Commit 034d9ad2 authored by Eduard Zingerman's avatar Eduard Zingerman Committed by Alexei Starovoitov
Browse files

selftests/bpf: verifier/search_pruning converted to inline assembly



Test verifier/search_pruning automatically converted to use inline assembly.

Signed-off-by: default avatarEduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230421174234.2391278-19-eddyz87@gmail.com


Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
parent 65222842
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Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
#include "verifier_regalloc.skel.h"
#include "verifier_ringbuf.skel.h"
#include "verifier_runtime_jit.skel.h"
#include "verifier_search_pruning.skel.h"
#include "verifier_spill_fill.skel.h"
#include "verifier_stack_ptr.skel.h"
#include "verifier_uninit.skel.h"
@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@ void test_verifier_ref_tracking(void) { RUN(verifier_ref_tracking); }
void test_verifier_regalloc(void)             { RUN(verifier_regalloc); }
void test_verifier_ringbuf(void)              { RUN(verifier_ringbuf); }
void test_verifier_runtime_jit(void)          { RUN(verifier_runtime_jit); }
void test_verifier_search_pruning(void)       { RUN(verifier_search_pruning); }
void test_verifier_spill_fill(void)           { RUN(verifier_spill_fill); }
void test_verifier_stack_ptr(void)            { RUN(verifier_stack_ptr); }
void test_verifier_uninit(void)               { RUN(verifier_uninit); }
+339 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/* Converted from tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/search_pruning.c */

#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include "bpf_misc.h"

#define MAX_ENTRIES 11

struct test_val {
	unsigned int index;
	int foo[MAX_ENTRIES];
};

struct {
	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
	__uint(max_entries, 1);
	__type(key, long long);
	__type(value, struct test_val);
} map_hash_48b SEC(".maps");

struct {
	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
	__uint(max_entries, 1);
	__type(key, long long);
	__type(value, long long);
} map_hash_8b SEC(".maps");

SEC("socket")
__description("pointer/scalar confusion in state equality check (way 1)")
__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 leaks addr as return value")
__retval(POINTER_VALUE)
__naked void state_equality_check_way_1(void)
{
	asm volatile ("					\
	r1 = 0;						\
	*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1;				\
	r2 = r10;					\
	r2 += -8;					\
	r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;				\
	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
	if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=;				\
	r0 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0);				\
	goto l1_%=;					\
l0_%=:	r0 = r10;					\
l1_%=:	goto l2_%=;					\
l2_%=:	exit;						\
"	:
	: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
	  __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
	: __clobber_all);
}

SEC("socket")
__description("pointer/scalar confusion in state equality check (way 2)")
__success __failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 leaks addr as return value")
__retval(POINTER_VALUE)
__naked void state_equality_check_way_2(void)
{
	asm volatile ("					\
	r1 = 0;						\
	*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1;				\
	r2 = r10;					\
	r2 += -8;					\
	r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;				\
	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
	if r0 != 0 goto l0_%=;				\
	r0 = r10;					\
	goto l1_%=;					\
l0_%=:	r0 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0);				\
l1_%=:	exit;						\
"	:
	: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
	  __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
	: __clobber_all);
}

SEC("lwt_in")
__description("liveness pruning and write screening")
__failure __msg("R0 !read_ok")
__naked void liveness_pruning_and_write_screening(void)
{
	asm volatile ("					\
	/* Get an unknown value */			\
	r2 = *(u32*)(r1 + 0);				\
	/* branch conditions teach us nothing about R2 */\
	if r2 >= 0 goto l0_%=;				\
	r0 = 0;						\
l0_%=:	if r2 >= 0 goto l1_%=;				\
	r0 = 0;						\
l1_%=:	exit;						\
"	::: __clobber_all);
}

