Merge branch 'fixes' into next (e1ab9a73) · Commits · EulixOS / Software / Kernel

arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c

+2 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -2697,8 +2697,10 @@ static int kvmppc_core_vcpu_create_hv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
		HFSCR_DSCR \| HFSCR_VECVSX \| HFSCR_FP \| HFSCR_PREFIX;
		if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)) {
		vcpu->arch.hfscr &= mfspr(SPRN_HFSCR);
		#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
		if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_P9_TM_HV_ASSIST))
		vcpu->arch.hfscr \|= HFSCR_TM;
		#endif
		}
		if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM_COMP))
		vcpu->arch.hfscr \|= HFSCR_TM;

+20 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -302,6 +302,9 @@ long kvmhv_enter_nested_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
		if (vcpu->kvm->arch.l1_ptcr == 0)
		return H_NOT_AVAILABLE;

		if (MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(vcpu->arch.shregs.msr))
		return H_BAD_MODE;

		/* copy parameters in */
		hv_ptr = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 4);
		regs_ptr = kvmppc_get_gpr(vcpu, 5);
		@@ -322,6 +325,23 @@ long kvmhv_enter_nested_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
		if (l2_hv.vcpu_token >= NR_CPUS)
		return H_PARAMETER;

		/*
		* L1 must have set up a suspended state to enter the L2 in a
		* transactional state, and only in that case. These have to be
		* filtered out here to prevent causing a TM Bad Thing in the
		* host HRFID. We could synthesize a TM Bad Thing back to the L1
		* here but there doesn't seem like much point.
		*/
		if (MSR_TM_SUSPENDED(vcpu->arch.shregs.msr)) {
		if (!MSR_TM_ACTIVE(l2_regs.msr))
		return H_BAD_MODE;
		} else {
		if (l2_regs.msr & MSR_TS_MASK)
		return H_BAD_MODE;
		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.shregs.msr & MSR_TS_MASK))
		return H_BAD_MODE;
		}

		/* translate lpid */
		l2 = kvmhv_get_nested(vcpu->kvm, l2_hv.lpid, true);
		if (!l2)

+22 −3

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -317,6 +317,9 @@ int kvmhv_vcpu_entry_p9(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit, unsigned long lpc
		*/
		mtspr(SPRN_HDEC, hdec);

		#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
		tm_return_to_guest:
		#endif
		mtspr(SPRN_DAR, vcpu->arch.shregs.dar);
		mtspr(SPRN_DSISR, vcpu->arch.shregs.dsisr);
		mtspr(SPRN_SRR0, vcpu->arch.shregs.srr0);
		@@ -415,11 +418,23 @@ int kvmhv_vcpu_entry_p9(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit, unsigned long lpc
		* is in real suspend mode and is trying to transition to
		* transactional mode.
		*/
		if (local_paca->kvm_hstate.fake_suspend &&
		if (!local_paca->kvm_hstate.fake_suspend &&
		(vcpu->arch.shregs.msr & MSR_TS_S)) {
		if (kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early(vcpu)) {
		/* Prevent it being handled again. */
		trap = 0;
		/*
		* Go straight back into the guest with the
		* new NIP/MSR as set by TM emulation.
		*/
		mtspr(SPRN_HSRR0, vcpu->arch.regs.nip);
		mtspr(SPRN_HSRR1, vcpu->arch.shregs.msr);

		/*
		* tm_return_to_guest re-loads SRR0/1, DAR,
		* DSISR after RI is cleared, in case they had
		* been clobbered by a MCE.
		*/
		__mtmsrd(0, 1); /* clear RI */
		goto tm_return_to_guest;
		}
		}
		#endif
		@@ -499,6 +514,10 @@ int kvmhv_vcpu_entry_p9(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 time_limit, unsigned long lpc
		* If we are in real mode, only switch MMU on after the MMU is
		* switched to host, to avoid the P9_RADIX_PREFETCH_BUG.
		*/
		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM) &&
		vcpu->arch.shregs.msr & MSR_TS_MASK)
		msr \|= MSR_TS_S;

		__mtmsrd(msr, 0);

		end_timing(vcpu);

+22 −3

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -242,6 +242,17 @@ int kvmppc_rtas_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
		* value so we can restore it on the way out.
		*/
		orig_rets = args.rets;
		if (be32_to_cpu(args.nargs) >= ARRAY_SIZE(args.args)) {
		/*
		* Don't overflow our args array: ensure there is room for
		* at least rets[0] (even if the call specifies 0 nret).
		*
		* Each handler must then check for the correct nargs and nret
		* values, but they may always return failure in rets[0].
		*/
		rc = -EINVAL;
		goto fail;
		}
		args.rets = &args.args[be32_to_cpu(args.nargs)];

		mutex_lock(&vcpu->kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock);
		@@ -269,9 +280,17 @@ int kvmppc_rtas_hcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
		fail:
		/*
		* We only get here if the guest has called RTAS with a bogus
		* args pointer. That means we can't get to the args, and so we
		* can't fail the RTAS call. So fail right out to userspace,
		* which should kill the guest.
		* args pointer or nargs/nret values that would overflow the
		* array. That means we can't get to the args, and so we can't
		* fail the RTAS call. So fail right out to userspace, which
		* should kill the guest.
		*
		* SLOF should actually pass the hcall return value from the
		* rtas handler call in r3, so enter_rtas could be modified to
		* return a failure indication in r3 and we could return such
		* errors to the guest rather than failing to host userspace.
		* However old guests that don't test for failure could then
		* continue silently after errors, so for now we won't do this.
		*/
		return rc;
		}

+2 −2

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -2048,9 +2048,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
		{
		struct kvm_enable_cap cap;
		r = -EFAULT;
		vcpu_load(vcpu);
		if (copy_from_user(&cap, argp, sizeof(cap)))
		goto out;
		vcpu_load(vcpu);
		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_enable_cap(vcpu, &cap);
		vcpu_put(vcpu);
		break;
		@@ -2074,9 +2074,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,
		case KVM_DIRTY_TLB: {
		struct kvm_dirty_tlb dirty;
		r = -EFAULT;
		vcpu_load(vcpu);
		if (copy_from_user(&dirty, argp, sizeof(dirty)))
		goto out;
		vcpu_load(vcpu);
		r = kvm_vcpu_ioctl_dirty_tlb(vcpu, &dirty);
		vcpu_put(vcpu);
		break;