Commit ce48ee81 authored by Fabio M. De Francesco's avatar Fabio M. De Francesco Committed by Jonathan Corbet
Browse files

admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst 



Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of
making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered
untrusted".

Suggested-by: default avatarVineeth Pillai <Vineeth.Pillai@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarFabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJoel Fernandes (Google) <joelaf@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210721190250.26095-1-fmdefrancesco@gmail.com


Signed-off-by: default avatarJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
parent b426d9d7

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst

+6 −4
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -181,10 +181,12 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve 
--------------------------------------------------------

1. For MDS

~~~~~~~~~~

Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in

user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks

which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such

attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).

Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings

running in user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all

siblings run tasks which trust each other, when the kernel is executing

code on behalf of a task, it cannot trust the code running in the

sibling. Such attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes

(host or guest mode).



2. For L1TF

~~~~~~~~~~~