SEC("socket")
__description("varlen_map_value_access pruning")
__failure __msg("R0 unbounded memory access")
__failure_unpriv __msg_unpriv("R0 leaks addr")
__flag(BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT)
__naked void varlen_map_value_access_pruning(void)
{
	asm volatile ("					\
	r1 = 0;						\
	*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1;				\
	r2 = r10;					\
	r2 += -8;					\
	r1 = %[map_hash_48b] ll;			\
	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
	if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=;				\
	r1 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0);				\
	w2 = %[max_entries];				\
	if r2 s> r1 goto l1_%=;				\
	w1 = 0;						\
l1_%=:	w1 <<= 2;					\
	r0 += r1;					\
	goto l2_%=;					\
l2_%=:	r1 = %[test_val_foo];				\
	*(u64*)(r0 + 0) = r1;				\
l0_%=:	exit;						\
"	:
	: __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
	  __imm_addr(map_hash_48b),
	  __imm_const(max_entries, MAX_ENTRIES),
	  __imm_const(test_val_foo, offsetof(struct test_val, foo))
	: __clobber_all);
}

SEC("tracepoint")
__description("search pruning: all branches should be verified (nop operation)")
__failure __msg("R6 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
__naked void should_be_verified_nop_operation(void)
{
	asm volatile ("					\
	r2 = r10;					\
	r2 += -8;					\
	r1 = 0;						\
	*(u64*)(r2 + 0) = r1;				\
	r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;				\
	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
	if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=;				\
	r3 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0);				\
	if r3 == 0xbeef goto l1_%=;			\
	r4 = 0;						\
	goto l2_%=;					\
l1_%=:	r4 = 1;						\
l2_%=:	*(u64*)(r10 - 16) = r4;				\
	call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];			\
	r5 = *(u64*)(r10 - 16);				\
	if r5 == 0 goto l0_%=;				\
	r6 = 0;						\
	r1 = 0xdead;					\
	*(u64*)(r6 + 0) = r1;				\
l0_%=:	exit;						\
"	:
	: __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns),
	  __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
	  __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
	: __clobber_all);
}

SEC("socket")
__description("search pruning: all branches should be verified (invalid stack access)")
/* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
__success __failure_unpriv
__msg_unpriv("invalid read from stack off -16+0 size 8")
__retval(0)
__naked void be_verified_invalid_stack_access(void)
{
	asm volatile ("					\
	r2 = r10;					\
	r2 += -8;					\
	r1 = 0;						\
	*(u64*)(r2 + 0) = r1;				\
	r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;				\
	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
	if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=;				\
	r3 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0);				\
	r4 = 0;						\
	if r3 == 0xbeef goto l1_%=;			\
	*(u64*)(r10 - 16) = r4;				\
	goto l2_%=;					\
l1_%=:	*(u64*)(r10 - 24) = r4;				\
l2_%=:	call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];			\
	r5 = *(u64*)(r10 - 16);				\
l0_%=:	exit;						\
"	:
	: __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns),
	  __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
	  __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
	: __clobber_all);
}

SEC("tracepoint")
__description("precision tracking for u32 spill/fill")
__failure __msg("R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
__naked void tracking_for_u32_spill_fill(void)
{
	asm volatile ("					\
	r7 = r1;					\
	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];			\
	w6 = 32;					\
	if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=;				\
	w6 = 4;						\
l0_%=:	/* Additional insns to introduce a pruning point. */\
	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];			\
	r3 = 0;						\
	r3 = 0;						\
	if r0 == 0 goto l1_%=;				\
	r3 = 0;						\
l1_%=:	/* u32 spill/fill */				\
	*(u32*)(r10 - 8) = r6;				\
	r8 = *(u32*)(r10 - 8);				\
	/* out-of-bound map value access for r6=32 */	\
	r1 = 0;						\
	*(u64*)(r10 - 16) = r1;				\
	r2 = r10;					\
	r2 += -16;					\
	r1 = %[map_hash_8b] ll;				\
	call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem];			\
	if r0 == 0 goto l2_%=;				\
	r0 += r8;					\
	r1 = *(u32*)(r0 + 0);				\
l2_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
	exit;						\
"	:
	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32),
	  __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem),
	  __imm_addr(map_hash_8b)
	: __clobber_all);
}

