Commit 4c9a908c authored by Pawan Gupta's avatar Pawan Gupta Committed by Yongqiang Liu
Browse files

KVM: x86/speculation: Disable Fill buffer clear within guests

stable inclusion
from stable-v4.19.248
commit e0d1437042f0b491bf2cb7880628b0bd7783f80d
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I5D5RS


CVE: CVE-2022-21123,CVE-2022-21125,CVE-2022-21166

--------------------------------

commit 027bbb88 upstream

The enumeration of MD_CLEAR in CPUID(EAX=7,ECX=0).EDX{bit 10} is not an
accurate indicator on all CPUs of whether the VERW instruction will
overwrite fill buffers. FB_CLEAR enumeration in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES{bit 17} covers the case of CPUs that are not
vulnerable to MDS/TAA, indicating that microcode does overwrite fill
buffers.

Guests running in VMM environments may not be aware of all the
capabilities/vulnerabilities of the host CPU. Specifically, a guest may
apply MDS/TAA mitigations when a virtual CPU is enumerated as vulnerable
to MDS/TAA even when the physical CPU is not. On CPUs that enumerate
FB_CLEAR_CTRL the VMM may set FB_CLEAR_DIS to skip overwriting of fill
buffers by the VERW instruction. This is done by setting FB_CLEAR_DIS
during VMENTER and resetting on VMEXIT. For guests that enumerate
FB_CLEAR (explicitly asking for fill buffer clear capability) the VMM
will not use FB_CLEAR_DIS.

Irrespective of guest state, host overwrites CPU buffers before VMENTER
to protect itself from an MMIO capable guest, as part of mitigation for
MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.

Signed-off-by: default avatarPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[cascardo: arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c has been split and context adjustment at
 vmx_vcpu_run]
[cascardo: moved functions so they are after struct vcpu_vmx definition]
[cascardo: fb_clear is disabled/enabled around __vmx_vcpu_run]
Signed-off-by: default avatarThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Conflicts:
            arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
Signed-off-by: default avatarYipeng Zou <zouyipeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarZhang Jianhua <chris.zjh@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarLiao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarYongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13@huawei.com>
parent a7b8a41c
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