Unverified Commit 7a13eafd authored by openeuler-ci-bot's avatar openeuler-ci-bot Committed by Gitee
Browse files

!1468 Backport 5.10.155 LTS 

Merge Pull Request from: @sanglipeng 
 
Backport 5.10.155 LTS patches from upstream.

Conflicts:

Already merged(3):
cc21dc48a78c: bpf, sockmap: Fix the sk->sk_forward_alloc warning of sk_stream_kill_queues
02f8dfee7580: tcp: prohibit TCP_REPAIR_OPTIONS if data was already sent
0f544353fec8: io_uring: kill goto error handling in io_sqpoll_wait_sq()

Total patches: 97 - 3 = 94 
 
Link:https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/1468

 

Reviewed-by: default avatarJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJialin Zhang <zhangjialin11@huawei.com>
parents 14ab9dd1 c983d6f2

Documentation/virt/kvm/devices/vm.rst

+3 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ KVM_S390_VM_TOD_EXT). 
:Parameters: address of a buffer in user space to store the data (u8) to

:Returns:   -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible from kernel space;

	    -EINVAL if setting the TOD clock extension to != 0 is not supported

	    -EOPNOTSUPP for a PV guest (TOD managed by the ultravisor)



3.2. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_TOD_LOW

-----------------------------------
@@ -224,6 +225,7 @@ the POP (u64). 


:Parameters: address of a buffer in user space to store the data (u64) to

:Returns:    -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible from kernel space

	     -EOPNOTSUPP for a PV guest (TOD managed by the ultravisor)



3.3. ATTRIBUTE: KVM_S390_VM_TOD_EXT

-----------------------------------
@@ -237,6 +239,7 @@ it, it is stored as 0 and not allowed to be set to a value != 0. 
	     (kvm_s390_vm_tod_clock) to

:Returns:   -EFAULT if the given address is not accessible from kernel space;

	    -EINVAL if setting the TOD clock extension to != 0 is not supported

	    -EOPNOTSUPP for a PV guest (TOD managed by the ultravisor)



4. GROUP: KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO

============================

arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c

+34 −18
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -12,6 +12,14 @@ 


#include <asm/efi.h>



static bool region_is_misaligned(const efi_memory_desc_t *md)

{

	if (PAGE_SIZE == EFI_PAGE_SIZE)

		return false;

	return !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr) ||

	       !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT);

}



/*

 * Only regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE need to be

 * executable, everything else can be mapped with the XN bits
@@ -25,14 +33,22 @@ static __init pteval_t create_mapping_protection(efi_memory_desc_t *md) 
	if (type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)

		return PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE;



	if (WARN_ONCE(!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr),

		      "UEFI Runtime regions are not aligned to 64 KB -- buggy firmware?"))

	if (region_is_misaligned(md)) {

		static bool __initdata code_is_misaligned;



		/*

		 * If the region is not aligned to the page size of the OS, we

		 * can not use strict permissions, since that would also affect

		 * the mapping attributes of the adjacent regions.

		 * Regions that are not aligned to the OS page size cannot be

		 * mapped with strict permissions, as those might interfere

		 * with the permissions that are needed by the adjacent

		 * region's mapping. However, if we haven't encountered any

		 * misaligned runtime code regions so far, we can safely use

		 * non-executable permissions for non-code regions.

		 */

		return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);

		code_is_misaligned |= (type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE);



		return code_is_misaligned ? pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC)

					  : pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);

	}



	/* R-- */

	if ((attr & (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO)) ==
@@ -62,19 +78,16 @@ int __init efi_create_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md) 
	bool page_mappings_only = (md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE ||

				   md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);



	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr) ||

	    !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT)) {

	/*

		 * If the end address of this region is not aligned to page

		 * size, the mapping is rounded up, and may end up sharing a

		 * page frame with the next UEFI memory region. If we create

		 * a block entry now, we may need to split it again when mapping

		 * the next region, and support for that is going to be removed

		 * from the MMU routines. So avoid block mappings altogether in

		 * that case.

	 * If this region is not aligned to the page size used by the OS, the

	 * mapping will be rounded outwards, and may end up sharing a page

	 * frame with an adjacent runtime memory region. Given that the page

	 * table descriptor covering the shared page will be rewritten when the

	 * adjacent region gets mapped, we must avoid block mappings here so we

	 * don't have to worry about splitting them when that happens.

	 */

	if (region_is_misaligned(md))

		page_mappings_only = true;

	}



	create_pgd_mapping(mm, md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr,

			   md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
@@ -101,6 +114,9 @@ int __init efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm, 
	BUG_ON(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE &&

	       md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);



	if (region_is_misaligned(md))

		return 0;



	/*

	 * Calling apply_to_page_range() is only safe on regions that are

	 * guaranteed to be mapped down to pages. Since we are only called

arch/mips/kernel/jump_label.c

+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ void arch_jump_label_transform(struct jump_entry *e, 
			 * The branch offset must fit in the instruction's 26

			 * bit field.

			 */

			WARN_ON((offset >= BIT(25)) ||

			WARN_ON((offset >= (long)BIT(25)) ||

				(offset < -(long)BIT(25)));



			insn.j_format.opcode = bc6_op;

arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h

+1 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -470,6 +470,7 @@ extern void *dtb_early_va; 
extern uintptr_t dtb_early_pa;

void setup_bootmem(void);

void paging_init(void);

void misc_mem_init(void);



#define FIRST_USER_ADDRESS  0

arch/riscv/kernel/process.c

+2 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long usp, unsigned long arg, 
{

	struct pt_regs *childregs = task_pt_regs(p);



	memset(&p->thread.s, 0, sizeof(p->thread.s));



	/* p->thread holds context to be restored by __switch_to() */

	if (unlikely(p->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_IO_WORKER))) {

		/* Kernel thread */