s" to the QEMU command line