Commit b27a9f41 authored by Daniel Kiss's avatar Daniel Kiss Committed by Will Deacon
Browse files

arm64: Add ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config option



This patch add the ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config and deals with the
build aspect of it.

Userspace support has no dependency on the toolchain therefore all
toolchain checks and build flags are controlled the new config
option.
The default config behavior will not be changed.

Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Kiss <daniel.kiss@arm.com>
Acked-by: default avatarWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210613092632.93591-2-daniel.kiss@arm.com


Signed-off-by: default avatarWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
parent c4681547
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+19 −14
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1481,12 +1481,6 @@ menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features"
config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
	bool "Enable support for pointer authentication"
	default y
	depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC
	# Modern compilers insert a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC
	# which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1.
	depends on LD_IS_LLD || LD_VERSION >= 23301 || (CC_IS_GCC && GCC_VERSION < 90100)
	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || AS_HAS_CFI_NEGATE_RA_STATE
	depends on (!FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS)
	help
	  Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides
	  instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret
@@ -1498,13 +1492,6 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
	  for each process at exec() time, with these keys being
	  context-switched along with the process.

	  If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or
	  -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option
	  will also cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address
	  protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to
	  support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be
	  disabled with minimal loss of protection.

	  The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
	  hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it
	  be enabled.
@@ -1515,6 +1502,24 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
	  but with the feature disabled. On such a system, this option should
	  not be selected.

config ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL
	bool
	default y
	depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH
	depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC
	# Modern compilers insert a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC
	# which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1.
	depends on LD_IS_LLD || LD_VERSION >= 23301 || (CC_IS_GCC && GCC_VERSION < 90100)
	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || AS_HAS_CFI_NEGATE_RA_STATE
	depends on (!FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS)
	help
	  If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or
	  -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option
	  will cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address
	  protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to
	  support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be
	  disabled with minimal loss of protection.

	  This feature works with FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER option only if
	  DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS is enabled.

@@ -1606,7 +1611,7 @@ config ARM64_BTI_KERNEL
	bool "Use Branch Target Identification for kernel"
	default y
	depends on ARM64_BTI
	depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH
	depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL
	depends on CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET_BTI
	# https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94697
	depends on !CC_IS_GCC || GCC_VERSION >= 100100
+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ endif
# off, this will be overridden if we are using branch protection.
branch-prot-flags-y += $(call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none)

ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y)
ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL),y)
branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all
# We enable additional protection for leaf functions as there is some
# narrow potential for ROP protection benefits and no substantial
+2 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ int main(void)
  DEFINE(THREAD_SCTLR_USER,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.sctlr_user));
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
  DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user));
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL
  DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_kernel));
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE
+3 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ void lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
static noinline void change_pac_parameters(void)
{
	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH)) {
	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL)) {
		/* Reset the keys of current task */
		ptrauth_thread_init_kernel(current);
		ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel(current);
@@ -477,8 +477,8 @@ noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC(void)
#define CORRUPT_PAC_ITERATE	10
	int i;

	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH))
		pr_err("FAIL: kernel not built with CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH\n");
	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL))
		pr_err("FAIL: kernel not built with CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL\n");

	if (!system_supports_address_auth()) {
		pr_err("FAIL: CPU lacks pointer authentication feature\n");