x86/sgx: Support loading enclave page without VMA permissions check

mainline inclusion
from mainline-6.0-rc1
commit b3fb517d
category: feature
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/intel-kernel/issues/I5USAM


CVE: NA

Intel-SIG: commit b3fb517d x86/sgx: Support loading enclave page
without VMA permissions check.
Backport for SGX EDMM support.

--------------------------------

sgx_encl_load_page() is used to find and load an enclave page into
enclave (EPC) memory, potentially loading it from the backing storage.
Both usages of sgx_encl_load_page() are during an access to the
enclave page from a VMA and thus the permissions of the VMA are
considered before the enclave page is loaded.

SGX2 functions operating on enclave pages belonging to an initialized
enclave requiring the page to be in EPC. It is thus required to
support loading enclave pages into the EPC independent from a VMA.

Split the current sgx_encl_load_page() to support the two usages:
A new call, sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(), behaves exactly like the
current sgx_encl_load_page() that takes VMA permissions into account,
while sgx_encl_load_page() just loads an enclave page into EPC.

VMA, PTE, and EPCM permissions continue to dictate whether
the pages can be accessed from within an enclave.

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d4393513c1f18987c14a490bcf133bfb71a5dc43.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com


Signed-off-by: Zhiquan Li <zhiquan1.li@intel.com>