Commit 41af3be7 authored by Patrick Bellasi's avatar Patrick Bellasi Committed by Wentao Guan
Browse files

x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit

stable inclusion
from stable-v6.6.80
commit 60ba9b8a5b767d1b33f7dfff1814926412b015b3
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IBXANC

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=60ba9b8a5b767d1b33f7dfff1814926412b015b3



--------------------------------

commit 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e upstream.

In [1] the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags has been redefined for a
better separation of concerns:
 - ENTRY_IBPB     -- issue IBPB on entry only
 - IBPB_ON_VMEXIT -- issue IBPB on VM-Exit only
and the Retbleed mitigations have been updated to match this new
semantics.

Commit [2] was merged shortly before [1], and their interaction was not
handled properly. This resulted in IBPB not being triggered on VM-Exit
in all SRSO mitigation configs requesting an IBPB there.

Specifically, an IBPB on VM-Exit is triggered only when
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is set. However:

 - X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set for "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb",
   because before [1] having X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB was enough. Hence,
   an IBPB is triggered on entry but the expected IBPB on VM-exit is
   not.

 - X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT is not set also when
   "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit" if X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB is
   already set.

   That's because before [1] this was effectively redundant. Hence, e.g.
   a "retbleed=ibpb spec_rstack_overflow=bpb-vmexit" config mistakenly
   reports the machine still vulnerable to SRSO, despite an IBPB being
   triggered both on entry and VM-Exit, because of the Retbleed selected
   mitigation config.

 - UNTRAIN_RET_VM won't still actually do anything unless
   CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY is set.

For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb", enable IBPB on both entry and VM-Exit
and clear X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT which is made superfluous by
X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT. This effectively makes this mitigation
option similar to the one for 'retbleed=ibpb', thus re-order the code
for the RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB option to be less confusing by having
all features enabling before the disabling of the not needed ones.

For "spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit", guard this mitigation setting
with CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY to ensure UNTRAIN_RET_VM sequence is
effectively compiled in. Drop instead the CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO guard,
since none of the SRSO compile cruft is required in this configuration.
Also, check only that the required microcode is present to effectively
enabled the IBPB on VM-Exit.

Finally, update the KConfig description for CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
to list also all SRSO config settings enabled by this guard.

Fixes: 864bcaa3 ("x86/cpu/kvm: Provide UNTRAIN_RET_VM") [1]
Fixes: d893832d ("x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT") [2]
Reported-by: default avatarYosry Ahmed <yosryahmed@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPatrick Bellasi <derkling@google.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 60ba9b8a5b767d1b33f7dfff1814926412b015b3)
Signed-off-by: default avatarWentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
parent eca44e9f
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+2 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -2605,7 +2605,8 @@ config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY
	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
	default y
	help
	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
	  Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb and
	  spec_rstack_overflow={ibpb,ibpb-vmexit} mitigations.

config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
	bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
+14 −7
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1113,6 +1113,8 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)

	case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
		mitigate_smt = true;

		/*
		 * IBPB on entry already obviates the need for
@@ -1122,9 +1124,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);

		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
		mitigate_smt = true;

		/*
		 * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
		 * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
@@ -2626,6 +2625,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
			if (has_microcode) {
				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;

				/*
@@ -2635,6 +2635,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
				 */
				setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
				setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);

				/*
				 * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
				 * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
				 * regardless of IBPB implementation.
				 */
				setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
			}
		} else {
			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
@@ -2643,8 +2650,8 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
		break;

	case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
			if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
			if (has_microcode) {
				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;

@@ -2656,7 +2663,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
				setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
			}
		} else {
			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
			goto pred_cmd;
		}
		break;