SEC("tracepoint")
__description("precision tracking for u32 spills, u64 fill")
__failure __msg("div by zero")
__naked void for_u32_spills_u64_fill(void)
{
	asm volatile ("					\
	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];			\
	r6 = r0;					\
	w7 = 0xffffffff;				\
	/* Additional insns to introduce a pruning point. */\
	r3 = 1;						\
	r3 = 1;						\
	r3 = 1;						\
	r3 = 1;						\
	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];			\
	if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=;				\
	r3 = 1;						\
l0_%=:	w3 /= 0;					\
	/* u32 spills, u64 fill */			\
	*(u32*)(r10 - 4) = r6;				\
	*(u32*)(r10 - 8) = r7;				\
	r8 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8);				\
	/* if r8 != X goto pc+1  r8 known in fallthrough branch */\
	if r8 != 0xffffffff goto l1_%=;			\
	r3 = 1;						\
l1_%=:	/* if r8 == X goto pc+1  condition always true on first\
	 * traversal, so starts backtracking to mark r8 as requiring\
	 * precision. r7 marked as needing precision. r6 not marked\
	 * since it's not tracked.			\
	 */						\
	if r8 == 0xffffffff goto l2_%=;			\
	/* fails if r8 correctly marked unknown after fill. */\
	w3 /= 0;					\
l2_%=:	r0 = 0;						\
	exit;						\
"	:
	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
	: __clobber_all);
}

SEC("socket")
__description("allocated_stack")
__success __msg("processed 15 insns")
__success_unpriv __msg_unpriv("") __log_level(1) __retval(0)
__naked void allocated_stack(void)
{
	asm volatile ("					\
	r6 = r1;					\
	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];			\
	r7 = r0;					\
	if r0 == 0 goto l0_%=;				\
	r0 = 0;						\
	*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r6;				\
	r6 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8);				\
	*(u8*)(r10 - 9) = r7;				\
	r7 = *(u8*)(r10 - 9);				\
l0_%=:	if r0 != 0 goto l1_%=;				\
l1_%=:	if r0 != 0 goto l2_%=;				\
l2_%=:	if r0 != 0 goto l3_%=;				\
l3_%=:	if r0 != 0 goto l4_%=;				\
l4_%=:	exit;						\
"	:
	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
	: __clobber_all);
}

/* The test performs a conditional 64-bit write to a stack location
 * fp[-8], this is followed by an unconditional 8-bit write to fp[-8],
 * then data is read from fp[-8]. This sequence is unsafe.
 *
 * The test would be mistakenly marked as safe w/o dst register parent
 * preservation in verifier.c:copy_register_state() function.
 *
 * Note the usage of BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ to force creation of the
 * checkpoint state after conditional 64-bit assignment.
 */

SEC("socket")
__description("write tracking and register parent chain bug")
/* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
__success __failure_unpriv
__msg_unpriv("invalid read from stack off -8+1 size 8")
__retval(0) __flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
__naked void and_register_parent_chain_bug(void)
{
	asm volatile ("					\
	/* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */			\
	call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];			\
	r6 = r0;					\
	/* r0 = ktime_get_ns() */			\
	call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];			\
	/* if r0 > r6 goto +1 */			\
	if r0 > r6 goto l0_%=;				\
	/* *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0xdeadbeef */		\
	r0 = 0xdeadbeef;				\
	*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r0;				\
l0_%=:	r1 = 42;					\
	*(u8*)(r10 - 8) = r1;				\
	r2 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8);				\
	/* exit(0) */					\
	r0 = 0;						\
	exit;						\
"	:
	: __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
	: __clobber_all);
}

