Commit 8cb37a59 authored by Marco Elver's avatar Marco Elver Committed by Kees Cook
Browse files

stack: Introduce CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET



The randomize_kstack_offset feature is unconditionally compiled in when
the architecture supports it.

To add constraints on compiler versions, we require a dedicated Kconfig
variable. Therefore, introduce RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET.

Furthermore, this option is now also configurable by EXPERT kernels:
while the feature is supposed to have zero performance overhead when
disabled, due to its use of static branches, there are few cases where
giving a distribution the option to disable the feature entirely makes
sense. For example, in very resource constrained environments, which
would never enable the feature to begin with, in which case the
additional kernel code size increase would be redundant.

Signed-off-by: default avatarMarco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarNathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: default avatarPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131090521.1947110-1-elver@google.com
parent ae978009
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+18 −5
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1159,16 +1159,29 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
	  to the compiler, so it will attempt to add canary checks regardless
	  of the static branch state.

config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT
	bool "Randomize kernel stack offset on syscall entry"
config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
	bool "Support for randomizing kernel stack offset on syscall entry" if EXPERT
	default y
	depends on HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
	help
	  The kernel stack offset can be randomized (after pt_regs) by
	  roughly 5 bits of entropy, frustrating memory corruption
	  attacks that depend on stack address determinism or
	  cross-syscall address exposures. This feature is controlled
	  by kernel boot param "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", and this
	  config chooses the default boot state.
	  cross-syscall address exposures.

	  The feature is controlled via the "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off"
	  kernel boot param, and if turned off has zero overhead due to its use
	  of static branches (see JUMP_LABEL).

	  If unsure, say Y.

config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT
	bool "Default state of kernel stack offset randomization"
	depends on RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
	help
	  Kernel stack offset randomization is controlled by kernel boot param
	  "randomize_kstack_offset=on/off", and this config chooses the default
	  boot state.

config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
	def_bool n
+5 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H
#define _LINUX_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_H

#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
@@ -50,5 +51,9 @@ void *__builtin_alloca(size_t size);
		raw_cpu_write(kstack_offset, offset);			\
	}								\
} while (0)
#else /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */
#define add_random_kstack_offset()		do { } while (0)
#define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand)	do { } while (0)
#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */

#endif
+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ static void __init mm_init(void)
	pti_init();
}

#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE_RO(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT,
			   randomize_kstack_offset);
DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);