char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+0 −266
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
{
	"pointer/scalar confusion in state equality check (way 1)",
	.insns = {
	BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
	BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
	BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
	BPF_JMP_A(1),
	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10),
	BPF_JMP_A(0),
	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
	},
	.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
	.result = ACCEPT,
	.retval = POINTER_VALUE,
	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 leaks addr as return value"
},
{
	"pointer/scalar confusion in state equality check (way 2)",
	.insns = {
	BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
	BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
	BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_10),
	BPF_JMP_A(1),
	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
	},
	.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
	.result = ACCEPT,
	.retval = POINTER_VALUE,
	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 leaks addr as return value"
},
{
	"liveness pruning and write screening",
	.insns = {
	/* Get an unknown value */
	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 0),
	/* branch conditions teach us nothing about R2 */
	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, 0, 1),
	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_2, 0, 1),
	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
	},
	.errstr = "R0 !read_ok",
	.result = REJECT,
	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN,
},
{
	"varlen_map_value_access pruning",
	.insns = {
	BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
	BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
	BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 8),
	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
	BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_2, MAX_ENTRIES),
	BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, 1),
	BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
	BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_LSH, BPF_REG_1, 2),
	BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JA, 0, 0, 0),
	BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0, offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
	},
	.fixup_map_hash_48b = { 3 },
	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 leaks addr",
	.errstr = "R0 unbounded memory access",
	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
	.result = REJECT,
	.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
},
{
	"search pruning: all branches should be verified (nop operation)",
	.insns = {
		BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
		BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
		BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
		BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
		BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 11),
		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_3, 0xbeef, 2),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
		BPF_JMP_A(1),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 1),
		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -16),
		BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_10, -16),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_5, 0, 2),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_6, 0),
		BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, 0, 0xdead),
		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
	},
	.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
	.errstr = "R6 invalid mem access 'scalar'",
	.result = REJECT,
	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
},
{
	"search pruning: all branches should be verified (invalid stack access)",
	.insns = {
		BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
		BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
		BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
		BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
		BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 8),
		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_3, 0xbeef, 2),
		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -16),
		BPF_JMP_A(1),
		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_4, -24),
		BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_10, -16),
		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
	},
	.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 3 },
	.errstr_unpriv = "invalid read from stack off -16+0 size 8",
	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
	/* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
	.result = ACCEPT,
},
{
	"precision tracking for u32 spill/fill",
	.insns = {
		BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_1),
		BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
		BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_6, 32),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
		BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_6, 4),
		/* Additional insns to introduce a pruning point. */
		BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
		/* u32 spill/fill */
		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, -8),
		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, -8),
		/* out-of-bound map value access for r6=32 */
		BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -16, 0),
		BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
		BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -16),
		BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
		BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 2),
		BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_8),
		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
	},
	.fixup_map_hash_8b = { 15 },
	.result = REJECT,
	.errstr = "R0 min value is outside of the allowed memory range",
	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
},
{
	"precision tracking for u32 spills, u64 fill",
	.insns = {
		BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
		BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0),
		BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_7, 0xffffffff),
		/* Additional insns to introduce a pruning point. */
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 1),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 1),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 1),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 1),
		BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 1),
		BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_DIV, BPF_REG_3, 0),
		/* u32 spills, u64 fill */
		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, -4),
		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, -8),
		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_10, -8),
		/* if r8 != X goto pc+1  r8 known in fallthrough branch */
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_8, 0xffffffff, 1),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 1),
		/* if r8 == X goto pc+1  condition always true on first
		 * traversal, so starts backtracking to mark r8 as requiring
		 * precision. r7 marked as needing precision. r6 not marked
		 * since it's not tracked.
		 */
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_8, 0xffffffff, 1),
		/* fails if r8 correctly marked unknown after fill. */
		BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_DIV, BPF_REG_3, 0),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
	},
	.result = REJECT,
	.errstr = "div by zero",
	.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
},
{
	"allocated_stack",
	.insns = {
		BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_1),
		BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32),
		BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_0),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 5),
		BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_6, -8),
		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_10, -8),
		BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_7, -9),
		BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_10, -9),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
		BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 0),
		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
	},
	.result = ACCEPT,
	.result_unpriv = ACCEPT,
	.insn_processed = 15,
},
/* The test performs a conditional 64-bit write to a stack location
 * fp[-8], this is followed by an unconditional 8-bit write to fp[-8],
 * then data is read from fp[-8]. This sequence is unsafe.
 *
 * The test would be mistakenly marked as safe w/o dst register parent
 * preservation in verifier.c:copy_register_state() function.
 *
 * Note the usage of BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ to force creation of the
 * checkpoint state after conditional 64-bit assignment.
 */
{
	"write tracking and register parent chain bug",
	.insns = {
	/* r6 = ktime_get_ns() */
	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_6, BPF_REG_0),
	/* r0 = ktime_get_ns() */
	BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns),
	/* if r0 > r6 goto +1 */
	BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_6, 1),
	/* *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = 0xdeadbeef */
	BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, -8, 0xdeadbeef),
	/* r1 = 42 */
	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 42),
	/* *(u8 *)(r10 - 8) = r1 */
	BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_B, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_1, -8),
	/* r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) */
	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_FP, -8),
	/* exit(0) */
	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
	},
	.flags = BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ,
	.errstr_unpriv = "invalid read from stack off -8+1 size 8",
	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
	/* in privileged mode reads from uninitialized stack locations are permitted */
	.result = ACCEPT,
},